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Charles v. Amrhein

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Jan 18, 2022
Civil Action 21-cv-1133 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2022)

Opinion

Civil Action 21-cv-1133 Re: ECF 29

01-18-2022

ALLEN L. ST. CHARLES, Plaintiff, v. AMRHEIN; ZELAPOS; T. LANEY; CAPTAIN WISEMAN; EAST; LT. KOSLAWSKI;MAJOR VANCHIERI; ORLANDO HARPER; RUSH; HOLLAND; TOOMEY; BURNS; MS. J. BROWN; and SGT. SARVER, Defendants.


Christy Criswell Wiegand District Judge.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. RECOMMENDATION

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's renewed request for preliminary injunctive relief. ECF No. 29. It is respectfully recommended that the request, construed as a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, be denied as follows.

II. REPORT

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Allen L. St. Charles (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleges the violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the conditions of his confinement at the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”). ECF No. 12-2. The Court has granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered the United States Marshal to serve the Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 10, 14. Service by U.S. Mail was sent on October 26, 2021 and the docket reflects that as of today's date, service has not been returned as undeliverable. ECF No. 25.

Plaintiff previously filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief seeking an order requiring his immediate placement on a cell block away from inmates and guards reported by him to be participants in an institutional drug ring. ECF No. 20. The Court denied the requested relief based on “the absence of facts establishing a likelihood of success as to personal safety or mental health issues, ” or risk of irreparable harm. ECF No. 28.

Plaintiff again seeks the Court's immediate intervention to order officials at the ACJ to maintain his current protective housing placement, to require the provision of additional privileges, and to order changes to his mental health treatment and diagnosis. Plaintiff states his dissatisfaction with his current mental health provider, diagnosis, and treatment, and alleges that various ACJ personnel are retaliating against him for complaining about the conditions of his confinement by calling him names that could place him at risk of harm upon his transfer to another facility. Of relevance to the pending motion, Plaintiff concedes that he is safe, housed alone for his continued safety, and has access to showers, physical exercise, and adequate meals.

As to relief and status quo - I am, at this moment, in cell 12Q on Level 8, Pod E, “The Hole, ” I am PC status, neither RHU or DHU (Restrictive or Disciplinary Housing), my light-switch works, there is only one bunk, I am getting showers and a working tablet and not having to argue over a diet tray each meal with someone else's name on it, my *immediate* physical safety could be no more secure that I know of. There are guards giving out my DOC# and name and telling inmate that I am a snitch, a Satan-worshipper, a child-molester, an aids infected, fag, etc. and I have been told that once I get to prison, “someone is going to walk up to you one day and say, “so-and-so said you're a snitch” and next thing you know you'll be on the ground dying, “I can't get my recreation on this pod because if I let these inmates become familiar with my face, voice, and manner I will be in real danger later. I don't do much physical recreation anyway, so all this I can live with, I know I can't very well sue the ACJ later for failure to protect if I get stabbed in another facility - but the video of my property being disposed of - those same guards are on this pod and part of the rumors, preventing more of the same is a concern, - so if the court will recommend I be left in this cell, as-is, with my (full) property and
communication privileges intact, no more harassing moves, no more trashing my legal notes, stealing my mail, etc. no confiscating my clothing or any further similar ridiculousness, and the complete removal of Thomas Patts from having anything to do with my Mental health Care and removal of the false diagnosis (if possible in this order) from my file -
* * *
Short list: stay in this cell, allowed to buy the same commissary as every other PC inmate, not be subjected to a malicious psychiatrist or have my property taken or trashed repeatedly. Those few things should at least prevent further bad faith action by ACJ staff throughout the duration of this case, if for no other reason than by their demonstration of the Court's willingness to intervene in an inmate's right to Physical and Mental Integrity and Freedom from Reprisal/Intimidation for complaining.
ECF No. 29 at 4-6.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should issue only in limited circumstances. Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014). The Court considers four factors to determine whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction is warranted: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if denied relief; (3) whether the requested relief will cause greater harm to the nonmovant; and (4) whether an injunction would be in the public interest. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). The first two factors are “most critical” to the court's analysis, and the movant cannot succeed if either of these two factors are not established. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). If these first two “gateway factors” are met, the court considers the remaining factors and determines whether all four factors, on balance, weigh in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief. Id.

In resolving Plaintiff's current request for injunctive relief, the Court appreciates the “complex and intractable problems of prison administration, ” and thus “a request for injunctive relief in the prison context calls for caution and judicial restraint.” Brathwaite v. Phelps, 602 Fed.Appx. 847, 849 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)). Further, as relevant to Plaintiff's particular claims, the facts must support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. U.S. v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm; the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm, and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the Court should deny preliminary injunctive relief. Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 655 (3d Cir. 1994).

C. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff again fails to meet his burden for injunctive relief by demonstrating either a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm.

As to the merits, an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim requires both objective and subjective proof. A prisoner must demonstrate that he or she has been subjected to an objectively “serious” deprivation of life's basic needs or a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his or her health and that defendants knew of and were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation or risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Plaintiff concedes that he is now housed in a single cell and is as safe as conditions allow. It is evident that ACJ officials have taken steps to address Plaintiff's safety concerns, including transferring him to a single cell and placing him away from the guards and inmates identified by him in grievances. In addition, while Plaintiff disputes his diagnosis by ACJ's mental health provider, he does not allege facts that his present diagnosis places him at risk of irreparable harm or injury. Similarly, Plaintiff's property related claims do not present risk of irreparable harm given that relief may be afforded pursuant to institutional grievance procedures and state law.

See, e.g., Harris v. Wetzel, 822 Fed.Appx. 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Crosby v. Piazza, 465 Fed.Appx. 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Adequate remedies were available here as Crosby was provided an opportunity to file an administrative grievance. As the District Court correctly noted, to the ... extent Crosby is dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative process, he may still file a state court tort action.”) (citing Hudson v., 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984)); Mattis v. Dohman, 260 Fed.Appx. 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In Pennsylvania, the state prison system has established an internal grievance procedure through which the state hears claims and, when appropriate, provides remedies; Mattis was provided with a meaningful post-deprivation remedy regarding the loss of his property in the form of this grievance system.... Furthermore, Mattis could also have pursued a state tort suit for conversion of property.”) (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535)).

Under these circumstances, Plaintiff does not present facts establishing a likelihood of success as to personal safety, mental health, or property issues, nor the risk of irreparable harm. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority since the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons and the Court, without more, should not interfere in ACJ's housing placement and mental health treatment decisions.

D. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 29, be denied.

In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.


Summaries of

Charles v. Amrhein

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Jan 18, 2022
Civil Action 21-cv-1133 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2022)
Case details for

Charles v. Amrhein

Case Details

Full title:ALLEN L. ST. CHARLES, Plaintiff, v. AMRHEIN; ZELAPOS; T. LANEY; CAPTAIN…

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Jan 18, 2022

Citations

Civil Action 21-cv-1133 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2022)