Opinion
1164 CAF 14-01921
11-13-2015
In the Matter Of CHARLES P., Respondent–Appellant. Monroe County Attorney, Petitioner–Respondent.
Charles Plovanich, Attorney for the Child, Rochester, for Respondent–Appellant. Merideth H. Smith, County Attorney, Rochester (Paul D. Irving of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
Charles Plovanich, Attorney for the Child, Rochester, for Respondent–Appellant.
Merideth H. Smith, County Attorney, Rochester (Paul D. Irving of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:
Respondent appeals from an order adjudicating him to be a juvenile delinquent based on the finding that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute two counts of the crime of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.101, 3 ). We reject respondent's contention that the showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The showup was conducted in temporal and geographic proximity to the crime (see Matter of Jose T., 127 A.D.3d 875, 877, 8 N.Y.S.3d 334; People v. Williams, 118 A.D.3d 1478, 1479, 988 N.Y.S.2d 381, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1090, 1 N.Y.S.3d 16, 25 N.E.3d 353; People v. Kirkland, 49 A.D.3d 1260, 1260–1261, 856 N.Y.S.2d 339, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 961, 863 N.Y.S.2d 145, 893 N.E.2d 451, cert. denied 555 U.S. 1181, 129 S.Ct. 1331, 173 L.Ed.2d 603). The fact that respondent was in handcuffs and accompanied by an officer at the time of the showup did not, by itself, render the procedure unduly suggestive (see Matter of Madeline D., 125 A.D.3d 965, 966, 5 N.Y.S.3d 169; People v. Cooper, 152 A.D.2d 939, 939, 543 N.Y.S.2d 831, lv. denied 74 N.Y.2d 846, 546 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 546 N.E.2d 193; see also Matter of Terron B., 77 A.D.3d 499, 500, 908 N.Y.S.2d 689). In addition, nothing said by the officers was unduly suggestive or otherwise improper (see Matter of Nathaniel W., 121 A.D.3d 407, 407, 993 N.Y.S.2d 311; People v. Jeffries, 125 A.D.2d 412, 412, 509 N.Y.S.2d 131, lv. denied 69 N.Y.2d 882, 515 N.Y.S.2d 1030, 507 N.E.2d 1100).
Although respondent preserved for our review his contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he committed the robbery as a principal, he failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he shared the intent of the actual perpetrators and is culpable as an accomplice (see Matter of Jonathan S., 55 A.D.3d 1324, 1324–1325, 865 N.Y.S.2d 180). In any event, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in the second degree under Penal Law § 160.10(1) and (3). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, established that respondent was one of three perpetrators who forcibly stole personal property from the victim and then entered the victim's vehicle and fled the scene. Respondent “knowingly participated” in the acts and is culpable as an accomplice (People v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 832, 527 N.Y.S.2d 731, 522 N.E.2d 1029; see § 20.00; Matter of Kadeem W., 5 N.Y.3d 864, 867, 808 N.Y.S.2d 130, 842 N.E.2d 15; Matter of Jamal G., 127 A.D.3d 1081, 1082, 7 N.Y.S.3d 500). We further conclude that the court's findings are not against the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Shannon F., 121 A.D.3d 1595, 1596, 994 N.Y.S.2d 227, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 913, 2015 WL 94671; Matter of Isaac J., 109 A.D.3d 1176, 1176, 971 N.Y.S.2d 725; Matter of Shawn D.R.-S., 94 A.D.3d 1544, 1545, 942 N.Y.S.2d 913).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.