Opinion
No. 21880.
February 2, 1953.
APPEAL FROM THE ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT, ADAIR COUNTY, TOM B. BROWN, J.
George J. England and Jayne Jayne, Kirksville, for appellant.
J. P. Painter, A. D. Campbell, Roland A. Zeigel and Russell D. Roberts, Kirksville, for respondents.
Chariton River Drainage District, hereafter referred to as plaintiff, appealed from a judgment, based on a jury verdict, in the amount of $1500, in favor of John T. and Emma Waddill, defendants. Verdict and judgment were for 8.24 acres of land taken by plaintiff for right of way, for a drainage ditch, and for damages to the remainder of defendants' farm.
The appeal was to the Supreme Court and, by it, transferred to us. Defendants have filed no brief.
Defendants appealed to the circuit court under the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section 242.280 RSMo. 1949, V.A.M.S. That section provides that, when such an appeal is taken, "* * * there may be determined either or both of the following questions: First, whether just compensation has been allowed for property appropriated and, second, whether proper damages have been allowed for property prejudicially affected by the improvements."
By stipulation filed herein the parties agreed that both issues were for trial. The chief error complained of is that the court erred in referring to these two issues as "damages," in instruction No. 1, given on behalf of defendants; and, in receiving the verdict, which did not separate the amounts found due under each of the two issues; that it was error to enter judgment on a verdict combining two distinct issues in one indistinct total.
Its brief is brief. No authorities are cited save the above-mentioned statute.
Instruction No. 6, given for defendants, informed the jury that if the issues were found for defendants the verdict might be in the following form: "We, the jury, find the issues for the defendants and assess their damages at $ ____." However, under instruction No. 1, the jury was informed that the items of damage which defendants were entitled to recover were: (1) the fair and reasonable market value of the 8.24 acres of land taken for right of way purposes, and (2), the difference, if any, between the fair and reasonable market value of the remainder of the farm immediately before the taking, and its fair and reasonable value after the taking of the 8.24 acres of land by plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that this action was based on, and governed by, the special statute above cited; that a statutory right of hearing is given, on appeal, on the two issues mentioned therein. With those contentions there can be no disagreement.
However, it also contends that the court failed to follow the statute, in that both issues were treated as one which, it is claimed, is error.
Plaintiff's position, in this regard, is not supported by the record. The jury was meticulously instructed regarding the two issues upon which their verdict must be based, if the issues were found for defendants. However, as before stated, the jury was not required to state separately, in its verdict, the respective amounts allowed on each of the issues.
Sections 510.220, 510.230, and 510.270, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., are controlling as to jury verdicts. The issue in the instant case was one for the recovery of money. It is only in cases involving the assessing of exemplary or punitive, as well as compensatory damages, that it is required that the respective amounts allowed for each shall be separately found and stated. In other cases the statutes do not require that the various elements of damage involved be separately stated in the jury verdict together with the amount allowed for each.
Complaint is made of the admission of evidence relating to the amount and value of lumber that might have been produced from standing trees on the land taken. By instruction No. 1 the jury was given a proper rule for measuring defendants' damages. No error was committed in the admission of evidence tending to prove the reasonable market value of the land taken.
The judgment should be affirmed.
BOUR, C., concurs.
The foregoing opinion of SPERRY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the Court. The judgment is affirmed.
All concur.