This evidence that appellant had the recently stolen merchandise in his possession, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to trigger the presumption that appellant knew the merchandise had been stolen. Section 13A-8-16 (b)(2), Code of Alabama 1975; Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919 (1973) and cases therein cited; Stamps v. State, 380 So.2d 406 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Goodman v. State, 401 So.2d 208 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 213 (Ala. 1981), and cases therein cited. Appellant brought out on cross-examination of a state's witness that the merchandise was inside boxes which were not labeled and, therefore, that it was not obvious that such was stolen.
"(P)ossession of recently stolen property gives rise to a permissible inference of knowledge on the part of the possessor that the property had been stolen, unless the possession thereof is accounted for in a reasonable and satisfactory manner consistent with the circumstances of the possession. Stanley v. State, 46 Ala. App. 542, 245 So.2d 827, cert. denied, 286 Ala. 738, 245 So.2d 828 (1970); Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919 (1973); Rhone v. State, 53 Ala. App. 338, 299 So.2d 781 (1974). The reasonableness of the explanation given by one in possession of recently stolen property is to be determined from all the circumstances, and, if reasonable people can come to a different conclusion on the subject, the question of whether the explanation is reasonable is one to be determined by the jury.
Stanley v. State, 46 Ala. App. 542, 245 So.2d 827, cert. denied, 286 Ala. 738, 245 So.2d 828 (1970). Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919 (1973). Vines v. State, 57 Ala. App. 117, 326 So.2d 307 (1976); Hunt v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 331 So.2d 834 (1976); Bolding v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 342 So.2d 1372 (1977); Stamps v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 406 (1980).
He was thereupon sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary. In Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, this court held: "It is the law of this state that the unexplained possession of property does not raise the presumption that the property was stolen.
Here we have more than simply the mere unexplained possession of property which, of itself, is insufficient to raise the presumption that the property was stolen. Character v.State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 593, 287 So.2d 916, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919 (1973). We have searched the record for error and have found none.
The answer to appellant's contention is to be found in the established principle that possession of recently stolen property gives rise to a permissible inference of knowledge on the part of the possessor that the property had been stolen, unless the possession thereof is accounted for in a reasonable and satisfactory manner consistent with the circumstances of the possession. Stanley v. State, 286 Ala. 738, 245 So.2d 827 (1970); Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919 (1973); Rhone v. State, 53 Ala. App. 338, 299 So.2d 781 (1974). The reasonableness of the explanation given by one in possession of recently stolen property is to be determined from all of the circumstances, and, if reasonable people can come to a different conclusion on the subject, the question of whether the explanation is reasonable is one to be determined by the jury.
We hold that under the facts in this case the guilt or innocence of the appellant was a question for the jury. Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916; Weeks v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 346 So.2d 1181; Holt v. State, 49 Ala. App. 582, 274 So.2d 356; certiorari denied, 290 Ala. 367, 274 So.2d 360; Milam v. State, 240 Ala. 314, 198 So. 863. As provided by Alabama Code, 1975, Title 12-22-240, we have searched the record for any other errors prejudicial to the appellant and have found none.
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial appellant presented considerable testimony tending to show that he was at a dove shoot on September 23, 1978, and, therefore, could not have committed the alleged offense for which he stood convicted. In Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, certiorari denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919, this Court held: "It is the law of this state that the unexplained possession of property does not raise the presumption that the property was stolen.
The requisite scienter for the crime of receiving stolen property may be inferred from circumstances of the possession by the accused of the property soon after it has been stolen. Stanley v. State, 46 Ala. App. 542, 245 So.2d 827, cert. denied, 286 Ala. 738, 245 So.2d 828 (1970); Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919 (1973); Rhone v. State, 53 Ala. App. 338, 299 So.2d 781 (1974). As to the question whether there was substantial evidence to corroborate the testimony of David Gabriel, we find ample corroboration in the testimony of others; that within a few hours after seizure of the truck transporting some of the stolen tires, less than four days after they were stolen, one of the tires that had been stolen was found along the driveway of defendant's residence, about halfway between the public road and the building; tire strappings were found on a jeep top at the well house at defendant's residence; and about one hundred fifty or one hundred sixty of the stolen tires were about one hundred yards from defendant's home, across the public road from defendant's house.
Eddy, supra. In Character v. State, 51 Ala. App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, certiorari denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 918, this Court held: "It is the law of this state that the unexplained possession of property does not raise the presumption that the property was stolen.