No. 05-10-00629-CR
Opinion Filed June 20, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH TEX. R. APP. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F09-56470-VR.
Before Justices RICHTER, LANG, and FILLMORE.
Opinion By Justice RICHTER.
Appellant was charged by indictment alleging he committed the first-degree felony offense of aggravated robbery. Appellant waived his right to arraignment and to a jury trial and entered an open plea of guilty. After receiving all of the evidence, the trial court sentenced appellant to fifteen years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. On appeal, appellant asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction and erred by admitting appellant's juvenile record into evidence at the punishment phase of trial. Concluding appellant's arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Jurisdiction
A grand jury was impaneled by the 292nd District Court. The indictment was returned to the 265th District Court where the case was adjudicated. In his first issue, appellant asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and render judgment because the case was not transferred to its docket. The State counters that the court did not lack jurisdiction because the case was adjudicated in the court where the indictment was returned. We agree with the State. A grand jury formed and impaneled by a district judge inquires "into all offenses liable to indictment," and hears all the testimony available before voting on whether to indict an accused. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.09, 20.19 (West 2005); Ex parte Edone, 740 S.W.2d 446, 448 (1987). A grand jury is "often characterized as an arm of the court by which it is appointed rather than an autonomous entity." Dallas Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Doe, 969 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.). After the conclusion of testimony, a grand jury votes "as to the presentment of an indictment." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.19. Following presentment, an indictment is filed in a court with competent jurisdiction. See Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248, 255 (1961). In counties having two or more district courts, the judges of the courts may adopt rules governing the filing, numbering, and assignment of cases for trial, and the distribution of the courts' work they consider necessary or desirable to conduct the business of the courts. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.304 (West 2004); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.093 (West Supp. 2009) (addressing adoption of local rules of administration to provide, in part, for assignment, docketing, transfer, and hearing of all cases). Thus, a specific district court may impanel a grand jury, however, it does not necessarily follow that all cases returned by that grand jury are assigned to that court. See Bourque v. State, 156 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd). Here, there is no indication the case was originally filed in or appeared on the trial docket of the 292nd District Court. Therefore, the 265th court had jurisdiction to determine the case. Appellant's first issue is overruled. Juvenile Record
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting appellant's juvenile record into evidence at the punishment phase of the trial. The code of criminal procedure provides that ". . . evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant of an adjudication of delinquency based on a violation by the defendant of a penal law of the grade of felony or of a misdemeanor punishable by confinement in jail." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(a) (West Supp. 2010). Where the violation of penal law is a misdemeanor punishable by confinement in jail, such evidence of adjudication is "admissible only if the conduct upon which the adjudication is based occurred on or after January 1, 1996." Id. § 3(i). In the present case, appellant argues only that "the statute does not authorize the admission of [appellant's juvenile record] into evidence." The evidence establishes that appellant committed the offense of theft of property, a class B misdemeanor punishable by confinement in jail, and the adjudication occurred on February 18, 2007. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(2)(A) (West 2011). Because the offense was adjudicated after January 1996 and was punishable by confinement in jail, there is no basis for appellant's complaint that the prior adjudication was admitted in violation of article 37.07. Appellant's second issue is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.