Opinion
# 2015-009-002 Claim No. 120076 Motion No. M-85326
01-06-2015
MARY ANNE CHAPMAN v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW J. SCHATKIN BY: Andrew J. Schatkin, Esq., Of Counsel. HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General BY: Bonnie Gail Levy, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel.
Synopsis
Claimant sought damages for an injury to her finger when she caught her hand on a security gate at Cayuga Correctional Facility while visiting her son. Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim was granted based upon the Court's finding that a dangerous condition did not exist, nor was there any notice of a dangerous condition.
Case information
UID: | 2015-009-002 |
Claimant(s): | MARY ANNE CHAPMAN |
Claimant short name: | CHAPMAN |
Footnote (claimant name) : | |
Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
Footnote (defendant name) : | |
Third-party claimant(s): | |
Third-party defendant(s): | |
Claim number(s): | 120076 |
Motion number(s): | M-85326 |
Cross-motion number(s): | |
Judge: | NICHOLAS V. MIDEY JR. |
Claimant's attorney: | LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW J. SCHATKIN BY: Andrew J. Schatkin, Esq., Of Counsel. |
Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General BY: Bonnie Gail Levy, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel. |
Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
Signature date: | January 6, 2015 |
City: | Syracuse |
Comments: | |
Official citation: | |
Appellate results: | |
See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Defendant has brought this motion seeking an order of summary judgment dismissing the claim.
The following papers were considered by the Court in connection with this motion:
Notice of Motion; Attorney Affirmation, with Exhibits A-R 1, 2
Defendant's Memorandum of Law 3
Claimant's Affidavit (in Opposition) 4
Claimant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition 5
Deposition Transcripts of Scott Henry, Linda Sue Polinsky, Aaron Evener 6-8
In her claim, claimant seeks damages for an injury to her left index finger which she suffered on February 5, 2011 at Cayuga Correctional Facility. Claimant alleges that she was exiting the facility after visiting her son, who was at that time incarcerated there, when she cut and fractured her left index finger when her coat got stuck in the visiting room security gate.
Defendant now moves to dismiss the claim, contending that a dangerous condition did not exist, and alternatively, that the State did not create or have actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition.
It is well settled that summary judgment is the procedural equivalent of a trial (Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]) and should be granted only when it has been established that there is no triable issue (Moskowitz v Garlock, 23 AD2d 943 [3d Dept 1965]). The role of the Court, therefore, on a motion for summary judgment is not to resolve material issues of fact, but instead is to determine whether any such issues exist (Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]). If such material issues of fact exist, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 [1978]). In other words, the issue is not whether claimant can ultimately establish liability, but rather, whether there exists a substantial issue of fact requiring a plenary trial (Scarpulla v County of Suffolk, 128 AD2d 603 [2d Dept 1987]). However, only bona fide issues of fact are sufficient to defeat an application for summary judgment, and not issues "based on conclusory or irrelevant allegations" (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, supra at 231). Generally, negligence cases are not subject to resolution by summary judgment, but may be granted if the proof submitted on such an application is sufficient to clearly establish the right to such relief (Foltis, Inc. v City of New York, 287 NY 108 [1941]; deVoil v Wallace, 221 AD2d 411 [2d Dept 1995]). The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law "by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form" (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr, 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion "to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986], citing Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 562).
There is no question that the State has a duty to maintain its facilities, including its correctional facilities, in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injuries to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk (Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 513 [1984]; Preston v State of New York, 59 NY2d 997, 998 [1983]; Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 241 [1976]; Condon v State of New York, 193 AD2d 874 [3d Dept 1993]). The State, however, is not an insurer, and negligence cannot be inferred solely from the occurrence of an accident (Killeen v State of New York, 66 NY2d 850 [1985]; Muhammad v State of New York, 15 AD3d 807 [3d Dept 2005]; Mochen v State of New York, 57 AD2d 719 [4th Dept 1977]).
In order to establish a breach of this duty, a claimant must establish that (1) a dangerous condition existed; (2) the defendant either created the dangerous condition, or had actual or constructive notice and failed to alleviate the condition within a reasonable time; and (3) the condition was a proximate cause of the accident (Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 [1986]).
The determination as to whether a condition is dangerous, requiring the landowner to then take remedial measures to correct the condition, depends upon the context or circumstances of each case.
In this particular matter, defendant submitted a transcript of the deposition testimony of Russell Sampson, Maintenance Supervisor at Cayuga Correctional Facility (Exhibit L to Items 1, 2).
In his deposition, Mr. Sampson testified that he was Maintenance Supervisor at Cayuga Correctional Facility when this incident occurred. He further testified that after being notified of claimant's injury, he examined and inspected the security gate. Mr. Sampson testified that he examined the gate for sharp edges, and that he also opened and then closed the gate and did not notice anything which indicated that the gate was not working properly. Mr. Sampson also testified that he reviewed work orders with respect to the security gate for a period of two years prior to claimant's accident, and did not find any report indicating a problem with the gate not working properly or closing too fast.
In response to the motion, claimant submitted transcripts of the deposition testimony of Scott Henry, Linda Sue Polinsky, and Aaron Evener. All of these witnesses confirmed that claimant had suffered an injury to her finger on the day in question, but none of these individuals actually witnessed the incident by which claimant had suffered her injury.
Claimant provided no other evidence, expert opinion, or eyewitness testimony with respect to any alleged improper operation or defect in the security gate in question.
Therefore, based on its review of the evidence presented, and without any evidence establishing a material question of fact, the Court concludes that a dangerous condition did not exist at the time of this accident. There simply is no evidence to suggest that the security gate in question was in any state of disrepair, nor any evidence that it malfunctioned in any way. If a dangerous condition does not exist, the State cannot be held liable for the injuries suffered by claimant.
Additionally, assuming, arguendo, that the condition of this security gate did constitute a dangerous condition, claimant has also failed to come forward with any evidence or indication that the State either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition. There is no suggestion that the State created a dangerous condition, nor is there any indication from the deposition testimony submitted by claimant to suggest that the State had actual notice that the security gate was not operating properly. Furthermore, there is no indication that any prior complaints had been made to the State regarding the operation of the security gate, which would have provided the State with actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. Without any prior notice, either actual or constructive, claimant cannot establish liability against the State for the injuries suffered by her in this incident. To do so would render the State an insurer of its premises.
Accordingly, it is the decision of this Court that the defendant has submitted sufficient proof establishing that a dangerous condition did not exist, and additionally that the defendant did not create any dangerous condition or have actual or constructive notice of such a condition. In response to this prima facie showing by the defendant, claimant has failed to raise a material issue of fact sufficient to warrant a trial, and therefore defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing this claim must be granted.
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED, that motion No. M-85326 is hereby GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Claim No. 120076 is hereby DISMISSED.
January 6, 2015
Syracuse, New York
NICHOLAS V. MIDEY JR.
Judge of the Court of Claims