The state argues that Request No. 22 was not charged because it was covered by a pattern charge. We held in Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706 ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989), that while evidence of battered woman syndrome may be presented to the jury in an appropriate case, it is not a separate defense but is part of the defense of justification. Therefore, no separate charge need be given on this issue.
In this state, the battered person syndrome is not a separate defense and expert testimony as to that syndrome is admissible only to assist the jury in evaluating a defendant's claim of self-defense. Pugh v. State, 260 Ga. 874, 876 (3) ( 401 S.E.2d 270) (1991); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707 (4) ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 ( 277 S.E.2d 678) (1981). Nothing whatsoever in OCGA § 16-3-21 or in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions regarding the defense of justification authorizes the use of deadly force to defend against the mere verbal threat of physical force.
1994) (expert testimony on battered person syndrome admitted only in cases involving a strong relationship, such as a surrogate father and son or a two-year romantic relationship). See, e.g, Smith, 268 Ga. at 196 (evidence that husband beat wife repeatedly during an 18-month marriage, frequently held a gun to her head and threatened to kill her and take her child, and choked her until she lost consciousness); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706 ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989) (evidence that husband frequently beat wife during courtship and marriage, hit and threatened to kill her two days before his death, and beat her for buying new clothes on the day she killed him). See Smith, 268 Ga. at 200 (issue is whether defendant was reasonable in believing danger was imminent based on her psychological condition and circumstances).
" Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385, 387 ( 283 S.E.2d 479) (1981). As we subsequently explained in Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 708 ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989), evidence of battered woman syndrome is admissible to show "that the defendant had a mental state necessary for the defense of justification although the actual threat of harm does not immediately precede the homicide." That is, evidence of past physical abuse is admissible for the limited purpose of illustrating that defendant had a reasonable belief in the imminence of additional physical abuse at the hands of the victim and that, therefore, she was presently justified in acting in self-defense.
(Emphasis supplied.) While in those unique factual scenarios giving rise to the battered woman syndrome, expert testimony may be necessary to "attempt to show that the defendant had a mental state necessary for the defense of justification," Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 708 ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989), our holdings in regard to the admissibility of evidence of the battered woman syndrome have not otherwise changed the rule in homicides where justification is raised as a defense, namely, that justification is based upon the fears of a reasonable person, not upon the reasonable fears of the defendant. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662 (6) ( 187 S.E.2d 277) (1972).
[Cit.]" Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707 (4) ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989). Evidence of the syndrome is admissible as relevant to the defense of justification and here "[t]he trial court gave a full and fair charge on [Mrs.
When applied to homicide cases, this revolutionary change in the law of evidence is a throwback to frontier days and gives judicial sanction to a new defense to murder: the victim "needed killing." See, e.g., Stoudemire v. State, 261 Ga. 49 ( 401 S.E.2d 482) (1991); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706 ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989); Hill v. State, 259 Ga. 655 ( 386 S.E.2d 133) (1989); Harrison v. State, 251 Ga. 837 ( 310 S.E.2d 506) (1984); Golden v. State, 250 Ga. 428 ( 297 S.E.2d 479) (1982); Respress v. State, 249 Ga. 731 ( 293 S.E.2d 319) (1982); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 453 ( 276 S.E.2d 633) (1981); Music v. State, 244 Ga. 832 ( 262 S.E.2d 128) (1979); Andrews v. State, 118 Ga. 1 ( 43 S.E. 852) (1903). It is well put in Harrison v. State, 251 Ga. 837 (3) ( 310 S.E.2d 506) (1984), that, "[g]enerally the character of a victim is not admissible, it being as unlawful to kill a violent person as to kill a nonviolent person."
Carver v. State , 258 Ga. 824, 825 (3), 375 S.E.2d 599 (1989). Accord Chapman v. State , 259 Ga. 706, 707 (3), 386 S.E.2d 129 (1989) (rejecting claim that court failed to give requested charge on state's burden when an affirmative defense is raised because the court charged that general principle of law); Shackleford v. State , 198 Ga. App. 768 (1), 403 S.E.2d 74 (1991) (jury charge not incomplete where trial court charged on self-defense and instructed jury that burden was on the state to disprove self-defense). 3.
Chester v. State, 267 Ga. 9, 10 ( 471 SE2d 836) (1996), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 200, n. 5 ( 486 SE2d 819) (1997). See also Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198 ( 475 SE2d 892) (1996); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707 (4) ( 386 SE2d 129) (1989), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at [200], n. 5; Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 ( 277 SE2d 678) (1981); Pugh v. State, 191 Ga. App. 394 ( 382 SE2d 143) (1989). However, self-defense is not an issue in this trial, where the criminal acts were directed toward non-aggressor victims.
Chester v. State, 267 Ga. 9, 10 ( 471 S.E.2d 836) (1996), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 200, n. 5 ( 486 S.E.2d 819) (1997). See also Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198 ( 475 S.E.2d 892) (1996); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707 (4) ( 386 S.E.2d 129) (1989), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 100, n. 5; Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 ( 277 S.E.2d 678) (1981); Pugh v. State, 191 Ga. App. 394 ( 382 S.E.2d 143) (1989). However, self-defense is not an issue in this trial, where the criminal acts were directed toward non-aggressor victims.