The superior court concluded that OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (1) violates due process, equal protection, and separation of powers by failing to provide for judicial review of a prosecutor's decision to charge minors in superior court rather than juvenile court. However, this Court has previously rejected similar arguments in Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592 ( 385 SE2d 661) (1989) and Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821 ( 462 SE2d 716) (1995). OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (1) is constitutional.

See OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (C) (giving district attorney discretion to decline to prosecute juvenile in superior court and to transfer it to juvenile court for adjudication); see also Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821 (1995) (holding that statutory provision did not violate separation of powers, due process, or equal protection).Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592 ( 385 S.E.2d 661) (1989). See Carr, 267 Ga. at 710-712 (prosecuting attorney's inappropriate and illegal conduct showed her disregard for due process and fairness and was inexcusable); Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 311-312 ( 369 S.E.2d 232) (1988) (knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction).

In this statement, McIntyre admitted to his mother that he "tied the knot off." Chapman and Earnest were tried and convicted. Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592 ( 385 S.E.2d 661) (1989); Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494 ( 422 S.E.2d 188) (1992). Chapman testified for the State and his testimony was corroborated in several material respects.

Furthermore, the General Assembly's grant to litigants of the option to select the forum for prosecution of their cases is the grant of "neither judicial, legislative, or executive power. Hence, its exercise by a prosecutor does not violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine. [Cit.]" Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 593 (3) ( 385 S.E.2d 661) (1989). The Georgia Constitution establishes exclusive jurisdiction over felony cases in the superior court, but gives the General Assembly the power to alter that jurisdiction in felony cases involving juvenile offenders.

Colorado and Louisiana. The State also cites Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 385 S.E.2d 661 (1989), as persuasive authority. However, Chapman addresses primarily a separation-of-powers question.

Thus, in capital cases, a juvenile does not acquire special rights in the juvenile court system "until such time as the juvenile court exercises its concurrent jurisdiction." Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 593 ( 385 S.E.2d 661) (1989). This court has held that the entering of a detention order is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court. Thompson v.State, 260 Ga. 820 ( 400 S.E.2d 312) (1991); Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17 (1) ( 257 S.E.2d 525) (1979).

The Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld other provisions of OCGA § 15-11-28 (b) (2) against constitutional challenges on due process and equal protection grounds, and it has found no constitutional infirmity in allowing the exercise of discretion to determine whether a defendant is adjudicated as a juvenile or sentenced as an adult for an offense.Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592 (1) ( 385 SE2d 661) (1989) (citations omitted). see Bishop v. State, 265 Ga. 821, 823 (2) ( 462 SE2d 716) (1995) (addressing former OCGA § 15-11-5, which is now OCGA § 15-11-28); Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 42, 46 (5) ( 614 SE2d 146) (2005); see also Seabolt v. State, 279 Ga. 518, 520 (1) ( 616 SE2d 448) (2005) (juvenile does not lose substantive protection when lesser crimes are tried in superior court along with crimes over which superior court had exclusive jurisdiction).

Their special rights are created by statute." Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 592, 593 ( 385 S.E.2d 661). Two of the primary purposes for amending the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia a decade ago was "to provide for disposition of juveniles who commit designated felony acts" and "to provide for practice, procedure, and other matters relative to the foregoing. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

Courts elsewhere uniformly agree.See, e.g., State v. B.T.D., 296 So.3d 343, 361 (Ala.Crim.App.2019) ("[a] juvenile offender does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in juvenile-court adjudication"); C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81, 82-83 (Alaska 2020) ("'[a] juvenile offender has no constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court'") (quoting W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)); State v. Belcher, 721 A.2d 899, 903 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)) ("there is no constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile; the right is statutory"); Calhoun v. State, 397 So.2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("there is no common law, inherent, or constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile"); Chapman v. State, 385 S.E.2d 661, 662 (Ga. 1989) ("any right a defendant may have to be treated as a juvenile is not an inherent right specifically protected by the constitution, but one created by statute"); People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 551 (Ill. 2014) ("access to juvenile courts is not a constitutional right because the Illinois juvenile justice system is a creature of legislation"); Stout v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) ("[i]t is axiomatic that a juvenile offender has no constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court"); State v. Watkins, 423 P.3d 830, 835 (Wash. 2018) ("'there is no constitutional right to be tried in a juvenile court'') (quoting In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 973 (Wash. 1996));