Opinion
CIVIL 1:23-CV-1498
03-05-2024
CRYSTAL S. CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. MOTT'S LLP, Defendant.
Wilson Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a second screening review of the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint. The plaintiff, Crystal Chapman, brought this action against her former employer, alleging claims of racial, gender, age, and disability discrimination, a failure to accommodate her disability, and retaliation. (Doc. 1). The initial complaint and attached exhibits also appeared to assert a claim that she was terminated for using leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). (Doc. 1-6).
Chapman filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which we granted. We conducted an initial screening review of the plaintiff's complaint and concluded that while her complaint appeared to state a plausible FMLA claim, her claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) failed as a matter of law. (Doc. 5). Thus, we recommended that these claims be dismissed without prejudice to Chapman attempting to amend her complaint, a recommendation that was adopted by the District Court. (Docs. 5, 6).
Chapman filed an amended complaint on January 30, 2024. (Doc. 10). Curiously, this amended complaint contains even fewer factual allegations than Chapman's initial pleading and appears to conflate her claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the FMLA. (Id.). For example, Chapman asserts that she was granted leave under the FMLA, but due to Motts' “harsh discriminatory tactics[,] [she] was compelled to work with one of the employees that continually demonstrated racism and bullied [her].” (Doc. 10, ¶ 3). Further, she alleges that she had some documentation from a medical provider to be absent from work, but that Motts' terminated her for this absence. (Id. ¶ 4). Additionally, she contends that she was discriminated against because of her age, but in the same paragraph, asserts that her position was given to “the Caucasian girl managers friend[,]” implying some racially discriminatory reason for her replacement or termination. (Id. ¶ 9).
Thus, in our view, Chapman's amended complaint continues to suffer from the same fatal flaws as her initial complaint-namely, that she fails to allege facts to support her claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. Accordingly, we recommend that these claims now be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). However, a pro se complaint must still meet the basic requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which states that a complaint must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
B. The Plaintiff's Title VII, ADEA, and ADA Claims should be Dismissed With Prejudice.
Like her initial complaint, we presume that Chapman asserts her claims against the defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Chapman's amended complaint, however, fails to allege facts to support her claims. Accordingly, we recommend that these claims now be dismissed with prejudice.
1. Race and Gender Discrimination under Title VII
To state a claim of race- or gender-based discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there are circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). Additionally, to the extent Chapman asserts a retaliation claim, she must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and adverse employment action. Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006).
In the instant case, there are no facts in the amended complaint to suggest that Chapman suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of race- or gender-based discrimination. With respect to her gender discrimination claim, there are no facts to suggest that Chapman was treated any differently as a female than any male coworkers or employees. Additionally, with respect to her race discrimination claim, while Chapman asserts that she was compelled to work with an employee who “continually demonstrated racism and bullied [her],” in our view, this vague allegation falls far short from what is needed to state a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII. Accordingly, these claims should be dismissed.
Similarly, Chapman has failed to meet her burden to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation. It is well settled that “protected activity” under Title VII means either filing a formal charge of discrimination, or informally protesting discriminatory employment practices via complaints, letters, and other means of reporting. Mufti v. Aarsand & Co., Inc., 667 F.Supp.2d 535, 552 (W.D. Pa. 2009). In this case, Chapman asserts in a vague and conclusory fashion that she reported “discrimination form (sic) other coworkers” and that Motts took no action. (Doc. 10 ¶ 8). Accordingly, in our view, Chapman has not alleged facts to support her claim that she engaged in protected activity for purposes of her Title VII retaliation claim.
2. Age Discrimination under the ADEA
Chapman also appears to generally assert that she was discriminated against because of her age. Under the ADEA, to state a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) that she is 40 years of age or older; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that she was qualified for her position; and (4) that she was replaced by a sufficiently younger individual giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, Chapman's amended complaint contains one allegation regarding age discrimination. However, this allegation merely recites the elements of an age discrimination claim with no supporting facts. Thus, Chapman asserts that she is over 40 years old, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that she was qualified for her position. (Doc. 10 ¶ 9). Curiously, she does not allege that she was replaced by an individual who was younger; rather, she asserts that she was replaced by “the Caucasian girl managers friend.” (Id.). Simply put, Chapman's allegations are insufficient to state a claim for age discrimination under the ADEA, and this claim should be dismissed.
3. Disability Discrimination under the ADA
Chapman also appears to assert that she was discriminated against because of a disability, and that Mott's failed to accommodate her disability. The amended complaint does not specify her disability; rather, she asserts that she had medical documentation that recommended she work from home “because of a medical disability.” (Doc. 10 ¶ 2). Further, Chapman appears to allege a failure to accommodate claim, stating that she requested a different chair for back pain but was ignored. (Id. ¶ 4).
To state a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, Chapman must allege that “(1) [s]he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) [s]he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Discrimination under the ADA also includes an employer's failure to accommodate an employee's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). As to this claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) her employer knew of her disability; (2) she requested an accommodation; (3) her employer failed to accommodate her; and (4) she could have been reasonably accommodated. Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). The Third Circuit has held that in certain circumstances, “a request for FMLA leave may qualify . . . as a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.” Id. at 156-57.
Here, we cannot conclude that Chapman's amended complaint states a claim under the ADA. At the outset, Chapman's amended complaint fails to identify that she suffers from a disability, other than alleging in a conclusory fashion that she had medical documentation for a medical disability. Moreover, although Chapman alleges that her medical provider recommended that she work from home, she asserts no allegations that she requested such an accommodation from Motts and the accommodation was denied. Additionally, Chapman's vague allegations that she requested a different chair for back pain and was ignored falls far short of what is needed to establish a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA. Accordingly, the plaintiff's ADA claims should be dismissed.
While we recognize that pro se plaintiffs should generally be permitted to amend their complaints, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), the amended complaint is materially flawed with respect to these Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims against the defendant. Thus, given that Chapman was permitted to amend her complaint and failed to remedy the deficiencies we had identified, we believe that further leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, we recommend that these claims now be dismissed with prejudice.
We are constrained to note that, while our screening review of the initial complaint permitted the plaintiff's FMLA claim to proceed, the amended complaint does not appear to adequately state a claim under the FMLA. Other than one single allegation that Chapman had an absence note and was terminated for that absence, we cannot conclude that the sparse allegations in the amended complaint state a claim under the FMLA. However, because we initially concluded that Chapman's complaint stated a colorable claim under the FMLA, we recommend that Chapman's FMLA claim be dismissed without prejudice, and that she be permitted one final opportunity to amend with respect to the FMLA claim only.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.