Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union

14 Citing cases

  1. Hussain v. Bache Co., Inc.

    562 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1977)   Cited 8 times

    We believe it is our duty to persist with this anomalous rule unless it is changed by Congress or the Supreme Court."See, e.g., Chapman v. Local 581, ILGWU, 401 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1968): "There is room for dissatisfaction with a rule that tolerates opposite results depending upon the pure fortuity of the outcome of the race to the courthouse" (using A E Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968) as an example of such an anomaly); Wallace v. Norman Industries, Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1972).See, e.g., Note, Appealability of Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 47 Minn.L.Rev. 1099 (1963); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts (3d ed. 1976) 514-515.

  2. New England Power v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp.

    456 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1972)   Cited 51 times
    Rejecting broad interpretation of "injunction" as used in section 1292

    Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co., 293 U.S. 379, 55 S.Ct. 310, 79 L.Ed. 440 (1935); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 317 U.S. 188, 63 S.Ct. 163, 87 L.Ed. 176 (1942).See also Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 75 S.Ct. 249, 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955); City of Morgantown, West Virginia v. Royal Insurance Co., 337 U.S. 254, 69 S.Ct. 1067, 93 L.Ed. 1347 (1949); Shanferoke Coal Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 55 S.Ct. 313, 79 L.Ed. 583 (1935); Western Geophysical Co. of Amer. v. Bolt Associates, Inc., 440 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1971); Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1970); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1968); Travel Consultants. Inc. v. Travel Management Corp., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 367 F.2d 334 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912. 87 S.Ct. 861, 17 L.Ed.2d 785 (1967); Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 332 F.2d 266 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882, 85 S.Ct. 150, 13 L.Ed.2d 88 (1964); Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962). In four recent cases, we reached the merits of appeals from district court orders staying or refusing to stay litigation pending arbitration where the underlying causes of action were at law.

  3. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.

    485 U.S. 271 (1988)   Cited 858 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an order denying a motion to stay an order under Colorado River abstention because "the district court may well have determined only that it should await further developments before concluding that the balance of factors to be considered ... warrants a ... stay"

    Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson Curtis, Inc., supra, at 733-742 (Posner, J.). See, e. g., Langley v. Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, 707 F.2d 1, 2, n. 2, 5 (CA1 1983); Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 307-309 (CA2 1967); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 767-770 (CA3 1984); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626, 628 (CA4 1968); Wallace v. Norman Industries, Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (CA5 1972); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1022-1023 (CA6 1979); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 870-871 (CA7 1985); Mellon-Bank, N. A. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 651 F.2d 1244, 1247-1248 (CA8 1981); Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1462, n. 3 (CA9 1983); Pepper v. Miani, 734 F.2d 1420, 1421 (CA10 1984); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 853, n. 3 (CA1: 1986) (per curiam); Lee v. Ply[*]Gem Industries, Inc., 193 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 115, 593 F.2d 1266, 1269, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). Commentators have been no less scathing in their evaluations of the Enelow-Ettelson rule.

  4. Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson Curtis, Inc.

    806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986)   Cited 73 times
    Finding it "impossible to understand" how the plaintiff was hurt by defendant's failure to advise her in the agreement that she could elect a qualified arbitration forum and that defendant would pay any incremental fees assessed by the arbitrators

    Every circuit (except the Federal Circuit, which is new and apparently has not yet had an Enelow-Ettelson appeal) is on record with criticism, often harsh, of the doctrine. See, e.g., Langley v. Colonial Leasing Co., 707 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1967); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 767-70 (3d Cir. 1984); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1968); Wallace v. Norman Industries, Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1972); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (6th Cir. 1979); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., supra, 763 F.2d at 870-71; Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., supra; Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1462 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1983); Pepper v. Miani, supra; Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 853 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Lee v. Ply[*] Gem Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1268-69 and n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Judge Rubin has urged his court to reject the doctrine.

  5. Mowbray v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook

    795 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1986)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that a non-signatory introducing brokerage firm could not enforce an arbitration clause in a customer agreement between the plaintiffs and a clearing brokerage firm because the introducing broker failed to show that it was an agent of the clearing broker or that it was a third-party beneficiary of the customer agreement

    acterization of the underlying action (and hence, appellate jurisdiction) is permissible where the complaint is "wholly or basically and predominantly an action at law," Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 332 F.2d 266, 277 (9th Cir. 1964), and where the prayers for equitable relief, if present, are "merely incidental." Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1967); Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 725 F.2d 440, 444-445 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) ("the equitable relief sought [must be] more than merely incidental" to preclude appellate jurisdiction); Lee v. Ply[*]Gem Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2417, 60 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1979) (the "presumption [is] that the pending action is equitable, but that may be overborne if the request for equitable relief is incidental or clearly subordinate to essentially legal claims"); Thompson v. House of Nine, Inc., 482 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir. 1968) (same). For a stronger statement, and perhaps further tightening, of the requirement that prayers for equitable relief be incidental, see Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard, Keang Nam Corp., 651 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981) ("a complaint praying for a mix of equitable and legal relief will be deemed equitable, unless the equitable claim is so insubstantial as to be considered frivolous.").

  6. Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane

    732 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1984)   Cited 15 times
    In Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 732 F.2d 444, 445 (5th Cir. 1984), the reorganized Fifth Circuit mischaracterized La Nacional as a case where ยง 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction was asserted under the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine. (See infra Part IV for a discussion of Enelow-Ettelson.)

    See, e.g., Hartford Financial Systems, Inc. v. Florida Software Services, Inc., 712 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1983) ( Enelow is "a Serbonian bog, where cases whole have sunk from sight"). See also Mellon Bank v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 651 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1981) ("the Enelow-Ettelson rule has been roundly criticized by nearly every court and commentator that has considered its application"); Goldberg v. Carey, 601 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1979) ( Enelow-Ettelson rule "somewhat artificial"); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[t]he law on this matter is largely an historical anomaly"); Lee v. Ply[*]Gem Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2417, 60 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1979) (rule has been "much maligned as divorced from any rational or coherent appeals policy"); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1968) ("There is room for dissatisfaction with a rule that tolerates opposite results depending upon the pure fortuity of the race to the court-house."). Criticism of the Enelow-Ettelson rule is uniformly coupled with the regretful supposition that it binds appellate courts until Congress or the Supreme Court effects a change.

  7. Poriss v. Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc.

    685 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1982)   Cited 12 times

    The injunctive relief sought in this action cannot be characterized as "merely incidental." See, e.g., Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir. 1968). Therefore, Judge Cabranes's January 21, 1982, order denying a stay of litigation pending arbitration ordinarily would not be an appealable interlocutory order.

  8. USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, Ltd.

    574 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1978)   Cited 27 times

    There appears to be a growing tendency, when confronted with a hybrid of legal and equitable claims for relief, to treat the matter as equitable for purposes of the Enelow-Ettelson rule. See, e.g., Stateside Machinery Co., Ltd. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1975); Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1973); Thompson v. House of Nine, Inc., 482 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1973); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir. 1968); Standard Chlorine, supra, 384 F.2d at 309; Schine v. Schine, 367 F.2d 685, 688-689 (2d Cir. 1966). Applying the historical analysis, once again, the complaint is best cast as an equitable one.

  9. Stateside Machinery Co., Ltd. v. Alperin

    526 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1975)   Cited 32 times
    In Stateside Machinery Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1975), we upheld a district court order denying Stateside's motion for a preliminary injunction against arbitration proceedings initiated by Alperin.Id. at 483-84.

    Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962) (en banc).Thompson v. House of Nine, Inc., 482 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1973); Chapman v. ILGWU, 401 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1968); Standard Chlorine, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1967). "When a complaint is a homogenization of legal, equitable, and statutory elements, and it cannot fairly be said that either the legal or the equitable aspects predominate, the complaint shall be deemed equitable for the purpose of applying the Enelow-Ettelson rule."

  10. Excavation Construction v. Carpenters' Dist

    519 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1975)   Cited 2 times

    We therefore affirm the order of the district court staying the employer's suit for money damages and accompanying equitable relief until such time as arbitration under Article XIII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement has been carried to completion. Because we view the company's suit as one principally and substantially for money damages, we think that the district court's order staying the law suit pending arbitration was an appealable one. Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626 (4 Cir. 1968). We deny the union's motion to dismiss the appeal.