Also, Luedtke's failure to seek medical treatment does not affect the right of recovery. Chapman v. Employers Ins. Co. of Ala., 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1981). Rather, causation is the hurdle to be cleared before recovery is granted.
"Although evidence of causation may not be speculative or conjectural, 'absolute medical certainty is not required.'" Id. (quoting Glisson v. Mohon Int'l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tenn. 2006)); see also Chapman v. Employers Ins. Co. of Alabama, 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1981) ("expert opinion must always be more or less uncertain"). Additionally, deposition testimony of experts should not be read and evaluated in a vacuum.
Patterson v. Tucker Steel Co., 584 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tenn.1979). However, the trial judge may properly predicate an award on medical testimony to the effect that a given accident "could be" the cause of the plaintiff's injury when he also has before him lay testimony from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accident in fact was the cause of the injury. Chapman v. Employers Ins. Co., 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1978). If equivocal medical evidence combined with other evidence supports a finding of causation, such an inference may be drawn by the trial court.
However, absolute certainty in the medical evidence is not required since expert opinion by its very nature is always more or less uncertain and speculative. See Chapman v. Employers Ins. Co. of Ala., 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1981). Acknowledging the imprecision and uncertainty of medical proof of causation, any reasonable doubt must be construed in favor of the employee.
Any reasonable doubt as to whether an injury arose out of the employment is to be resolved in favor of the employee. Id. Absolute medical certainty is not required. The trial judge may properly predicate an award on medical testimony to the effect that a given accident "could be" the cause of the plaintiff's injury when he also has before him lay testimony from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accident in fact was the cause of the injury. Chapman v. Employers Ins. Co., 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1978). Saturn points to testimony by Dr. Allen that there was no causal connection between Mr. Carlson's injury and his employment.
Dr. O'Brien dismissed the ailment as age-related, and Bridgestone argues the employee is simply experiencing a non-compensable increase in pain; however, Dr. Walwyn reported it was more probable than not that the injury arose out of work at Bridgestone. As long as medical testimony suggests an alleged accident "could be" the cause of the claimant's injury and the lay testimony bolsters this position, it may be reasonably inferred the accident was the cause of the injury. Chapman v. Employer's Ins. Co., 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1981). Consequently, it can be inferred, based on Dr. Walwyn's report and the employee's testimony, that the employee's pre-existing condition may have been advanced or progressed after the incident in November 1997.
Absolute medical certainty is not required for recovery in a case for worker's compensation benefits. Chapman v Employers Insurance Co., 627 S.W.2d 122 (Tenn. 1981). The connection between the accident and the injury may be shown by expert medical testimony in conjunction with lay testimony, Smith v Empire Pencil Co., 781 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn.
Absolute medical certainty is not required to establish causation. Chapman v. Employer's Insurance Co. 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1981) Foster v. ESIS Inc. 563 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tenn. 1978).
At the outset, we note that absolute medical certainty is not required to establish causation. Chapman v. Employer's Insurance Co., 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1981); Foster v. ESIS, Inc., 563 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tenn. 1978).
1978). See also Tindall v. Waring Park Association, supra, 725 S.W.2d at 938; Chapman v. Employers Ins. Co. of Alabama, 627 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tenn. 1981); Foster v. ESIS, Inc., 563 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tenn. 1978); American Ins. Co. v. Ison, 538 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn.