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Chapman v. California Department of Education

United States District Court, N.D. California
Sep 5, 2003
No. C 01-01780 CRB (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2003)

Opinion

No. C 01-01780 CRB

September 5, 2003


SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT


On March 12, 2003, this Court signed an order dismissing as unripe all of plaintiffs' claims with the exception of plaintiffs' challenges under the IDEA, the ADA, and the Declaratory Judgment Act to the process for obtaining a waiver of the exit exam requirement. The Court requested additional briefing in connection with those claims. Subsequently, the Court's briefing schedule was extended to permit the parties to address the implications of the Board of Education's expected decision as to whether to delay the effective date of the exit exam requirement.

On July 9, 2003, the nine members of the state Board of Education voted unanimously to eliminate the exit exam as a graduation requirement for the class of 2004 but to reinstate it for the class of 2006. The issue now before the Court is what effect that decision has on the remaining claims in this litigation.

I. Standing

In order to invoke federal court jurisdiction, a plaintiff "must himself [have] suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action." City of Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, only individuals who face some risk of injury as a result of the exit exam requirement have standing to assert a challenge in federal court. By virtue of the Board of Education's decision to delay the requirement, only students who anticipate graduating in 2006 or later have standing to bring such a challenge.

All of the named individual plaintiffs in the second amended complaint are in the class of 2004 or 2005. None of these plaintiffs will be required to pass the exit exam in order to graduate. As such, they do not have standing to sue.

The only other plaintiff in this litigation is the Learning Disabilities Association of California, a volunteer organization serving individuals with learning disabilities. As the Court noted in its March 12, 2003 order, plaintiffs do not claim that any of the Association' members have taken the CAHSEE or will be subject to the CAHSEE requirement. Accordingly, the Association will not suffer any "injury in fact" as a result of the exit requirement and thus does not have standing to bring this action on its own. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.l (1992) ("injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way"); id. at 563 (plaintiffs must be directly affected "apart from their "special interest in the subject'") (citation omitted).

In the absence of a named plaintiff with standing to bring this action, the case must and will be dismissed.

II. Status of Challenge to Waiver Process

Under section 60851(c) of the California Education Code, as revised in January 200: the governing board of a local school district "may waive the requirement to successfully pass one or both subject matter parts of the high school exit examination for a pupil with a disability" provided that three conditions are met: (1) the student has an IEP or section 504 plan that requires particular accommodations or modifications for taking the exam; (2) the student has completed or is progressing toward the completion of sufficient high school level coursework to have attained the skills and knowledge otherwise needed to pass the exit exam; and (3) the student has received the equivalent of a passing score on the exit exam using a modification. See Cal. Educ. Code § 6085l(c) (emphasis added).

In December 2002, the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs' claims regarding access to the CAHSEE were ripe because section 60851(c) forced learning disabled students who were subject to the exit exam requirement to make a Hobson's choice between taking the CAHSEE with modifications and risking denial of a waiver, or taking it without modifications and risking failure. As this Court noted in its March 12, 2003 order, it was "the discretionary nature of the waiver process"-the fact that a student who meets the three specified conditions may be granted a waiver-that gave rise to this dilemma. Slip op. at 6. By implication, a waiver process that is less discretionary-one in which students who met certain conditions will be granted waivers-would obviate the "real and immediate injury" identified by the Ninth Circuit. See Smiley v. Calif. Dep't of Educ., 2002 WL 31856343, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2002).

Since the Ninth Circuit issued its ruling, and subsequent to this Court's March 12, 2003 order, the state has clarified its position regarding the availability of waivers. In supplemental pleadings filed with this Court, the state has taken the position that section 60851(c) vests no discretion in local school boards to grant or deny waivers to students who satisfy the statutory criteria. Rather, according to the state, "[i]f a student meets the [statutory] requirements for obtaining a waiver, a waiver will be granted." Defs.' Supp. Br. at 11 (emphasis added). As such, the only discretion left for school boards to exercise is the discretion "to decide whether the requirements have been met."Id. Thus, "when a student has taken the CAHSEE in a fundamentally altered form (i.e., with the help of calculators, readers, corrective devices, and other assistance that non-disabled students cannot use), but has otherwise demonstrated sufficient high school proficiency as required by the statute, a waiver will be granted." Id. In light of this submission, it appears that the uncertainty that learning disabled students may have faced when deciding whether to take the CAHSEE with modifications has been significantly reduced. Local school districts' policies and procedures with respect to waiver requests, many of which are still in development, may further reassure learning disabled students that the decision to use modifications on the exit exam will not substantially burden their access to a high school diploma.

CONCLUSION

Because all of the named plaintiffs lack standing to sue, this matter is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Chapman v. California Department of Education

United States District Court, N.D. California
Sep 5, 2003
No. C 01-01780 CRB (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2003)
Case details for

Chapman v. California Department of Education

Case Details

Full title:JULEUS CHAPMAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. California

Date published: Sep 5, 2003

Citations

No. C 01-01780 CRB (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2003)