Opinion
No. 2-392 / 01-1478
Filed October 16, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bruce B. Zager, Judge.
The petitioner appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the denial of his workers' compensation claim. AFFIRMED.
Jay P. Roberts of Roberts, Stevens Lekar, P.L.C. Waterloo, for appellant.
David L. Jenkins of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Torrance Chapman appeals the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the denial of his workers' compensation claim. He contends the district court erred in affirming the commissioner's ruling that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. He argues the discovery doctrine tolled the statute of limitations, and respondents should be equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations.
We review a district court's review of agency action for correction of errors of law. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). Our review is limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review function. Id. We are bound by the workers' compensation commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same conclusion. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000).
The Chief Deputy Workers' Compensation Commissioner made the following relevant findings, which are not in dispute: On August 24, 1995, Chapman sustained a work injury while lifting a motor. When the injury occurred, Chapman believed he had strained his back but it was not very painful. He reported the injury to his supervisor. When Chapman awoke on August 26, 1995, he had difficulty moving. He filed his workers' compensation petition on August 26, 1997. The district court concluded there is substantial evidence to support these findings, and we concur.
The district court affirmed the commissioner's dismissal of Chapman's claim, holding it was time barred because the petition was filed more than two years after Chapman's August 24, 1995 injury occurred. Chapman argues the district court erred in failing to apply the discovery rule to his claim. Chapman also claims respondents should be estopped from raising the statute of limitations.
I. Discovery Rule. Chapman argues the applicable date on which the statute of limitations began to run was August 26, 1995, the day he discovered the seriousness of his injury. Iowa Code section 85.26(1) (1999) requires a workers' compensation claim to be filed within two years of the date of the occurrence of the injury. Under the discovery rule, the two-year limitation period does not begin to run until the employee discovers, or should discover in the exercise of diligence, (1) the nature, (2) seriousness, and (3) probable compensable character of the injury or disease. Swartzendruber v. Schimmel, 613 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 2000). The claimant must have actual or imputed knowledge of all three characteristics of the injury or disease before the statute begins to run. Id.
Chapman's injury is categorized as a "traumatic event/latent manifestation" injury. See id. This type of injury involves a known traumatic event that produces both an immediately known injury and latent injury. Id. In other words, when Chapman lifted the motor, he realized that he was injured and the source of the injury, but the full extent of his injury was not yet known to him. See LeBeau v. Dimig, 446 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 1989). Under the discovery rule for traumatic event/latent manifestation injuries, the statute of limitations begins to run from the initial injury, not when the seriousness of the injury is later discovered. Swartzendruber, 613 N.W.2d at 650. Accordingly, the statute of limitations on Chapman's injury began to run on August 24, 1995, the date of the initial injury. The district court did not err in affirming the commissioner's dismissal of Chapman's claim because it was not filed within the two-year statute of limitations.
II. Equitable Estoppel. Chapman claims the respondents knew from the beginning of the case that he had not worked on August 26, 1995, yet in their correspondence they showed the date of injury as August 26, 1995. He argues the respondents "chose" August 26, 1995 as the date of the injury. They then waited until almost thirty days before trial before they raised the statute of limitations and therefore they should be estopped from asserting that defense. The district court concluded Chapman failed to show a factual basis for applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel. We agree.
In order to avail himself of the theory of equitable estoppel, Chapman must prove four elements: (1) respondents falsely represented or concealed material facts, (2) he lacked knowledge of the true facts, (3) respondents intended him to rely on the representation or concealment, and (4) he was prejudiced by the reliance. See Paveglio v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 167 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 1969). The party alleging estoppel must be excusably ignorant of the true facts. Dierking v. Bellas Hess Superstore, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Iowa 1977). Chapman initially reported the date of injury to be August 26, 1995. On the First Report of Injury the employer indicated Chapman did not work on that date. Chapman's failure to research the true date of his injury does not qualify as excusable ignorance. The district court did not err in denying Chapman's equitable estoppel claim. Chapman offers no authority for his argument that somehow estoppel applies because the employer did not raise the statute of limitations until shortly before trial and he abandoned this arument in oral argument. Therefore, we do not consider it.
At his deposition, Chapman testified he believed he was injured on the Thursday following his birthday. That year, Chapman's August 20th birthday fell on a Sunday. The following Thursday was August 24th. August 26th fell on a Saturday, a day that Chapman did not work.