A party moving for a preliminary injunction must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction. Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 573 F.Supp.3d 104, 110 (D.D.C. 2021) (Walton, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006))
And, “[u]nder the expressio unius cannon, ‘the mention of one thing implies exclusion of another thing.'” Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. v. Raimondo, 573 F.Supp.3d 104, 114-15 (D.D.C. 2021) (Walton, J.) (quoting Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Although the District of Columbia Circuit has noted that this canon “cannot carry the day over the text and structure of [a] statute[] [that] confers specific and broad authority[,]” Farrell v. Blinken, 4 F.4th 124, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2021), in this case, the negative implication arising out of § 1276(c)'s exclusion of the provision at issue, i.e., § 1271(a)(1), is consistent with the Court's conclusion, based on the text and structure of the SMCRA, that Congress did not intend to subject agency rulemaking actions to the SCMRA's lower standard for judicial review of orders and decisions.
The district court denied the motion on the ground that the plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on this claim. Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo , No. 21-cv-1798, 573 F.Supp.3d 104, 116-18 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2021). We have jurisdiction to review this interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).