Summary
noting that where expert testimony conflicts, "the Commission may consider other evidence in determining whether a claimant has met [her] burden of proof"
Summary of this case from Wrangler, Inc. v. CoxsonOpinion
44706 Record No. 831707.
October 12, 1984.
Present: Carrico, C.J., Poff, Compton, Stephenson, Russell, and Thomas, JJ.
A finding by the Industrial Commission that claimant failed to establish a causal connection between her disability and an industrial accident is based upon credible evidence and is binding upon the Supreme Court; Commission may resolve conflict in opinions by single expert by considering other evidence.
(1) Workers' Compensation — Evidence — Industrial Commission — Statutory Construction — Conclusiveness of Award (Code Sec. 65.1-98) — Findings of Fact Conclusive and Binding Upon Court When Based on Credible Evidence.
(2) Workers' Compensation — Evidence — Expert Opinions — Industrial Commission — Conflicting Expert Opinions — Constitute Question of Fact to Which Industrial Commission Conclusiveness Rule Applies.
(3) Workers' Compensation — Evidence — Expert Opinions — Industrial Commission — Conflict in Opinion of Single Expert — If Internal Conflict in Expert's Opinions, Commission May Consider Other Evidence in Determining If Claimant Has Met His Burden of Proof.
(4) Workers' Compensation — Evidence — Expert Opinions — Industrial Commission — Conflict in Opinion of Single Expert — Rule Respecting Conflicting Expert Opinions Applies When Sole Expert Gives Conflicting Opinions.
(5) Workers' Compensation — Evidence — Industrial Commission — Credible Evidence Supports Commission's Determination that Claimant Failed to Establish a Causal Connection Between Disability and Industrial Accident.
Chandler was employed at Schmidt Baking Company, and was responsible for monitoring bread on a conveyor belt. On 26 January 1983, Chandler was injured when a crank, weighing about one and one-half pounds, fell from a height of four feet and struck her just above the right ankle. Chandler immediately reported the accident.
Chandler continued to work following the accident and first sought medical treatment on 3 February 1983, when she was examined by Dr. Fowler. At that time, Chandler was also being treated by Fowler for a back problem and had been hospitalized for this problem shortly before her accident. Dr. Fowler again admitted Chandler to a hospital on 9 February 1983. She was discharged on 19 February, and returned to work on 23 March 1983.
When Chandler was admitted to the hospital, she complained of tenderness in her lower extremities. The hospital discharge summary indicated that she had reported tenderness in these areas at the time of her admission the previous month for back pain.
When Chandler was discharged from the hospital, Dr. Fowler stated that the exact cause of her discomfort was still uncertain. However, in his report to the Commission on 24 March 1983, Dr. Fowler stated that the diagnosed condition was due to the injury Chandler sustained at work on 26 January 1983.
A Deputy Commissioner found that Chandler established that her disability was causally connected to the industrial accident and awarded compensation. The full Commission reversed the award. Chandler appeals.
1. A finding by the Industrial Commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible evidence, is conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court (Code Sec. 65.1-98).
2. Conflicting expert opinions are questions of fact to which the Commission Conclusiveness Rule applies.
3. When there is an internal conflict in an expert's opinion, the Commission may consider other evidence in determining whether a claimant has met her burden of proof.
4. The rule respecting conflicting expert opinions also applies when a sole expert gives conflicting opinions.
5. Credible evidence supports the Commission's finding that claimant failed to establish a causal connection between her disability and the industrial accident.
Appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission of Virginia.
Affirmed.
Peter D. Menk (Lotz, Black Menk, on brief), for appellant.
Stephen D. Busch (McGuire, Woods Battle, on brief), for appellee.
In this case, the Industrial Commission found that the claimant, Betty J. Chandler, failed to establish a causal connection between her disability and her industrial accident. The sole issue on appeal, therefore, is whether the Commission's finding of fact is supported by credible evidence.
Chandler was employed by Schmidt Baking Company, Inc. She was responsible for monitoring bread on a conveyor belt so that it was in a proper position to be sliced by a machine.
On January 26, 1983, Chandler was injured when a crank fell from the slicing machine and struck her just above the right ankle. The crank, which weighed one and one-half pounds, fell from a height of approximately four feet. The blow to Chandler's leg caused bleeding, and she reported the accident immediately.
Chandler continued to work following the accident and first sought medical treatment on February 3, 1983, when she was examined by Dr. D. R. Fowler. At that time, Chandler also was being treated by Dr. Fowler for a back problem and had been hospitalized for this problem shortly before her accident. Dr. Fowler again admitted Chandler to a hospital on February 9, 1983. She was discharged from the hospital on February 19, 1983, and returned to work on March 23, 1983.
When Chandler was admitted to the hospital, she complained of tenderness in her lower extremities. The hospital discharge summary also indicated that she reported "some tenderness in these areas at the time of her admission last month for back pain."
Dr. Fowler's diagnosis at the time of claimant's discharge from the hospital was "(1) Myalgia (fibrocytis). (2) Bilateral lower extremities." He also stated that "[a]t the time of discharge the exact etiology of her discomfort was still uncertain." In his report to the Commission, dated March 24, 1983, however, Dr. Fowler diagnosed claimant's condition as"? phlebitis lower extremity" and stated that the diagnosed condition was due to the injury Chandler sustained at work on January 26, 1983.
A deputy commissioner found that Chandler established that her disability was causally related to her industrial accident and awarded compensation. Upon review, the full Commission reversed the award, finding that Chandler's disability was unrelated to her accident.
[1-3] It is firmly established that a finding by the Commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible evidence, is conclusive and binding upon us. Code Sec. 65.1-98; McCaskey v. Patrick Henry Hospital, 225 Va. 413, 415, 304 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1983); Marval Poultry v. Johnson, 224 Va. 597, 601, 299 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1983); Sky Chefs, Inc. v. Rogers, 222 Va. 800, 805, 284 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1981); Fairfax Hospital v. DeLaFleur, 221 Va. 406, 410, 270 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1980). Moreover, this rule also applies to facts found from conflicting expert opinions. McCaskey, 225 Va. at 415, 304 S.E.2d at 2; Eccon Company v. Lucas, 221 Va. 786, 790, 273 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1981). When there is an internal conflict in an expert's opinion, the Commission may consider other evidence in determining whether a claimant has met his burden of proof. Island Creek Coal v. Miller, 223 Va. 645, 649, 292 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1982).
Chandler contends that there is no conflict in the evidence. She argues that although the hospital discharge summary and the later report by Dr. Fowler may suggest a conflict, the attending physician's final diagnosis, absent other conflicting medical evidence, is controlling. We do not agree.
We believe the rule respecting conflicting expert opinions also applies when, as here, a sole expert gives conflicting opinions. Contrary to what Dr. Fowler later said, he previously reported in the hospital discharge summary that he was uncertain as to the cause of her disability. Moreover, neither the hospital admission sheet nor its discharge summary makes any reference to a job-related injury requiring hospital care, and Chandler conceded that she had "some tenderness" in her lower extremities when she was previously admitted to the hospital "for back pain." Furthermore, Chandler's problems were not in the area of her leg where she received the blow. None of Dr. Fowler's reports provides an explanation for this.
In the present case, there was a conflict in the evidence, and the Commission, as it had the right to do, resolved that conflict against the claimant. It is not our function, but the Commission's, to weigh conflicting evidence, and when there is credible evidence to support the Commission's findings, we are bound thereby. Because we find credible evidence to support the Commission's finding of fact, its award in favor of the employer will be affirmed.
Affirmed.