Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2280 (GK)
July 19, 2002
Johnny Ray Chandler [pro se], GREENVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Jarrett, VA., Plaintiff.
George Edwin Rickman, OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C., Washington D.C., for DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT, Odie Washington, Director, D.C. Department of Corrections, defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a District of Columbia prisoner currently confined at Greensville Correctional Center in Jarrett. Virginia, sues the District of Columbia and D.C. Department of Corrections Director Odie Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common law. Plaintiff alleges that the Department of Corrections denied him his First Amendment right of access to the courts when it failed to transport him to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a scheduled hearing in his case filed in the Small Claims Division. He also claims that Defendants' inaction constituted a breach of contract. Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies, Defendant Washington has qualified immunity and the complaint fails to state a claim. The Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs First Amendment claim falls within the "prisons conditions" lawsuits requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a). It need not resolve that issue because it agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim.
At the time this action was commenced, some District of Columbia prisoners were housed in Virginia prisons pursuant to a contract between the District of Columbia and Virginia under the Interstate Corrections Compact. See D.C. Code § 24-1001; Va. Code. §§ 53.1-216, 217; Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F. Supp.2d 48. 53-55 (D.D.C. 2000). vacated in part on unrelated grounds, Jackson v. District of Columbia. 254 F.3d 262 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Court understands from more recent unrelated proceedings that the contract may have expired.
A court may dismiss a complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted only if it appears that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Harris v. Ladner, 127 F.3d 1121, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). To survive a motion to dismiss in a § 1983 action. Plaintiff must show the deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To prevail on his First Amendment claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered "actual injury." See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2179 (1996) (following Bounds v. Smith, 97 S.Ct. 1491 (1977)); accord Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied 506 U.S. 818 (1992); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2186-87 (2002) ("the complaint must identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought."). Plaintiff alleges that he "lost" his claim. Complaint at 4, but the evidence is to the contrary. The D.C. Superior Court dismissed Plaintiffs lawsuit without prejudice, and the District of Columbia statute of limitations is tolled during Plaintiff's incarceration. See D.C. Code § 12-302(a). Plaintiff is not barred from refilling his case and therefore has not "lost" his claim.
Moreover, a prisoner's right of access to the courts is limited by his incarceration. "[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim. . . ." Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. at 2181-82. As the Court observed in Lewis, "Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." Id. at 2182. Under that standard, Plaintiffs inability to prosecute his claim in the Superior Court's Small Claims Division would not amount to a constitutional injury even if the claim was lost.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants also violated the due process clause. The due process clause is triggered when the government deprives an individual of life, liberty or property. See Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989). Plaintiff claims that a liberty interest flows from mandatory language in the Interstate Corrections Compact. see n. 1. supra, holding the D.C. Department of Corrections responsible for transporting "individual [D.C.] inmates to and from Virginia for any reason." Amended Complaint (Exhibit A). That provision is an allocation of duties between the contracting parties which in no way creates a constitutionally protected right of prisoners to be transported to court or any other place.
The Court will grant Plaintiffs unopposed Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Complaint and Supplement the Pleading filed June 19, 2002.
Plaintiff cites the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that amendment applies only to the states. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the District of Columbia. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497. 499 (1954).
In any event, it is common knowledge that prison officials cannot simply transport an inmate on the inmate's request. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants violated a court order directing his presence at the hearing, and he does not have a constitutional right to be present at the hearing. See. e.g., Pollard v. White, 738 F.2d 1124, 1125 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111 (1985) ("The right to access does not necessarily mean the right to be physically present at the trial of a civil suit . . . The proper procedural vehicle for securing a prisoner's presence at trial is a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum which may be issued at the discretion of the district court.") (footnote omitted); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1948) (prisoner has no constitutional right to argue or to be present at appellate court proceedings); see also accord In re Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911. 914 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Smith v. Wilkinson, 119 S.Ct. 873 (1999) (quoting Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1980)) (as a general rule, "prisoners who bring [civil] actions . . . have no right to be personally present at any stage of the judicial proceedings.").
To the extent such an order would have been violated. Plaintiffs recourse would lie not with this Court but rather with the issuing court.
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim and therefore grants Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court declines to entertain Plaintiffs breach of contract claim, which is more appropriately addressed, if at all, in the District of Columbia courts. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Complaint and Supplement the Pleading [# 23] is granted; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [# 15] is granted; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions are denied; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that this case is dismissed. This is a final appealable Order.