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Chandler v. Chandler

United States District Court, D. Nevada
Sep 7, 2010
2:10-CV-672 JCM (LRL) (D. Nev. Sep. 7, 2010)

Opinion

2:10-CV-672 JCM (LRL).

September 7, 2010


ORDER


Presently before the court is Chandler v. Chandler (2:10-cv-00672-JCM-LRL). Plaintiff William Chandler, who is proceeding pro se, has filed three amended complaints. (Docs # 19, 24, 40). The original complaint named defendants Sandra J. Chandler, Nancy A. Kelley, and Charles W. Gurtler, Jr. (Doc. #1). The first amended complaint added defendant Stephen L. Irgens. (Doc. #19). The following two amended complaints, filed without leave of the court, added defendants Rick A. Williams and Richard Weiss. (Docs. # 24, 40).

Plaintiff and defendant Chandler are parties to a divorce proceeding in Arizona. Defendants Kelley and Irgens were attorneys for defendant Chandler in that case to represent her in that case. Defendants Gurtler, Williams, and Weiss are judges who have presided over the Arizona divorce proceeding.

In his complaints, plaintiff maintains that defendants collectively conspired to defraud him of his property. Plaintiff asserts that both he and his wife, defendant Chandler, were residents of Nevada when the divorce was filed. Accordingly, plaintiff alleges that because neither party was domiciled in Arizona, defendants Kelley, Gurtler, Irgens, Williams, and Weiss violated their legal duty by allowing the case to continue in Arizona. Plaintiff maintains that defendants' acts caused the loss of his property and his subsequent bankruptcy.

Plaintiff originally brought suit alleging diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 pursuant to his federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Plaintiff's amended complaints allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and additional tortious acts.

To adjudicate a claim, a court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and it must be proper to exercise that jurisdiction. This court finds that it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, and that even if it did, exercising jurisdiction would be improper.

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that "if the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Here, the court finds that it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint.

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions that arise under the constitution or federal law. Here, plaintiff claims this court has federal question jurisdiction because he has asserted civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. However, plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie case under § 1983, and his § 1985 claim is not properly before the court. Therefore, there is no federal question to adjudicate.

I. Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that 1) defendants are state officers; 2) defendants acted in their official capacity to deprive the plaintiff of his rights under the constitution or federal law; 3) plaintiff was deprived of his property without due process of law; 4) this deprivation caused the plaintiff's injury. See e.g, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (stating that the person responsible must be fairly classified as a "state actor"); Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (holding that there must be a causal link between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's harm); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (explaining what constitutes a deprivation of due process).

Here, plaintiff is unable to plead the first element of a section 1983 claim, which requires showing that the defendants are state officers. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 837. Defendant Chandler is a private citizen. As plaintiff admits in his complaints, defendants Kelley and Irgens are attorneys licensed to practice in Arizona. Private attorneys are not state officers, and plaintiff does not set forth any facts alleging otherwise.

Although defendants Gurtler, Williams, and Weiss are judges and therefore state officers, they are protected actors. Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, judges are immune from liability for acts done in their judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554 (1967). A dissatisfied litigant may appeal the judge's decision but may not attempt to hold the judge personally liable, even if the decision was made maliciously or corruptly. Id. Such immunity is necessarily in the best interest of the public, for judges must be able to function independently and without fear of liability. Id.

The court finds that plaintiff does not have a claim under section 1983; accordingly, it may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to this claim.

ii. Section 1985 Claims

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a plaintiff may amend his complaint once without leave of court. However, rule 15(a)(2) states that the plaintiff cannot further amend his complaint unless he receives the court's leave or defendants' permission. While pro se plaintiffs are held to a lesser pleading standard than trained professionals, Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008), pro se plaintiffs must still abide by the rules of the court and are not excused from failing to follow rules simply because of their status. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46 (1975) (explaining that "[t]he right of self-representation is not . . . a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law").

Here, plaintiff has filed two amended complaints without leave of the court in violation of rule 15(a), which have added a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Although rule 15 gives this court discretion to admit the second and third amended complaints, consideration of plaintiff's amended complaints is futile according tot he Rooker-Feldman analysis below.

Both bases for federal question jurisdiction having been dismissed, this court does not have jurisdiction under section 1331.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, subject matter jurisdiction exists where there is complete diversity between the parties, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The court may find complete diversity where no defendant is a resident of the same state as the plaintiff. See Owen Equipment Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978).

Here, plaintiff maintains that the Arizona court does not have jurisdiction to hear the divorce proceeding because plaintiff and defendant Chandler are residents of Nevada, and neither was domiciled in Arizona at the time the divorce proceeding began. Plaintiff never alleges that defendant Chandler's residency status has since changed. Thus, having claimed that the divorce proceeding was filed against two Nevada residents, he cannot now assert that defendant Chandler is an Arizona resident without some explanation and support for his changed position. Accordingly, the court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this case.

Both diversity and federal question jurisdiction lacking, the court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to properly adjudicate the present case.

II. ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

Even if this court were to find it had jurisdiction, it would have to consider whether exercising jurisdiction would be appropriate. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court should refrain from sitting in direct review of state court decisions unless specifically authorized by Congress. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). This doctrine encompasses constitutional rights claims that are so related to the state court's decision that a district court would essentially have to review the state court's decision in order to adjudicate the federal claim. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86.

Here, plaintiff's claims would force this court to review the Arizona court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over the Chandlers' divorce proceeding. Essentially, this court would have to decide whether the Arizona court erred in determining defendant Chandler was domiciled in Arizona. The court finds that this method of review would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Therefore, even if this court did find that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case, the issues presented are inappropriate for adjudication.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Chandler v. Chandler (2:10-cv-00672-JCM-LRL) be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are hereby vacated.

DATED September 7, 2010.


Summaries of

Chandler v. Chandler

United States District Court, D. Nevada
Sep 7, 2010
2:10-CV-672 JCM (LRL) (D. Nev. Sep. 7, 2010)
Case details for

Chandler v. Chandler

Case Details

Full title:WILLIAM R. CHANDLER, Plaintiff, v. SANDRA J. CHANDLER, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, D. Nevada

Date published: Sep 7, 2010

Citations

2:10-CV-672 JCM (LRL) (D. Nev. Sep. 7, 2010)