Opinion
NO. 12-11-00167-CV
01-31-2012
MARVIN CHAMPION, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 4TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
RUSK COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marvin Champion appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his suit under Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. He raises three issues on appeal. We affirm.
Champion did not state concisely all issues presented for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f). He also failed to number his issues. For purposes of our review, we have organized Champion's claims into three issues. The first issue is his claim that Chapter Fourteen in unconstitutional. His second issue is his claim that the State failed to offer sufficient rehabilitation to prison inmates. His third issue is his claim that he was denied meaningful access to the courts because the prison system limited the time he could spend in the library and did not provide a computer or "floppy disk" to allow him to do legal work.
BACKGROUND
Marvin Champion sued the State of Texas in 2007. In his petition, he alleged that Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code was unconstitutional, that the State of Texas did not offer sufficient training to prison inmates, and that he should not have been required to attend a specific class. That same year, Champion sought a restraining order to compel the prison system to allow him more access to the prison library. The trial court denied relief, and this court determined that Champion's claims were moot because he had been paroled.
See Champion v. State, No. 12-07-00450-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1581, at *6 (Tex. App.-Tyler March 4, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Champion filed a supplemental petition in 2009, in which he repeated and expanded on his original claims. In 2011, the trial court determined that Champion's lawsuit was frivolous pursuant to Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and dismissed it. This appeal followed.
EQUAL PROTECTION
In his first issue, Champion argues that Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is unconstitutional. Specifically, he argues that it violates the rights of prison inmates to equal protection under the law to require them to meet certain requirements before filing a law suit without paying filing fees. What Does Chapter Fourteen Require?
Chapter Fourteen requires inmates who wish to file a lawsuit without paying a filing fee to file an affidavit or declaration identifying each suit he has previously brought, other than a suit under the Family Code, in which he was not represented by an attorney. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.004(a) (West Supp. 2011); TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(a). For each suit, the inmate must state the operative facts for which relief was sought, set forth the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought, identify each party named in the suit, and state the result of the suit. Id. In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, a trial court may consider whether the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate that arises out of the "same operative facts." Id. § 14.003(b)(4) (West 2002). When an inmate files an affidavit or declaration that fails to comply with the requirements of Section 14.004, "the trial court is entitled to assume that the suit is substantially similar to one previously filed by the inmate, and therefore, frivolous." Bell v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). In such an instance, the trial court may dismiss the suit on the grounds that it is frivolous or malicious. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2), (b)(4); Thompson v. Rodriguez, 99 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
Inmates must also exhaust administrative remedies within the prison grievance system and file any lawsuit within thirty-one days after receiving a written decision from that process. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(a), (b) (West 2002). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it dismisses a lawsuit that does not include a showing that the inmate has exhausted his administrative remedies or a showing that the lawsuit was filed timely. See Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 804-05 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(b) ("A court shall dismiss a claim if the inmate fails to file the claim before the 31st day after the date the inmate receives the written decision from the grievance system."). Finally, an inmate must file a certified copy of his inmate's trust account statement with the trial court. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.006(f) (West 2002). A trial court may dismiss a lawsuit that does not comply with Section 14.006(f). See Thompson v. Rodriguez, 99 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Hughes v. Massey, 65 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.). Do These Requirements Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution?
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This means that "persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982)). The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S. Ct. at 3254.
Classifications based on race, alienage, gender, or national origin, or that impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution are subject to stricter scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 472 U.S. at 440-41, 105 S. Ct. at 3254-55. Champion does not assert that strict scrutiny applies in this case, and this court has held that prison inmates are not a suspect class. See McCray v. Mulder, No. 12-10-00349-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5884, at *8 (Tex. App.-Tyler July 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)).
Accordingly, to assert an equal protection claim, the deprived party must establish that he was treated differently than other similarly situated parties, and that he was treated differently without a reasonable basis. See Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Tex. App.-Houston 14th Dist. 2001, no pet.). In Sanders, the court concluded, preliminarily, that the first of those requirements was not met because the inmate was treated no differently than any other inmate seeking to file a lawsuit without paying filing costs.
Champion appears to be arguing not that he was treated differently from other inmates, but that inmates are treated differently from other litigants. The requirements of Chapter Fourteen apply to inmates who have filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration of an inability to pay court costs or filing fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(a) (West Supp. 2011). Within that stricture, all similarly situated indigent inmates are treated precisely the same and the Equal Protection Clause is not implicated. To the extent that indigent inmate litigants who have filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration and who do not wish to pay filing fees are treated differently that those who will pay a filing fee, this court and many others have recognized that Chapter Fourteen is rationally related to the state's interest in curbing frivolous lawsuits.
Indeed, Chapter Fourteen was "designed to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits being filed in the courts of this State by prison inmates, consuming valuable judicial resources with little offsetting benefit." See Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ). Prohibiting inmates with a history of instituting frivolous and malicious litigation from proceeding in forma pauperis clearly serves to deter such abuses of our judicial system. See Sanders, 36 S.W.3d at 226. We agree with the court in Sanders that "[r]equiring indigent inmates to file affidavits related to their previous filings, to exhaust their administrative remedies, to file suit within 31 days after the decision on their grievance, and to dismiss their suits if they do not comply, furthers the legitimate, even compelling, state interest in protecting scarce judicial resources from the continued onslaught of prisoners who abuse the judicial system by filing frivolous civil lawsuits." Id.at 226 (citing Hicks v. Brysch, 989 F. Supp. 797, 823 (W.D. Tex. 1997)); see also McCray v. Mulder, No. 12-10-00349-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5884, at *9 (Tex. App.-Tyler July 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Prohibiting inmates with a history of instituting frivolous and malicious litigation from proceeding in forma pauperis clearly serves to deter such abuses of our judicial system."); White v. State, No. 12-09-00342-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1444, at *6 (Tex. App.-Tyler Feb. 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("The legislature enacted this modest requirement with the reasonable goal of preserving scarce judicial resources in light of what it perceived to be the burden of frivolous and malicious lawsuits by inmates."); Hamilton v. Thompson, No. 12-07-00231-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4875, at *9-10 (Tex. App.-Tyler June 30, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same).
Accordingly, we hold that the requirements of Chapter Fourteen are rationally related to the state's interest in preserving judicial resources for the disputes that come before the courts and that the modest requirements imposed are rationally related to a reasonable state interest. We overrule Appellant's first issue.
CONCLUSION
Because of our resolution of Champion's first issue, we do not reach the remainder of Champion's issues. Champion did not file with the trial court proof of his exhaustion of administrative remedies or that his lawsuit was filed timely. Nor did he file a certified accounting of his inmate trust account. Accordingly, and for the reasons set out above, the trial court acted within its discretion when it dismissed his lawsuit for failure to comply with Chapter Fourteen. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Champion did file copies of what purports to be the results of his filings with the prison grievance system with a supplement to his appellate brief. The documents were not filed with the trial court and are not within the appellate record.
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JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
(PUBLISH)
Appeal from the 4th Judicial District Court
of Rusk County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 2007-223)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.