It further asserted that Hull "is entitled to recoupment of the additional money spent as a result. ..." Therefore, it is plain from the pleading that Hull's counterclaim sought an amount greater than $45,000, and the civil court erred by not entering a transfer order as directed by the governing legislation. 155 Ga. App. 134, 270 S.E.2d 272 (1980). See id. at 134, 270 S.E.2d 272.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is established by our laws and there is nothing parties to a suit can do to give a court jurisdiction over a matter that has not been conferred by law. See Williams v. Goss, 211 Ga.App. 195, 198 (438 S.E.2d 670) (1993); see also Champion v. Rakes, 155 Ga.App. 134, 135 (270 S.E.2d 272) (1980). Personal jurisdiction is also governed by our laws, and parties cannot agree to allow a court to extend its reach and exercise its powers over people beyond its territorial limits that is not otherwise permitted by law.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is established by our laws and there is nothing parties to a suit can do to give a court jurisdiction over a matter that has not been conferred by law. See Williams v. Goss, 211 Ga. App. 195, 198 ( 438 S.E.2d 670) (1993); see also Champion v. Rakes, 155 Ga. App. 134, 135 ( 270 S.E.2d 272) (1980). Personal jurisdiction is also governed by our laws, and parties cannot agree to allow a court to extend its reach and exercise its powers over people beyond its territorial limits that is not otherwise permitted by law.

Although the trial court discussed the applicability of FELA in general terms, the court effectively pretermitted the exclusivity issue, basing the summary judgment ruling on the merits of the claims as asserted under Georgia law. While this approach was not raised by appellants in their enumerations of error or challenged by appellees by way of cross appeal, the exclusivity issue is a question of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court under FELA. Lewy v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 799 F.2d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 1986). Since a judgment on a matter not within the court's jurisdiction is void at all times and may not be waived, Champion v. Rakes, 155 Ga. App. 134, 135 ( 270 S.E.2d 272) (1980), we must resolve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established that in enacting FELA, Congress superseded state law remedies in the subject area covered by FELA and provided the exclusive remedy for employees of common carriers injured by the negligence of their employers.

The amendment to OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) merely changed the method or procedure by which a plaintiff's existing claim of $3,000 or less could be asserted or enforced against a defendant, insofar as the magistrate court was added as a viable forum for resolution of such claims. Thus, it does not follow that, simply because the present case was filed prior to July 1, 1987, the remedial amendment to OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) cannot be applied. At the time that appellees filed their original statement of claim, they sought an amount which was within the $2,500 jurisdictional limits of the magistrate court. Compare Champion v. Rakes, 155 Ga. App. 134 ( 270 S.E.2d 272) (1980). The judgment of the magistrate court was entered after July 1, 1987 and, at that time, $2,794 was within the jurisdictional limits of that court.

The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin the alleged continuing trespass on the Premises located in South Carolina, and therefore the order of injunction must be reversed. See Laslie , 184 Ga. at 798-799 (1), 193 S.E. 763 ; Champion v. Rakes , 155 Ga. App. 134, 135, 270 S.E.2d 272 (1980) ("[A] judgment on a matter not within the [subject matter] jurisdiction of the court is void."). 3.

It is true that subject matter jurisdiction is assessed at the time of the filing of a suit and is not lost by the occurrence of subsequent developments. See Ga. Dept. of Community Health, 290 Ga. at 630(1), 724 S.E.2d 386;Champion v. Rakes, 155 Ga.App. 134, 134–135, 270 S.E.2d 272 (1980). But the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts can be preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

(Citation omitted.) Champion v. Rakes, 155 Ga.App. 134, 135, 270 S.E.2d 272 (1980). “The nature of any specific preemption claim will depend on congressional intent in enacting the particular preempting statute.”

No amendment was ever made to the complaint, and no amended complaint was ever filed. In Champion v. Rakes, 270 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), a Georgia appellate court was "confronted with a question of whether a court which had no jurisdiction of the subject matter when suit was filed can obtain jurisdiction by rendering a judgment which is within such court's jurisdiction." In a persuasive analysis of the problem, the court answered the question in the negative.