Opinion
Case No.: 1:11-cv-01504 - JLT
07-21-2012
CHERYL CHAMPION, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME
(Doc. 17)
The parties have stipulated by counsel to extend the period of time for Defendant to file a brief in opposition. (Doc. 15). Notably, the scheduling order in this action allows for "a single thirty (30) day extension" by stipulation of the parties. (Doc. 9-1 at 4) (emphasis added). This extension was used by the plaintiff, who requested an additional thirty days to file her opening brief. (Docs. 16-17). Beyond the single thirty-day extension, "requests to modify [the scheduling] order must be made by written motion and will be granted only for good cause." (Doc. 9-1 at 4).
A scheduling order "is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded without peril." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). The deadlines are considered "firm, real and are to be taken seriously by parties and their counsel." Shore v. Brown, 74 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1260, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94828 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2009). Here, the parties have not identified any reason for the second request for an extension of the briefing schedule. Indeed, the entirety of the stipulation states:
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED, by and between the undersigned attorneys, subject to the approval of the Court, that Defendant shall have a 30-day extension, or until August 20, 2012, in which to file his Opposition to Plaintiff's Opening Brief.(Doc. 17). Consequently, the Court is unable to find that good cause exists for the extension requested by Defendant. In any event, rather than delay the process further—by requiring the filing of an adequate stipulation, the Court GRANTS the request. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Counsel are admonished to abide by the scheduling order and the legal requirements for attendant to any future filings.
Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE