The scope and extent of cross-examination rests primarily within the discretion of the trial judge. ( People v. Moretti (1955), 6 Ill.2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709.) Only an abuse of such discretion which results in prejudice to the complaining party will justify reversal by a reviewing court. ( Chamness v. Dawson (1963), 44 Ill. App.2d 176, 177, 194 N.E.2d 538.) We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion where it limited plaintiffs' cross-examination of the defendant regarding his connection with the Prudence Mutual Agency Company. Barrett was called by plaintiffs to testify as an adverse witness pursuant to section 60 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 60).

( People v. Moretti, 6 Ill.2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 947.) Only in the case of clear abuse of discretion, resulting in a manifest prejudice to the complaining party will a reviewing court interfere with the trial court's ruling. ( Chamness v. Dawson, 44 Ill. App.2d 176, 194 N.E.2d 538.) We find no such prejudice in this case.

( People v. Moretti, 6 Ill.2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 947, 2 L.Ed.2d 822, 78 S.Ct. 794.) A trial court's ruling will not be interfered with by the reviewing court unless presented with a case of clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. ( Chamness v. Dawson, 44 Ill. App.2d 176, 194 N.E.2d 538.) It is true that the accused should be given wide latitude in cross-examination of the prosecutrix in a sex case. ( People v. Malston, 122 Ill. App.2d 466, 258 N.E.2d 362, 364.)

Moreover, it is quite clear that restrictions on cross-examination will not be grounds for reversal when all the evidence is before the trial court and the appellate court. In the case of Chamness v. Dawson (1963), 44 Ill. App.2d 176, 194 N.E.2d 538, the court emphasized that the scope and extent of cross-examination was within the sound discretion of the trial court. At page 177, the court cited 69 A.L.R.2d 593 for the proposition:

[6, 7] It is well known that the scope and extent of cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Chamness v. Dawson, 44 Ill. App.2d 176, 194 N.E.2d 538. This case was consolidated for trial with an action filed against both parties by a passenger in defendant's car. No objection to the consolidation was made by plaintiff. It was inevitable that as a consequence of the consolidation and of the nature of this case that the trial would be a long and arduous one.

We also agree that prior injuries, as they relate to a litigant's present state of health, are an appropriate subject of inquiry. It is however, apparent, that prejudice to the rights of a litigant may result from the injection of questions not germane to the issue. In support of the relevancy of his cross-examination Petitioner relies principally on Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Miller, 212 Ill. 49, 72 N.E. 25, Chamness v. Dawson 44 Ill. App.2d 176, 194 N.E.2d 538, Chicago City R. Co. v. Canevin, 72 Ill. App. 81, and Gordon v. Checker Taxi Co. 334 Ill. App. 313, 79 N.E.2d 632. Although these cases support the general principle with respect to prior injuries and present state of health, we do not believe that the facts therein support the contentions of Petitioner. In Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Miller, supra, the cross-examination complained of did not concern previous injuries to the Plaintiff.

The guardian ad litem fees are based upon legal services of Robert S. Hill in preparing and presenting the case for the appellee in the Appellate Court. In this appeal, Chamness v. Dawson, 44 Ill. App.2d 176, 194 N.E.2d 538, it appears from the report that defendant's attorney and his guardian ad litem appeared for the appellee. [1] Unquestionably, Robert S. Hill, is entitled to fees for his services as guardian ad litem.