Summary
affirming district court's denial of bill of review
Summary of this case from Chambers v. StateOpinion
No. 05-09-00407-CV
Opinion Filed March 24, 2010.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law, Kaufman County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 09C-0107.
Before Justices O'NEILL, LANG, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marsha Chambers d/b/a Pedigrees Plus appeals the order of the county court at law denying her application for writ of certiorari to the Honorable Johnny Perry, Justice of the Peace Court Precinct One, to review the denial of her bill of review filed in the justice court. Appellant brings forty-six issues asserting the county court at law erred in denying her application for writ of certiorari and in not granting her bill of review. We affirm the county court at law's judgment.
BACKGROUND
Chapter 821 of the Texas Health and Safety Code permits a peace officer to apply for a warrant to seize an animal the officer has reason to believe has been or is cruelly treated. Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 821.022(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009). If the magistrate determines probable cause has been shown to believe the animal has been or is cruelly treated, the magistrate shall issue the warrant and set a hearing date in justice or municipal court within ten days of the issuance of the warrant. Id. § 821.022(b). The officer executing the warrant impounds the animal and gives the owner written notice of the time and place of the hearing. Id. § 821.022(c). At the hearing in justice or municipal court, all interested parties are permitted to present evidence. Id. § 821.023(c). If the court determines the owner has cruelly treated the animal, the court shall divest the owner of ownership of the animal and order the animal be sold at auction, given to a listed type of nonprofit organization, or humanely destroyed, and the court shall order the owner to pay all court costs. Id. § 821.023(d), (e). If the court does not find the owner has cruelly treated the animal, the court shall order the animal returned to the owner. Id. § 821.023(f).
In November 2004, peace officers seized 121 dogs and one cat from appellant's premises. A jury trial was held in Justice of the Peace Court Precinct One, and the jury found appellant had cruelly treated the animals. The justice of the peace ordered appellant divested of ownership of the animals and transferred their ownership to the Dallas Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, d/b/a SPCA of Texas. Appellant attempted to appeal the order to district court, but the district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Appellant then appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the district court's dismissal of her appeal because, at that time, the health and safety code did not permit an appeal of the justice court's order giving the animals to a nonprofit organization. Chambers v. Justice Court Precinct One, 195 S.W.3d 874, 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) ( Chambers I). In October 2006, appellant sued the State of Texas seeking the return of the animals and declarations that her constitutional rights had been violated and that the justice court lacked jurisdiction in the 2004 case. See Chambers v. State, 261 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) ( Chambers II). In the appeal from the trial court's dismissal of her suit and the denial of her motion for new trial, we concluded the State had not waived its immunity from suit, her suit was a collateral attack against the 2004 judgment, appellant failed to show the justice court lacked jurisdiction in the 2004 case, the justice court had jurisdiction to issue the warrant to seize appellant's animals, and appellant's constitutional challenges to chapter 821 of the health and safety code were impermissible collateral attacks because they would not render the underlying judgment void. Id. at 758-59.
See Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1043, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3000, 3002, amended by Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, § 11(a), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 4273, 4275 (codified at Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 821.025 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (authorizing appeal to county court or county court at law and providing animal may not be sold or given away while appeal is pending)).
In December 2008, appellant filed a bill of review in the justice court. The justice court denied the bill of review. Appellant then sought to appeal the denial of the bill of review by filing an application for writ of certiorari in the county court at law, and that court denied appellant's application for writ of certiorari. Appellant now appeals the denial of her application for writ of certiorari.
BILL OF REVIEW
"A bill of review is an independent equitable action brought by a party to a former action seeking to set aside a judgment, which is no longer appealable or subject to motion for new trial." Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979). According finality to judgments is of fundamental importance, and bills of review seeking relief from final judgments are scrutinized with "extreme jealousy and the grounds on which interference will be allowed are narrow and restricted." Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. 1984).
For a bill of review to be a direct attack of the underlying judgment, as opposed to a collateral attack, all persons with a real, present interest in the judgment attacked must be joined. Lowe v. Farm Cred. Bank of Tex., 2 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. App.-San Antonio1999, pet. denied) (discussing Hunt v. Ramsey, 162 Tex. 133, 345 S.W.2d 260 (1961)). In this case, the SPCA had a real, present interest in the 2004 judgment because that judgment passed ownership of the seized animals to it. Thus, it was a necessary party and had to be joined for the bill of review to be a direct attack. Appellant did not join the SPCA in the bill of review; thus, her attack is collateral.
As we stated in Chambers II:
Collateral attacks on final judgments are generally not allowed because policy favors finality of court judgments. Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2005). To prevail on this issue, appellant must prove that the justice court's judgment is void. See id. at 346 (only a void judgment may be collaterally attacked). A judgment is void if the court rendering the judgment (1) did not have jurisdiction of the parties, (2) did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, (3) did not have jurisdiction to render the judgment, or (4) did not have the capacity to act as a court. See id.
Chambers II, 261 S.W.3d at 758. Appellant's brief raises many issues besides the justice court's jurisdiction over the 2004 case and the county court at law's denial of the writ of certiorari. Those other issues are impermissible collateral attacks and will not be considered in this appeal. For example, many of the issues assert the provisions of chapter 821 are unconstitutional; we ruled in Chambers II that these arguments were impermissible collateral attacks. See id. at 759. Other impermissible collateral attacks asserted in appellant's brief include: the sufficiency and credibility of the evidence in the 2004 case, the justice court's rulings and refusals to rule in the 2004 case, violations of appellant's constitutional and statutory rights in the pretrial seizure of the animals and in the conduct of the trial, jury misconduct, appellant's bribery allegations against the district attorney, section 821.025's denial of a right of appeal, and this Court's and other courts' refusals to rule on appellant's actions for declaratory judgment.
Many of appellant's issues and arguments appear to be based on an assumption that this Court stated in Chambers II that the judgment in the 2004 case was a finding she was guilty of the crime of cruelty to animals under section 42.09 of the penal code. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (Vernon Supp. 2009). No such statement is express or implied in the opinion. As we stated, the 2004 case was filed under the health and safety code, not as a crime under the penal code. Chambers II, 261 S.W.3d at 759; see also State v. Almendariz, 301 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.). In the 2004 case, appellant was not charged with, tried for, or convicted of a crime. Accordingly, all of appellant's issues and arguments founded on the assumption that the 2004 case involved a criminal offense lack merit.
It appears appellant is relying on the following statement in the synopsis attached to the opinion published by Thompson Reuters/West on Westlaw and in the South Western Reporter: "justice court that presided over criminal animal cruelty case had jurisdiction to enter civil forfeiture order as to allow State to seize over 100 animals." Chambers II, 261 S.W.3d at 755 (emphasis added). The digest features also contained a similar statement. See id. at 756 (headnote 9). The synopsis and digest features are editorial additions of the publisher and are not part of the opinion of this Court. Accord Gutzke v. Gutzke, 908 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ("West's synopsis . . . is never considered part of a court's opinion."). This Court's opinion does not state the justice court, in the 2004 case, presided over a criminal case.
APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Appellant argues the justice court lacked jurisdiction over the 2004 case because the value of the animals exceeded the court's amount-in-controversy jurisdiction; and justice courts have no jurisdiction over "a suit in behalf of the state to recover a . . . forfeiture." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 27.031(a), (b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
The Texas Constitution provides for the civil jurisdiction of justice courts as follows: "Justice of the peace courts shall have . . . exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters where the amount in controversy is two hundred dollars or less, and such other jurisdiction as may be provided by law." Tex. Const. art. 5, § 19. By 2004, the legislature had provided justice courts with jurisdiction over civil matters where the amount in controversy did not exceed $5000 and exclusive jurisdiction was not in the district or county courts. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 27.031(a)(1). The legislature also limited justice courts' jurisdiction by providing they did not have jurisdiction over "a suit in behalf of the state to recover a penalty, forfeiture, or escheat." Id. § 27.031(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
See Act of May 22, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 776, § 2, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2767, 2767 (increasing amount-in-controversy jurisdiction to $5000), amended by Act of May 16, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 383, § 2, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 685, 686 (increasing amount-in-controversy jurisdiction to $10,000).
Appellant asserts that applying section 27.031, the justice court lacked jurisdiction over the 2004 case because the suit was brought by the State to recover a "forfeiture," and the value of her property disposed of in the suit (i.e., the animals) was $60,000 to $350,000, which exceeded the $5000 limit on the justice court's jurisdiction. Appellant raised this same issue in Chambers II. We rejected the argument in that case, observing,
Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the legislature passed chapter 821 of the Texas Health and Safety Code to provide justice courts with special and limited jurisdiction over actions alleging cruel treatment of animals. We conclude that appellant has not shown that the justice court lacked jurisdiction to hear the animal cruelty case. As a result, her collateral attack on that judgment on this basis must fail.
Chambers II, 261 S.W.3d at 759 (citations omitted); see also Chambers I, 195 S.W.3d at 875 ("Chapter 821 of the Texas Health and Safety Code provides justice courts with special and limited jurisdiction over forfeiture of animals found in situations constituting cruelty to animals."). For the same reason, appellant's collateral attack in this case likewise fails.
Appellant also argues the justice court lacked jurisdiction to order the "forfeiture" of her animals because there was no allegation or proof that the animals were linked to criminal activity. She asserts that chapter 59 of the code of criminal procedure requires that the forfeited property be linked to criminal activity. Article 59.02 of the code of criminal procedure provides, "Property that is contraband is subject to seizure and forfeiture under this chapter." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.02 (Vernon Supp. 2009). Article 59.01(2) defines "contraband" as any property that is used in the commission or to facilitate the commission of certain criminal offenses or that is proceeds of or acquired with the proceeds of certain criminal offenses. Id. art. 59.01(2). However, in the 2004 case, appellant's property was not forfeited under chapter 59 of the code of criminal procedure; accordingly, its provisions do not apply. Appellant was divested of ownership of the animals under chapter 821 of the health and safety code, which does not require allegations or proof of criminal activity. We conclude appellant has not shown the lack of allegations or proof of criminal activity rendered the 2004 judgment void.
Appellant also appears to argue the justice court lacked capacity to enter the 2004 judgment because the justice of the peace was sitting as a magistrate in a show-cause hearing or because it was sitting as an administrative hearing officer for the department of health. The record shows the justice of the peace was sitting as a justice court and entered the 2004 judgment pursuant to its jurisdiction under section 821.023 of the health and safety code.
None of appellant's other issues or arguments assert the justice court lacked jurisdiction in the 2004 case over the parties or the subject matter, lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or lacked capacity to act as a court. Accordingly, they are impermissible collateral attacks. Because appellant failed to show the judgment in the 2004 case was void, the justice court did not err in denying appellant's bill of review, and the county court at law did not err by denying appellant's application for writ of certiorari. We overrule appellant's issues.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.