Opinion
Civil Action 2: 22-cv-1477
07-31-2023
JEFFREY RAHIEM CHAMBERS, Plaintiff, v. MELINDA ADAMS, KAREN FEATHER, JEAN HOLDREN, AND WELLPATH MEDICAL CONTRACT COMPANY, Defendants.
Marilyn J. Horan United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
The motion to dismiss filed by the Corrections Defendants has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 72.1.3 and 72.13. It is recommended that the motion be granted and the claims against the Corrections Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile.
II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Rahiem Chambers, is a state prisoner committed to the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and at all times relevant to this lawsuit was incarcerated at SCI-Mercer. He commenced this action on October 19, 2022, by the filing of a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”). Attached to the IFP motion was a verified Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights, which was lodged pending disposition of the IFP motion. The IFP motion was granted on October 24, 2022, (ECF No. 5), and the Complaint was filed that day. (ECF No. 6).
Plaintiff has brought this case against two types of defendants: (1) DOC personnel or administrators at SCI-Mercer - Superintendent / Facility Manager Melinda Adams and Corrections Health Care Administrator (“CHCA”) Karen Feather (collectively referred to as the “Corrections Defendants”) and (2) medical care providers - Dr. Jean Holdren, DO, Medical Director, and Wellpath Medical Contract Company (collectively referred to as the “Medical Defendants”). All defendants are named only in their official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by denying and delaying adequate medical treatment, and providing inadequate treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. As relief, Plaintiff seeks, “an injunctive relief of $250,000.00 for pain and suffering, and punitive damage relief of $250,000.00.” Complaint, at ¶ VI, Relief.
Once served, the Medical Defendants filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses. (ECF No. 31). The Corrections Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 32). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 48). The matter is ripe for consideration.
B. Jurisdiction
The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
C. Factual Background
The following allegations of Plaintiff's complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.Plaintiff injured his left knee on June 7, 2021 while playing basketball in the yard at SCI-Mercer. The SCI-Mercer medical staff personnel deemed it necessary to transport the Plaintiff to Sharon Regional Hospital Emergency Room for his injury. There, it was determined that the injury was a possible torn ACL or Meniscus and that a MRI would be necessary to determine the diagnosis and a follow up with an orthopedic specialist would be needed. Upon returning to SCI-Mercer, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Holdren, who submitted a request for a MRI for the Plaintiff. Dr. Holdren's request was subsequently denied by the Wellpath Contract Company review committee as it concluded that Plaintiff should follow up with the onsite physical therapist. On July 12, 2021, Plaintiff received a MRI which revealed he had a complete ACL tear, a partial MCL tear, lateral meniscus tear, LCL sprain, PCL sprain, triangle meniscus fragmented, and bone marrow edema. See Complaint, Injuries, at p. 5 (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff was seen by an orthopedic specialist on July 22, 2021, and had a surgical procedure to repair the damage to his knee on August 31, 2021.
As Plaintiff is a prisoner appearing pro se, the Court will treat the additional factual allegations contained in his response as though they were included in the complaint. Baker v. Younkin, 529 Fed.Appx. 114, 115 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Lewis v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 878 F.2d 714, 722 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Eighty-five (85) days elapsed from the time of Plaintiff's injury to the surgical intervention. According to Plaintiff, during this time, he could not walk and endured pain and suffering due to the initial denial of medical treatment and inadequate treatment, which resulted in delayed adequate medical treatment. P's Resp., Statement Of The Case (ECF No. 48 at pp. 23).
D. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1983). In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). To determine whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir.1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint - regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so - when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
E. Discussion
The Corrections Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them contending that the complaint fails to state a claim because (i) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars any claim against them in their official capacities; (ii) the facts alleged do not support the personal involvement of either Defendants Adams or Feather in any actionable conduct; and (iii) the facts alleged do not support an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Feather. These arguments will be addressed in order.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Corrections Defendants first contend that dismissal is warranted because “Eleventh Amendment immunity bars any claim against the individual Corrections Defendants in their official capacities.” Br. at 3. (ECF No. 33). In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that the Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions for monetary damages in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials in their official capacities. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity). Plaintiff argues, however, that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar his claims because he is seeking only injunctive relief against the Corrections Defendants.
The complaint is clear that Plaintiff brings his claims against the Corrections Defendants in their official capacities and Plaintiff has disclaimed any claim for monetary damages against the Corrections Defendants. Thus, the motion to dismiss is moot to the extent it seeks dismissal of any claim seeking monetary damages against these defendants.
As noted above, the Corrections Defendants in their official capacities do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent Plaintiff requests injunctive relief against them. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed to review Plaintiff's claims on their merits.
The Court notes that the title of Paragraph B of the Brief contains the names of three individuals who are not defendants in this case. Br. at p. 4. The body of the argument, however, only addresses Defendants Adams and Feather.
The Corrections Defendants next argue that dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts to establish that either Corrections Defendant had personal involvement in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
To prevail on a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is axiomatic that liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's “personal involvement” in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Gould v. Wetzel, 547 Fed.Appx. 129 (3d Cir. 2013). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
a. Superintendent / Facility Manager Melinda Adams
When the defendant is a supervising prison official, liability must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986). Nor can Section 1983 liability be predicated solely on the theory of respondeat superior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See also Monell v. Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, (1978) (superiors of line officers who act in violation of constitutional rights may not be held liable on a theory of vicarious liability merely because the superior had a right to control the line officer's actions); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293-95 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that § 1983 plaintiff is required to show that supervisor personally participated in violating her rights, that he directed others to violate her rights, or that he had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations). Rather, a supervisordefendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
Moreover, it is “well established that the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite for personal involvement.”).
Here, Plaintiff's only factual averment regarding Superintendent / Facility Manager Adams relates to her role in denying Plaintiff's grievances. Specifically, the Complaint states that Superintendent / Facility Manager Adams “failed to thoroughly investigate the Plaintiff's grievances, complaints, and requests related to the denial and delayed health care treatment. The Defendant also failed to provide appropriate resolutions.” Complaint, Statement of Claim, at p. 8 (ECF No. 6).
As described above, this type of averment is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mincy, 508 Fed.Appx. at 104 (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”); Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL 4609144, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was “made aware of several issues of the plaintiff's and . . . failed to help him” is insufficient to state a claim for relief).
Therefore, it is recommended that all claims against Defendant Adams be dismissed as Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts to establish that Defendant Adams had personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. Further, it is recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile.
b. CHCA Karen Feather
To the extent that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Feather arise from her involvement in the grievance process, it is recommended that such claims be denied for the reasons stated above. This alone warrants dismissal of the claims against Defendant Feather.
In the alternative, however, the Corrections Defendants argue that CHCA Feather is a non-medical defendant. As such, she was not personally involved in the medical decisions regarding Plaintiff's treatment and the complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against her. See Fantone v. Herbik, 528 Fed.Appx. 123, 128, n.6 (3d Cir. 2013) (Defendant, although a registered nurse, “while acting as the [CHCA] [] acted in a purely administrative role and did not provide direct medical treatment to inmates.”).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has previously concluded that non-medical prison officials are generally justified in relying on the expertise and care of prison medical providers. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.”). Moreover, the case law is clear that health care administrators are “undisputably administrators, not doctors . . .,” Thomas v. Dragovich, 2005 WL 1634260, *6 (3d Cir. 2005), and, therefore, “cannot be deemed deliberately indifferent simply because the lay administrator did not challenge the physician's care or respond directly to a prisoner's request for more or different treatment.” Judge v. Medical Dept at SCI-Greene, Civ. Act. No. 05-1776, 2007 WL 1576400, *4 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2007). Further, as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained in Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), a non-physician defendant cannot be considered deliberately indifferent for failing to respond to an inmate's medical complaints when he is already receiving treatment by the prison's medical staff.
The complaint states that Defendant Feather knew Plaintiff had gone to the emergency room on June 6, 2021, and that Plaintiff had a MRI on July 12, 2021, which revealed that he had,
a complete ACL tear, Lateral Meniscus tear, partial MCL tear, LCL, and PCL sprain, Triangle Meniscus Fragmented, and Bone Marrow Edema. The Plaintiff's injuries required immediately surgical attention. The Defendant knew of these possible injuries on June 8, 2021, and the potential risk to the Plaintiff for more than thirty days.
Complaint, IV. Statement of the Claim. at pp. 8-9. In his response to the motion, Plaintiff adds that as CHCA, Defendant Feather is “responsible for scheduling inmate transfers between the state correctional facility to provide surgical, clinical, and out-patient services, which she denied in doing so for non-medical reasons.” Resp. at p. 8.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a prison official knows of an inmate's need for medical care and intentionally refuses to provide it, delays it for non-medical reasons, or prevents the prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment. See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1992). In his response, Plaintiff makes the conclusory statement that Defendant Feather delayed treatment for “non-medical reasons.” Resp. at p. 8 (ECF No. 48). Even assuming that Defendant Feather was responsible for Plaintiff's medical treatment, which as a CHCA she was not, the Complaint does not allege that Defendant Feather made any decisions based on avoiding incurring costs of care or that she was acting for any other non-medical reason. Because Plaintiff has alleged in the most conclusory terms that Defendant Feather delayed treatment for non-specified “non-medical reasons,” it is recommended that, in the alternative, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference against Defendant Feather be dismissed. See Winslow v. Prison Health Services, 406 Fed.Appx. 671, 675 (2011).
For these reasons, it is recommended that all claims against Defendant Feather be dismissed as Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts to establish that Defendant Feather had personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. Alternatively, it is recommended that all claims against Defendant Feather be dismissed as the Complaint fails to state a claim that Defendant Feather was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. It is also recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Corrections Defendants be granted and the claims against the Corrections Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by August 18, 2023, and the Corrections Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by August 15, 2023. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).