729 F.2d at 1134. Cf. Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General Insurance Co., 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 331 N.E.2d 203 (1st Dist. 1975). In this case, as in Home Insurance, there was a single loss and multiple theories of liability.

Gibraltar Cas. Co. v. Sargent Lundy, 574 N.E.2d 64, 671 (Ill.App.Ct. 1991). See also Chambers Gasket Mfg. Co. v. General Ins. Co., 29 Ill. App.3d 998 (insurer correct in refusing to defend because the damages alleged in the complaint against the insured were not covered). Here, with the exception of the Johnson complaint, the damages sought in the underlying complaints under the Consumer Fraud Act in Count I and for common law fraud in Count II are plainly not covered under the TILA Endorsement

That portion itself accommodates the circumstance of a withdrawal by a purchaser of the insured's product who uses that product as a component part of his own and who withdraws his product due to a defect in a component supplied by the insured. Chambers Gasket Mfg. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 331 N.E.2d 203 (1975), is a case in point. A valve manufacturer purchased a supply of gaskets which it installed in its finished products.

( Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. (7th Cir. 1975), 508 F.2d 417, 419-20 ("We do not think that the mere inclusion of a defective component, where no physical harm to the other parts results therefrom, constitutes `property damage' within the meaning of the policy. * * * Idled machinery is not injured or destroyed tangible property and, therefore, there is no `property damage' within the coverage of the policy"); accord Sentry Insurance Co. v. S L Home Heating Co. (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 687, 414 N.E.2d 1218 (insured was sued after the HVAC system it installed in a plant failed to adequately perform; court determined that the expense of repairing the HVAC system was economic losses which would not have been covered under the policy and only found coverage after specific physical injuries to portions of the HVAC system were alleged); Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General InsuranceCo. of America (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 1000, 331 N.E.2d 203 (claim for the value or replacement of the insured's defective gaskets "was clearly not within the scope of the policy coverage"). Although the allegations with respect to repair could be consistent with physical injury to other portions of the system aside from the thermal banks themselves, they cannot by themselves denote that any such physical damage took place, particularly in the context of a claim against multiple defendants who were cumulatively active in the manufacture or installation of the entire system.

osition that Illinois courts preclude a finding of insured property damage where only economic losses are claimed: Qualls (123 Ill. App.3d at 835) (damages resulting from poor workmanship in house construction are economic losses, not property damage); CMO Graphics, Inc. v. CNA Insurance (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 491, 496-97, 450 N.E.2d 860 (lost profits, goodwill and printing costs are intangibles not covered under a general liability policy where plaintiff failed to allege any damages caused to its products or any diminution in value of its products as a result of the printing of defective advertising inserts); Ludwig Candy Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 306, 310, 396 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (lost profits, damage to reputation, lost goodwill and costs incurred from incidental expenses and in warehousing defective candy that had to be pulled from the market were economic losses not covered by the property damages portion of the insured's liability coverage); Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 1001-02, 331 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (no property damage alleged when complaint sought recovery for defective gaskets but alleged no injury to any other property); Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Case FoundationCo. (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 115, 124, 294 N.E.2d 7 (investments, anticipated profits and financial interests are not physical or tangible property); and Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. (7th Cir. 1975), 508 F.2d 417, 419 (inclusion of a defective component where no physical harm occurs to other parts is not property damage). Plaintiff contends Wilkin is distinguishable because there the court had to consider the unique and serious health risks associated with asbestos.

International also asserts that mere installation or removal of defective parts which causes no destruction or injury to the third person's products does not constitute property damage. ( Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 1001, 331 N.E.2d 203, 206; Elco Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 1106, 1111, 414 N.E.2d 41, 45.) It characterizes the current case as involving simply removal and replacement of defective parts, the pipe.

• 3 Having addressed Prudential's potential duty to indemnify Catherine, we now consider whether Prudential has a separate duty to defend Catherine in the lawsuit filed by Laura-Jean. It is well settled that an insurer's duty to defend an insured arises only if the allegations fall within the scope of the insurance policy. ( Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1986), 144 Ill. App.3d 943; Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 331 N.E.2d 203; Maretti v. Midland National Insurance Co. (1963), 42 Ill. App.2d 17, 190 N.E.2d 597.) Thus, we conclude that the absence of an obligation for Prudential to indemnify Catherine precludes any obligation to defend her in the lawsuit filed by Laura-Jean.

ere is no coverage. (See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Gleason (1964), 50 Ill. App.2d 207, 214, 200 N.E.2d 383, 387.) Illinois has followed the rule that there is no duty to defend where the claim is beyond the scope of coverage in numerous cases: Schneider v. Autoist Mutual Insurance Co. (1931), 346 Ill. 137, 139-40, 178 N.E.2d 466, 467-68 (insurer had no duty to defend where coverage was contingent upon the insured's cooperation with the insurer); Stiefel v. Illinois Union Insurance Co. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 352, 357, 452 N.E.2d 73, 76 (insurer was under no duty to defend since the policy coverage did not extent to acts, errors or omissions of which the insured had knowledge of or could reasonably have foreseen would result in a claim); Graman v. Continental Casualty Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 896, 902, 409 N.E.2d 387, 392 (insured's noncompliance with the insuring agreement resulted in no policy coverage for the claims against the insured and thus the insurer had no duty to defend); Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 1002, 331 N.E.2d 203, 206 (insurer had no duty to defend action brought by customer against insured gasket manufacturer because the policy did not cover the damages sought by the customer); Mann v. Mann (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 552, 558, 273 N.E.2d 40, 45 (insurer's failure to defend did not invoke the estoppel doctrine as the claims against the insured were beyond the policy coverage); Midwest Contractors Equipment Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp. (1969), 112 Ill. App.2d 134, 140-41, 251 N.E.2d 349, 352 (insurer may decline to defend where the policy coverage does not extent to the claimant); Meyer v. Aetna Casualty Insurance Co. (1964), 46 Ill. App.2d 184, 190, 196 N.E.2d 707, 710 (insurer was not obligated to defend suit against the insured arising out of an auto accident in which the insured's son was driving as the policy coverage applied only to accidents occurring while the insured was driving); Brodeck v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of America (1937), 292 Ill. App. 363, 382-84, 11 N.E.2d 228, 236-37 (where

In Yakima Cement Products Co. v. Great American Insurance Co. (1980), 93 Wn.2d 210, 608 P.2d 254, the supreme court of Washington concluded that no intangible damage to tangible property within the policy coverage occurs unless there is proof that the value of the structure or entity into which the insured's product was integrated was in some way diminished. This is in accord with the law of Illinois. Sentry Insurance Co. v. S L Home Heating Co. (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 687, 414 N.E.2d 1218; Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 331 N.E.2d 203. The question of coverage aside, it seems to me that Fremont has demonstrated prejudice as a matter of law and should be relieved of any responsibility under the policy.

First, comprehensive general liability policies like the one here are intended to protect the insured from liability for injury or damage to the persons or property of others; they are not intended to pay the costs associated with repairing or replacing the insured's defective work and products, which are purely economic losses. ( LaMarche v. Shelby MutualInsurance Co. (Fla. 1980), 390 So.2d 325; Chambers Gasket Manufacturing Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 998, 331 N.E.2d 203; Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc. (1979), 81 N.J. 233, 405 A.2d 788.) Finding coverage for the cost of replacing or repairing defective work would transform the policy into something akin to a performance bond. Second, an exception to an exclusion such as that contained here in exclusion (a) should not be interpreted as granting coverage or providing an additional basis for coverage. Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Hodorowicz (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 948, 406 N.E.2d 146; Weedo. Third, and most important, the exception in exclusion (a) has a meaning that does not conflict with exclusions (f) and (g). Country Mutual cites the explanation given in Weedo, which construed an exclusion (a) identical in substance to the one here.