Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:03-CV-2145-G
November 21, 2003
ORDER
Before the court are the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation ("Findings") of the United States Magistrate Judge, filed November 12, 2003, and the objections to the Findings ("Objections") of the plaintiff Lonnie Charles Chalmers ("Chalmers"), filed November 13, 2003.
In his Objections, Chalmers asserts that "[t]he University of Texas at Dallas used the registration information received by [the] Texas Department of Public Safety . . . as the basis for termination [of Chalmers]." Objections at 1. Chalmers repeatedly asserts that the "overall design" of the sex offender registration statutes "is regulatory, not punitive," an observation made by Judge Barefoot Sanders in a separate case brought by Chalmers. Chalmers v. Gavin, No. 3:01-CV-528-H, 2002 WL 511512, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2002) (Sanders, District J.). Chalmers now argues that the University of Texas at Dallas ("the University")'s use of the sex offender registration information to fire him is "punitive," and, therefore, subverts Judge Sanders's earlier order. Objections at 1 ("Chalmers simply seek[s] enforcement of the provisions of this court[']s order that specifically state[s] that registration is non punitive. . . .").
As explained fully in the Findings, Chalmers does have a felony conviction on his record. The University's policies state that the University may base its hiring decisions "on such factors as the duties of the position, the nature and number of offenses, the dates of the offenses, employment and rehabilitation history, . . . and other job-related factors." UTD Admin. Pol. Proc. Manual at D2-115.0.1-2 (Sept. 17, 2003) (quoted in Findings at 5 n. 3). In accordance with this policy, the University's decision to terminate Chalmers was based on a criminal history report that listed Chalmers's felony conviction. See Memorandum from Euel Elliott, Associate Dean for Graduate Education, School of Social Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, to Lonnie Chalmers (September 18, 2003), attached to Plaintiff's Civil Action Complaint Exhibits For Deprivation Of Civil Rights Lawsuit as Exhibit 2.
Although the design of the sex registration laws is not punitive in nature, the fact that the consequences of Chalmers's felony conviction — as distinguished from the registration itself — may have a punitive effect on him does not in itself make those consequences unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court noted this year while upholding Alaska's sex offender registration laws, "[a]lthough the public availability of the information may have a lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the [Alaska Sex Offender Registration] Act's registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of public record." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, ___ 12 S.Ct. 1140, 1151 (2003). Accordingly, Chalmers's Objections are without merit.
With the addition set forth above, I am satisfied, after a review of the record, that the Findings of the magistrate judge are correct. It is therefore ORDERED that those Findings, with the additional comments made herein, are ADOPTED as the findings and conclusions of the court.