Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-1268-BH.
January 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are:
(1) Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 25, 2004;
(2) Brief in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def. Br."), filed October 25, 2004;
(3) Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl. Resp."), filed November 12, 2004;
(4) Brief by Plaintiff Reply to Defendant's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment [sic] ("Pl. Br."), filed November 12, 2004; and,
(5) Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def. Reply"), filed November 30, 2004.
Having reviewed the pertinent pleadings and the law applicable to the issues raised, the Court finds that Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lonnie Charles Chalmers ("Chalmers"), proceeding pro se, brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Dr. Donald Granvold ("Dr. Granvold") and Dr. Hector Diaz ("Dr. Diaz"). (Compl. at 1-2.) Both Defendants are professors in the School of Social Work at the University of Texas at Arlington ("UTA"). Id.A. Allegations of Academic Dishonesty
In the spring of 2003, Chalmers was studying to become a licensed social worker at UTA's School of Social Work and nearing graduation. (More Definite Statement I at 1.) In a letter dated April 29, 2003 and addressed to Dr. Larry Watson ("Dr. Watson"), Assistant Dean of the UTA School of Social Work, an individual named Ronnie Mack ("Mack") claimed to have written all the papers Chalmers turned in while attending UTA and the University of Texas at Dallas ("UT-Dallas"). (App. to More Definite Statement I at 4.) Mack sent a separate letter to Dr. Lon Johnston ("Dr. Johnston"), alleging that he had written a paper Chalmers turned in for Dr. Johnston's course. Id. at 5. Dr. Norman Cobb ("Dr. Cobb"), Director of the Community Services Clinic at the UTA School of Social Work, sent Chalmers a letter dated May 6, 2002, informing him of Mack's allegations and requesting that Chalmers submit papers he had recently turned in for social work courses; the letter further stated that papers written for Dr. Johnston's course would be particularly helpful. Id. at 6. Chalmers sent a letter to the Board of Regents on May 7, 2003, requesting that UTA hold a combined hearing with UT-Dallas to give him an opportunity to respond to all of Mack's accusations on one occasion. Id. at 25. On May 16, 2003, Dr. Johnston submitted a disciplinary referral regarding Chalmers' work to Dr. Watson, which Dr. Watson then referred to UTA's Dean of Students, Dr. Austin Lane ("Dean Lane"), on May 20, 2003. Id. at 28.
For ease of reference, the Court will refer to Chalmers' more definite statement filed January 5, 2003 as "More Definite Statement I" and the more definite statement filed January 30, 2003 as "More Definite Statement II."
Also on May 20, 2003, Dr. Pedro Reyes ("Dr. Reyes"), Associate Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs of the University of Texas System, sent Chalmers a letter explaining that Dr. Reyes had reviewed Chalmers' letter of complaint dated May 9, 2003. Id. at 26. Dr. Reyes said he had spoken to the officials handling Chalmers' case at UTA, and that because an official disciplinary claim involving Chalmers had been filed by a professor, the matter was being referred back to UTA. Id. Chalmers received notice on May 21, 2003 from the Dean of the UTA Graduate School that he would not receive his social work degree because his grade in Dr. Johnston's class was not yet resolved.
Dr. Reyes appears to be addressing topics distinct from those discussed in Chalmers' letter to the Board of Regents dated May 7, 2003. However, the exact contents of the letter to which Dr. Reyes refers are not clear, as Chalmers did not include a copy of the May 9, 2003 letter to the Board of Regents in any of the appendices he filed with the Court.
On May 22, 2003, both Dr. Granvold and Dr. Diaz submitted disciplinary referrals to Dean Lane, along with copies of papers Chalmers had submitted in their classes. (Def. App., Exh. A at 4-38; Exh. B at 61-71.) Defendants had highlighted the portions of the papers they thought were improperly attributed to their sources, and attached those sources. Id. at 6-38; 43-45; 62-89.
Chalmers disputes the date the disciplinary referrals were received and appears to allege that they were actually submitted on May 23, 2003.
B. Chalmers' First Lawsuit Against UTA Faculty Members
On May 23, 2003, Chalmers filed a lawsuit entitled Chalmers v. Johnston, 3:03-CV-1142-D, alleging that UTA faculty members Dr. Johnston, Dr. Cobb, and Dr. Watson impermissibly changed his grade in Dr. Johnston's class and prevented him from graduating. (More Definite Statement I at 3-4.) According to Chalmers, the purpose of the suit was to "move Dr. Johnson to enter the correct grade earned by Chalmers in SOCW 6323." Id. at 3.
Also on May 23, 2003, Dean Lane gave Chalmers two summons letters, one regarding Dr. Granvold's disciplinary referral, and the other regarding Dr. Diaz' referral, informing Chalmers that he had been accused of scholastic dishonesty. (Def. App., Exh. E at 120-121.) The letter informed Chalmers that he could choose, pursuant to the UTA Handbook of Operating Procedures, to have the matter resolved through a formal hearing or by the Discipline Coordinator. Id. At this meeting, Chalmers also received a copy of the UTA Handbook of Operating Procedures, describing the potential penalties for academic dishonesty. (App. Compl., Exh. A at 1-17.)
On May 27, 2003, Dean Lane sent Chalmers a letter explaining that the allegation of scholastic dishonesty brought by Dr. Johnston could not be substantiated, and that Chalmers would therefore receive no disciplinary penalty related to his grade in Dr. Johnston's course. (App. to Compl., Exh. E at 1.) Chalmers subsequently moved for voluntary dismissal of his suit against Dr. Cobb, Dr. Johnston, and Dr. Watson, stating that his grade had been changed and that defendants were not at fault regarding his inability to graduate.
The District Court granted Chalmers' dismissal request and closed the case on October 30, 2003.
C. Chalmers' Second Lawsuit Against UTA Faculty Members
On June 6, 2003, Chalmers filed the instant suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dean Lane, Dr. Granvold, and Dr. Diaz. (Compl. at 1-2.) In his suit, Chalmers complained that the defendants violated the rules and regulations of UTA regarding inquiries of scholastic dishonesty and prevented him from attaining his Master of Science in Social Work degree. Id. at 2-4. Specifically, Chalmers complained that Dr. Granvold and Dr. Diaz:
are retaliating against plaintiff for complaining and filing federal suit against employees in the school of social work. They are retaliating by filing false allegations against plaintiff, Granvold submitting a paper with my name on it that is not plaintiff's work . . . and Diaz submitting a paper against plaintiff that is not plaintiff's work . . . [sic]Id. at 2. Chalmers also argued that Dean Lane denied him due process by imposing interim disciplinary action (changing his grades in Defendants' courses to X) without an administrative hearing within ten days of that action. Id. at 4.
On June 26, 2003, Dean Lane sent Chalmers letter advising him that a formal disciplinary hearing had been scheduled as per his request at their meeting on May 23, 2003. (Def. App., Exh. F at 122-123). The formal hearing, the letter stated, would take place on July 16, 2003. Id. at 122. Enclosures included copies of the evidence to be presented at the hearing, including statements of the allegations against Chalmers and the evidence against him and a witness list. Id. An additional enclosure, Chapter 2 of the UTA Handbook of Operating Procedures, included a listing of authorized disciplinary actions for academic dishonesty, including cancellation of prior course credit and suspension. Id. at 95.
Chalmers responded by letter dated July 9, 2003, expressing his intention not to appear at the hearing. Id. at 118-119. In his letter, Chalmers denied having committed plagiarism in the paper for Dr. Diaz, and asserted that the paper submitted as evidence that he had plagiarized in Dr. Granvold's course was not the paper he had actually submitted. Id. A hearing officer conducted a formal hearing regarding the charges of academic dishonesty on July 16, 2003. (More Definite Statement I at 8.) On July 22, 2003, she issued her decision, finding Chalmers guilty of academic dishonesty, and ordering that Chalmers' grades in Granvold's and Diaz's courses be changed from interim "X" grades to grades of "F," and imposing a suspension of one academic year — from July 24, 2003 to July 24, 2004. (More Appendix/Exhibits to Plaintiff's Local Rule 7.2 Brief In Support for Preliminary Injunctive Relief Filed June 26, 2003 at 7.) Chalmers appealed the hearing officer's decision; UTA's Interim President affirmed it. (Def. App., Exh. C at 89.)
D. First Motion to Dismiss the Instant Lawsuit
On September 23, 2003, Dean Lane, Dr. Granvold, and Dr. Diaz jointly moved to dismiss Chalmers' Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. In the alternative, they requested that Chalmers file a more definite statement of his claims. In a Memorandum Opinion Order filed December 23, 2003, the Court dismissed Chalmers' monetary claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed all injunctive and declaratory claims against Dean Lane. See Chalmers v. Lane, 2003 WL 23109794, at *5-8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2003). Thus, only Chalmers' injunctive and declaratory claims against Granvold and Diaz remained. See id. at 8. Ruling on those claims in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court was required to accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to Chalmers. Id. at 7. Under this standard, the Court found that Defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating that Chalmers could prove no set of facts in support of his claims, and the Court therefore declined to dismiss those claims. Id. The Court ordered Chalmers to file a more definite statement of his injunctive and declaratory claims against Dr. Granvold and Dr. Diaz no later than January 30, 2004. Id. at 8. Chalmers filed the first of two more definite statements on January 5, 2003.
E. Second Motion to Dismiss the Instant Lawsuit
On January 26, 2004, Dr. Granvold and Dr. Diaz filed a second motion to dismiss Chalmers' Complaint as supplemented by the more definite statement he had filed January 5, 2003. They argued that Chalmers failed to state a claim for retaliation because he failed to allege that they had knowledge of the previous lawsuit at the time they filed their disciplinary referrals. Chalmers v. Lane, 2004 WL 833679, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2004). They also argued that Chalmers' claims were moot, because his one year suspension had expired, and because they were powerless to reinstate his previous grades. Id. Alternatively, they argued that Chalmers' complaint should be dismissed for failure to set forth a short and plain statement of his claim as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Id. at *5.
Chalmers filed his response to this motion to dismiss on January 30, 2004, along with a second more definite statement of his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. In the second more definite statement, he alleged that Dr. Granvold and Dr. Diaz filed allegations of academic dishonesty only because Chalmers complained to the Board of Regents and filed suit against other UTA professors. (More Definite Statement II at 1.)
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued April 16, 2004, this Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss, explaining that Defendants made no arguments in the second motion to dismiss that the Court had not already considered and rejected in the first motion to dismiss, nor had Defendants presented any reason for departing from the Court's previous decision. Chalmers v. Lane, 2004 WL 833679, at *3. This Court also rejected Defendants' mootness argument, noting that in the previous motion the Court had found that "[a] § 1983 suit against an individual in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the entity for whom the individual works." Id. at *4, n. 4. Therefore, "the proper inquiry is whether Chalmers claims against UTA are moot." Id. at *5. Because Granvold and Diaz did not argue that UTA lacked the ability to reinstate Chalmers' grades, his claim could not be dismissed on this ground. Id. Finally, this Court rejected Defendants' motion for dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 8, finding that Chalmers' more definite statements, filed January 5, 2003 and January 30, 2003, provided sufficient notice of and information about his claims to satisfy the requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Id.
E. Procedural History Subsequent to Motions to Dismiss
The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement through mediation. However, on August 23, 2004, Chalmers advised the Court that he no longer wished to have the case dismissed, due to his dissatisfaction with the implementation of the settlement agreement. The parties were unable to resolve their dispute in a second mediation ordered by the Court.
Defendants submitted the instant joint motion for summary judgment on October 25, 2004. In the motion, Defendants argue that Chalmers has not created a genuine issue of material fact in regard to his procedural due process and retaliation claims. (Def. Br. at 1-2.) Defendants also argue that even if the Court determined that Chalmers has created an issue of fact on any of his claims, they lack the authority to grant the relief sought. Id. at 9. Chalmers responded on November 12, 2004, asserting that Defendants had not provided any information to prevent a jury from reaching the conclusion that retaliation had not occurred, and reiterating his claim that Defendants violated his due process rights. (Pl. Br. at 4-5.) Defendants filed a reply on November 30, 2004. The matter is now before the Court and ripe for determination.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for resolving issues of law arising from a materially complete factual record." Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 93 F. Supp. 2d 751, 756 (N.D. Tex. 2000). "Furthermore, disputes over the legal inferences to be gleaned from the facts in evidence will not prevent summary judgment; thus, where a non-movant merely debates the consequences flowing from admitted facts, summary judgment is proper." Id. "Interpretations of statutory provisions that are dispositive and which raise only questions of law, there being no contest as to the operative facts, are appropriate for summary judgment." United States v. Miller, 2003 WL 23109906, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2003).
With regard to factual issues, summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material facts exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The movant makes such a showing by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmovant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show . . . some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the motion's opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 ( citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the non-movant's summary judgment burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment in favor of the movant is proper if, after adequate time for discovery, the motion's opponent fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and as to which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Section 1983
Chalmers filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. at 3.) Section 1983 provides a right of action against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A § 1983 suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the entity for whom the official works. See Greer v. Tran, 2003 WL 21467558, at *2 (E.D.La. June 23, 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985), and Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996)). Chalmers' claims against Defendants arise out of their official actions at UTA. Thus, they are claims against UTA. See id.
In § 1983 cases, the Court must first identify "the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 n. 5 (1998). In this case, Chalmers appears to assert due process claims as well as claims for retaliation in violation of his rights to complain and access the courts.
B. Retaliation Claims
Defendants assert that Chalmers "has failed to raise genuine issues of material fact on . . . his retaliation . . . theories." (Def. Br. at 4.)
1. Establishing a Retaliation Claim under § 1983
To state a claim for retaliation under § 1983, a plaintiff "must allege the violation of a specific constitutional right and be prepared to establish that but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred." Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Mt. Healthy City School District Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1990); Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1990) (Heaney, J., dissenting); McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1979). "Mere conclusionary allegations of retaliation will not withstand a summary judgment challenge." Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166 (citing Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1988)). In Woods, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff "must produce direct evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario, 'allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.'" 60 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988)) (other citations omitted).
Retaliation claims arise in a number of different contexts, but the framework for analyzing such claims does not vary greatly. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386-387 (6th Cir. 1999). "The essence of such a claim is that the plaintiff engaged in conduct protected by the statute, the defendant took an adverse action against the plaintiff, and this adverse action was taken in part because of the protected conduct." Id. In addressing student retaliation claims, the Fifth Circuit has not enunciated a different framework applicable to those claims. See, e.g., Shinn v. College Station Independent School District, 96 F.3d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding dismissal of retaliation claim because plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to find that secondary school student was retaliated against in violation of his right to free speech). This Court thus uses the framework set forth in Woods, which captures the essential elements of a retaliation claim (protected activity, adverse action, motive, and causation). The Court notes that because both Chalmers and the Defendants cite to Woods in their briefing on Chalmers' retaliation claims, they appear to agree that Woods provides an appropriate analytical framework.
2. Retaliatory Motive
Defendants assert that Chalmers has failed to establish that their disciplinary referrals were filed for any reason other than their discovery of evidence of plagiarism in his work. (Pl. Br. at 5.) In their affidavits, Defendants asserted that they initially reviewed the work Chalmers had done in their classes as a result of accusations made against him by an individual named Ronnie Mack. (Def. App., Exh. A at 1-2; Exh. B at 59-60.) In those affidavits, they explained that after discovering overwhelming evidence of plagiarism in Chalmers' work, they referred him to the Dean of Students, and accompanied their referrals with documentary evidence of plagiarism. Id. at 1-2, 6-38, 43-45, 59-60, 62-89.) By offering a non-retaliatory reason for the filing of their disciplinary referrals and pointing to evidence in the record that supports this explanation, Defendants have made a sufficient showing to shift the burden to Chalmers to identify specific record facts evidencing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether their motive was retaliatory.
Dr. Diaz stated "I reviewed the paper submitted by Mr. Chalmers because an individual named Ronnie Mack had written several letters to the School of Social Work accusing Mr. Chalmers of academic dishonesty and providing corroboration for the accusations. I referred Mr. Chalmers to the Dean of Students because when I reviewed his paper from my class, I found multiple long paragraphs copied verbatim from different textbooks and not attributed or credited to the proper authors. The only reason I referred Mr. Chalmers to the Dean of Students is because I believed that he had plagiarized in my class. (Def. App., Exh. A at 1-2)
Dr. Granvold stated "I reviewed the paper submitted by Mr. Chalmers because an individual named Ronnie Mack had written several letters to the School of Social Work accusing Mr. Chalmers of academic dishonesty and providing corroboration for the accusations. I referred Mr. Chalmers to the Dean of Students because when I reviewed his paper from my class, there were many direct quotes of others' work in Mr. Chalmers' final paper which were represented as his own. Original authors whose work was being directly lifted were not referenced in text as the authors of the information. My decision to refer Mr. Chalmers for academic dishonesty was based on the overwhelming evidence of plagiarism in completing requirements for my course . . . I did not refer Mr. Chalmers to the Office of Student Judicial Affairs in retaliation for any action or deed other than academic dishonesty." (Def. App., Exh. B at 59-60.)
Chalmers relies solely on the chronology of events — that the professors' referrals were filed shortly after he complained to the Board of Regents and near the time he filed suit — to support his claims for retaliation. (Pl. Br. at 4.) Chronology alone, however, will not always create a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d at 122-123 (finding that chronology alone did not support a claim for retaliation where protected activity and adverse action took place the same day, the official responsible for the adverse action provided a non-retaliatory motive, and plaintiff never produced documentary or testimonial evidence to support claim after sufficient period for discovery); Roberson v. Alltell, 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th 2004) ("the mere fact that some adverse action is taken after an employee engages in some protected activity will not always be enough for a prima facie case") (quoting Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997)).
In the instant matter, as in Richardson and Roberson, Defendants provided evidence of a non-retaliatory motive. Chalmers therefore cannot rely on chronology alone to support his claim; he must point to evidence rebutting Defendants' stated reasons for filing the disciplinary referrals. See Thomas v. Los Rios Community College District, 58 Fed. Appx. 700 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding district court's grant of summary judgment proper where plaintiff, an LVN student, argued that he was suspended because of his race and in retaliation for prior litigation but did not rebut evidence of defendants' non-discriminatory reasons for suspending him). Chalmers, however, despite a sufficient period for discovery, has presented no evidence that Defendants filed disciplinary referrals for any reason other than their discovery of evidence that he had plagiarized. Under these circumstances, he has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendants' motive. See Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d at 122-123 (finding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff produced no evidence of retaliation and defendant submitted an affidavit stating nonretaliatory reasons for actions); Roberson v. Alltell, 373 F.3d at 656 (finding summary judgment where plaintiff relied solely on timing allegations and defendants had offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions).
Chalmers has failed to failed to create a fact issue regarding the existence of an essential element of a retaliation claim, retaliatory motive. Accordingly, summary judgment for the Defendants on Chalmers' retaliation claims is appropriate, and the Court need not address whether Chalmers has established the other elements of a retaliation claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-323.
C. Due Process Claim
Defendants move for summary judgment of Chalmers' due process violation claim on grounds that he has failed to state a claim for such a violation. (Br. at 7.) Defendants argue that Chalmers cannot state a claim for a due process violation because he was given notice of the disciplinary referrals and an opportunity to be heard, thereby satisfying the due process requirements for disciplinary action in a university setting. (Br. at 7-8.) They also assert that he has not established that he was substantially prejudiced by any of the due process violations he alleged. Id. Although the Court is not convinced that Chalmers has properly brought a due process claim against Defendants, the Court will nevertheless address this claim in an abundance of caution.
In his Complaint, Chalmers' due process claim appeared to be limited to Dean Lane, who was dismissed from the suit on December 23, 2003. In Chalmers' second more definite statement, however, he asserts three due process violations against Defendants. (More Definite Statement II, at 2.) Those claims are that Granvold submitted a paper that was not Chalmers' work, that Diaz submitted a paper that was co-authored by another student, and that the co-author was not present at the hearing in which Chalmers was found guilty of academic dishonesty. The first two claims appear to be defenses against the allegations of academic dishonesty, rather than claims of due process violations. The last claim is properly brought by the co-author, as Chalmers has no standing to assert a claim on behalf of his co-author.
1. Standard for a Due Process Claim in the University Setting
In evaluating a university student's procedural due process claims, the court must decide (1) whether Chalmers had a property interest in the course grades changed to Fs and to school attendance during the year of suspension; (2) what process was due to Chalmers before he could be deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest; and (3) whether UTA accorded Chalmers the process due. See Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The Court need not determine whether Chalmers had a property interest in his course grades and continued attendance, because even assuming that he did have a property interest, he received all the process he was entitled to under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 973 (citing Board of Curators of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978)).
Procedural due process in the university setting requires that a student receive "some meaningful notice and an opportunity to respond." Id. at 975 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 (1976)). In determining whether a disciplinary hearing provides a meaningful opportunity to be heard, courts should not "evaluate it under the strict procedural standards accorded criminal trials, nor for that matter . . . under the procedural standards enforced in civil court trials or hearings." Davis, 882 F.2d at 976. To establish a denial of procedural due process, the aggrieved student must show substantial prejudice. Id. at 975 (citing Keogh v. Tate Co. Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1083 (5th Cir. 1983); U.S. Pipe Foundry v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 1979)).
2. Notice
Defendants assert that Chalmers was given adequate notice regarding the allegations of academic dishonesty against him as well as the hearing regarding those allegations, and Chalmers has not contested this issue. (Def. Mot. at 7.) Defendants point to the two summons letters Dean Lane gave Chalmers on May 23, 2003, informing him that he had been accused of scholastic dishonesty by professors in the Social Work Department. (Def. App., Exh. E at 120-121.) The letters instructed Chalmers to make an appointment with Dean Lane to explain or otherwise respond to the allegation. Id. The letters also informed him that he could request a formal hearing. Id. At that time Chalmers also received a copy of the UTA Handbook of Operating Procedures, describing the potential penalties for academic dishonesty. (App. Pl. Compl., Exh. A at 1-17.) On June 26, 2003, Dean Lane sent a second letter, including an attachment stating the allegations against Chalmers, the evidence against him, and a witness list, as well as setting a formal hearing for July 16, 2003. (Def. App., Exh. F at 122-123.) By sending these two letters, UTA met its burden as a matter of law to provide Chalmers with meaningful notice of the allegations against him. See Davis, 882 F.2d at 975 (finding that letter providing notice of charges and potential penalties and an opportunity to request a hearing, and followed by a letter with notice of hearing along with a witness list and detailed summary of witness' testimony, constituted sufficient notice). Chalmers does not dispute this evidence.
3. Opportunity to Be Heard
Defendants also assert that the formal hearing UTA provided satisfied the due process requirement that Chalmers have an opportunity to respond to the charges against him. (Def. Br. at 8.) UTA maintains that the hearing substantially complied with its procedural rules, and that "Chalmers' alleged procedural defects in the hearing have not raised a genuine issue of material fact that he was denied the requisite procedural process." (Def. Br. at 8.)
By scheduling a formal hearing with a neutral fact-finder, at which Chalmers had the right to present evidence and have witnesses testify on his behalf, UTA met its burden to provide Chalmers with a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Davis, 882 F.2d at 976 (finding that a hearing at which plaintiff had an opportunity to present case through positive witnesses, documentation, and cross-examination satisfied limited process due plaintiff). Although Chalmers contends that Dr. Granvold submitted a paper that was not his and that Dr. Diaz submitted a paper that was not solely his work, Chalmers has not asserted that the hearing did not provide him with a meaningful opportunity to contest this evidence. (Pl. Resp. at 5.) He also complains that the co-author of the paper written for Dr. Diaz was not summoned to the hearing by Defendants, but Chalmers has not argued that he was prohibited from summoning his co-author as a witness. Id. In sum, none of the due process violations Chalmers alleges implicate his right to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Chalmers sent the administration a letter describing his intention not to attend the hearing. By sending this letter, Chalmers may therefore have waived his right to complain about whether the hearing itself provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281, 285-286 (5th Cir. 1977) (excusing college from further due process requirements after a teacher waived his right to a hearing).
4. Substantial Prejudice
Defendants also assert that Chalmers has failed to establish that he was substantially prejudiced by any of the due process violations he alleges. (Def. Br. at 7-8.) In fact, Chalmers did not assert nor present evidence of substantial prejudice. Because Chalmers failed to present evidence that the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings would have been different had Defendants not committed the due process violations he alleges, Chalmers has not met his burden of demonstrating that he was substantially prejudiced by any alleged due process violations.
In sum, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that they provided Chalmers with notice and an opportunity to be heard, thereby satisfying their requirement that they furnish him with due process. Chalmers has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, nor has he pointed to evidence in the record establishing that he was substantially prejudiced by the alleged violations. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Chalmers' due process claim.
D. Injunctive Relief
Defendants assert that, even assuming, arguendo, that Chalmers created a fact issue on his claims, they lack "the authority to reverse the disciplinary action taken by the University." (Def. Br. at 8-9.) Because summary judgment is appropriate as to Chalmers' retaliation and due process claims, the Court need not address Defendants' assertion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Plaintiffs' claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.