The Court understands that Plaintiffs wish to proceed as representatives in a class action lawsuit, but that issue is premature until a claim or claims for relief have been set forth in a proper pleading. In addition, if even a single plaintiff receives injunctive relief that results in policy changes that affect the prison population as a whole, all prisoners would benefit from those changes and a formal class action may not be necessary to achieve the same result. See, e.g., Giles v. Prattville, 556 F.Supp. 612 (D. Ala. 1983); Chacon v. Zahorka, 663 F.Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1987). The Court expresses no opinion on that matter at this time, and any Plaintiff may renew a motion for class certification when the issue is ripe.
Many courts have held that, where a suit attacks the constitutionality of a policy, or practice by a state actor, there is generally little need for the suit to proceed as a class action, since it can be assumed that, if the court declares the policy or practice unconstitutional, then the responsible government officials will discontinue enforcement of it. See Lent v. Lopes, 107 F.R.D. 62 (D. Conn. 1985); Chacon v. Zahorka, 663 F.Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1987); Griffin v. Smith, 493 F.Supp. 129 (W.D. N.Y. 1980); Inmates, Washington County Jail v. England, 516 F.Supp. 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1981). For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion Amend Complaint for Classwide Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 44) will be denied; Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 45) will be denied; and Defendants' Motion to Stay Class Certification Motion (Dkt. 52) will be denied.
"Compliance with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a condition precedent to the commencement of a state action against a public entity." Chacon v. Zahorka, 663 F. Supp. 90, 93 (D.Colo. 1987) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Where the claim is based on state law, state substantive law applies and the Supremacy Clause does not control.
In view of this holding, we need not address the implications of Fielder v. Casey, 56 U.S.L.W. 4689 (June 22, 1988), wherein the United States Supreme Court recently held state notice of claim statutes preempted by the supremacy clause when a § 1983 action is brought in state court. See also Charcon v. Zahorka, 663 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1987). V
In support of this contention, plaintiffs again assert that the rule announced in Felder v. Casey, supra, pre-empted the General Assembly from adopting notice requirements which are inconsistent with federal law. They further rely upon the holdings in Chacon v. Zahorka, 663 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1987) (notice of claim is not required in federal civil rights case); and Mucci v. Falcon School District No. 49, 655 P.2d 422 (Colo.App. 1982) (federal civil rights claims are not barred by plaintiffs' failure to comply with notice provisions of Governmental Immunity Act). In support of the judgment, however, defendants argue that Chacon v. Zahorka, supra, and Mucci v. Falcon School District #49, supra, have no current precedential value because those cases were decided under the pre-1986 version of § 24-10-109.