A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Gould is an unpublished case issued under a summary disposition rule, and thus the court did not intend for it to have precedential value. See, e.g., Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 881 N.E.2d 792, 794 n.4 (2008). For this reason, Gould is unlike the published Iowa state supreme court decision the U.S. Supreme Court relied on in Mathis.
Under Massachusetts law, Rule 1:28 decisions "are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale." See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 881 N.E.2d 792, 794 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008). That is one reason why such decisions may not be cited as binding precedent.
Under the appeals court rules, these decisions, issued prior to February 25, 2008, could not be relied upon or cited as precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 881 N.E.2d 792, 795 n. 4 (Mass.App.Ct. 2008); Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 562, 476 N.E.2d 243, 246 n. 7 (Mass.App.Ct. 1985). We do not consider them.
” See id. (citing Chace v. Curran, 881 N.E.2d 792, 794 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008)). As the language in the appellate decision is not binding and has limited persuasive value since it does not address the facts nor offer any decisional rationale, the Court finds this quoted language offers minimal, if any, persuasive support to the Jones Defendants' position.
Moreover, Rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.” Chase v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008). Massachusetts courts do not consider such opinions to be binding precedent, although they may be cited for “persuasive value.” Id.