Opinion
C.A. No. 02C-08-012 WLW
Submitted: October 4, 2002
Decided: October 8, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Denied.
Beth D. Savitz, Esquire of Hudson, Jones, Jaywork Fisher, Dover, Delaware, attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Mary E. Sherlock, Esquire of Brown, Shiels, Beauregard Chasanov, Dover, Delaware, attorneys for the Defendant.
ORDER
I. Introduction
Upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on Super.Ct.Civ.R. 12(b)(1), and the response of Plaintiff, it appears to this Court that based upon settled theories of subject matter jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss should be denied.
II. Background
The Plaintiff, Chabbott Petrosky Commercial Realtors, Ltd. ("Chabbott"), is a Delaware general corporation with its principle place of business located at 2 North State Street, Dover. Chabbott engages in real estate transactions in both Maryland and Delaware. The Defendant, Charles E. Briggs, Sr. ("Briggs"), is a resident of Georgetown, Delaware. This lawsuit is to recover a realtor's commission based on the sale of a farm in Maryland. The agreement which forms the basis for the claimed commission was signed by Briggs in Maryland. The farm in question was sold to Briggs in an auction pursuant to a mortgage foreclosure sale. Both the Substitute Trustee in bankruptcy that handled the closing and the lender for Defendant's purchase of property are in Maryland. However, negotiations between the parties took place in Delaware for this and previous contracts. The Plaintiff also claims that post-contract conversations, including one in which Briggs admitted to owing Plaintiff the $70,000 commission, took place in Delaware. Furthermore, most of the witnesses that will be testifying are located in Delaware.
III. Analysis
"Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of all causes of a civil nature, real, personal, and mixed, at common law and all the other jurisdiction and powers vested by the laws of this State . . . ." The Superior Court has general jurisdiction to hear claims for monetary relief. Thus, this Court has competent jurisdiction over contract claims of this nature.
Delaware Constitution of 1897 Art. IV. § 7.
Am. Appliance, Inc. v. Delaware, 712 A.2d 1001, 1003 (Del. 1998).
When determining whether a Delaware court has power to hear this specific contract claim, this Court will look at Delaware's interest in adjudicating the claim. Here, this Court has substantial interest in having this litigated in Delaware. The Plaintiff is incorporated in Delaware and has its principle place of business here. The Defendant is a resident of Delaware. The Defendant has sufficient notice of the action and most of the witnesses are located in Delaware. This Court has an interest to provide a forum to its citizens claiming relief. Under choice of law, it is likely Maryland law will apply; however, this Court is competent to apply Maryland law to the facts of this case.
Note that the Defendant does not cite any law in support of its Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiff cites two cases neither of which specifically deals with the standard or factors to be used concerning subject matter jurisdiction. The Plaintiff's first case, Agusta Aviation Corp. v. Raco Helicopter Corp., 1984 Del. Super. LEXIS 787, deals with forum non conveniens, and the other, J.E. Rhoadds Sons, Inc. v. Ammeraal, Inc., 1988 Del. Super. LEXIS 116, deals with choice of law.
In addition, the Plaintiff's choice of forum is given great weight. "A defendant bears a heavy burden of proving inconvenience under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in order to override a plaintiff's choice of forum." The Supreme Court has stated that: "the dismissal of an action on the basis of the doctrine [forum non conveniens], and the ultimate defeat of plaintiff's choice of forum, may occur only in the rare case in which the combination and weight of the factors to be considered balance overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant."
Kane v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 1995 Del Super. Lexis 597, *5 (citing Moore Golf, Inc. v. Ewing, 269 A.2d 51, 52 (Del. 1970)).
Kolber v. Holyoke Shares, Inc., 59 Del. 66, 213 A.2d 444, 447 (Del. 1965).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.