Opinion
E073959
01-16-2020
C.H., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Ronda Chow for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Michael A. Markel, Principal Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J281353) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Petition denied. Ronda Chow for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Michael A. Markel, Principal Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
I
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner C.H. challenges the juvenile court's finding he was not entitled to presumed father status and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to eight-month-old I.H. On appeal, C.H. argues the juvenile court erred in finding he was not I.H.'s presumed father and making him a nonparty to the dependency matter when it held his statements to the social worker that he was not the biological father against him. C.H. also requested a stay of the section 366.26 hearing. We reject C.H.'s argument and deny his writ petition as well as his request for stay.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I.H.'s mother, E.S. (Mother), is not a party to this appeal.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Child Welfare History Involving Mother's Other Children
The family initially came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) in December 2016 when Mother's three other children, R.S., Lo.S., and Li.S., were removed from her care due to domestic violence between Mother and C.H. Mother reported several incidents of domestic violence between herself and C.H. from June 21 to June 28, 2016, with the last incident resulting in Mother going to the hospital and C.H. being arrested. On August 15, 2016, the father of the three children was granted custody of R.S., Lo.S., and Li.S. Due to concerns that Mother was living with C.H., a no contact order between the children and C.H. was ordered and reaffirmed by the court in January 2018.
In December 2016, R.S., Lo.S., and Li.S. were removed from their father's care due to physical abuse inflicted upon them by their father's girlfriend. However, the children were not placed with Mother due to ongoing domestic violence between Mother and C.H. In November 2017, R.S., Lo.S., and Li.S. were returned to their father's care. About a month and half later, the children were again removed from their father's care due to physical abuse inflicted upon them by their father.
On January 18, 2018, Mother reported that she understood CFS's concerns regarding her relationship with C.H. At that time, she also noted that C.H. was the biological father of her eldest child, M.R., and that she had ran into C.H. on January 28, 2018, at church. She requested that the no contact order be lifted since she had a child with C.H. The social worker advised Mother that she needed to follow the court order and that a Child and Family Team (CFT) meeting would need to take place to address the no contact order with C.H. A CFT meeting occurred on February 2, 2018, and a safety plan was developed with regards to childcare and the no contact order with C.H.
Eighteen days later, on February 20, 2018, Mother met with the social worker to complain about the safety plan and wanted the no contact order to be changed to a "no negative contact" order similar to the terms of C.H.'s parole. The social worker explained that the no contact order was in place to ensure the children's safety and unless the court stated otherwise, Mother was required to comply with the no contact order. Mother said that she understood and would follow through with the safety plan.
On April 17, 2018, R.S., Lo.S., and Li.S. were returned to Mother's care under a family maintenance plan with the understanding that Mother would comply with the no contact order. However, on August 27, 2018, the three children, along with their half sibling M.R., were removed from Mother after C.H. was found living with Mother and the children by C.H.'s parole officer. The social worker also learned that there had been a domestic violence call on June 15, 2018, alleging that Mother was sitting in the front seat of a car crying and C.H. was in the backseat hitting Mother in the head.
On November 1, 2018, Mother's reunification services were terminated as to R.S., Lo.S., and Li.S. And on November 28, 2018, Mother and C.H. were denied reunification services as to M.R.
B. Current Dependency Matter
On June 4, 2019, CFS received a referral as to I.H. The referral stated that there was possible domestic violence between Mother and C.H. and that the parents had a history of domestic violence. The referral also noted that C.H. had a history with abusing methamphetamine and heroin. Both C.H. and Mother denied the allegations.
I.H. was born in May 2019. C.H. stated that he had been in jail between August 1 and August 10, 2018, and that I.H. was delivered on time, maybe a day or two late. Mother reported that C.H.'s mother had helped her find a place to live. Thereafter, she and C.H. began living together in a trailer in March 2019, after they were both released from jail. Due to a parole violation, C.H. was in jail from January 3, 2019 to March 12, 2019. Mother was in jail from August 27, 2018 to September 11, 2018.
On June 7, 2019, the social the social worker sought and obtained a detention warrant based on Mother and C.H.'s history of domestic violence but was unable to serve the detention warrant because she could not locate the family. The social worker called Mother, who stated they were out of town and would not be back until June 10, 2019. The social worker advised Mother that she needed to contact the social worker or come into the office on June 10, 2019. C.H. and Mother came to the office on June 10, 2019, and I.H. was removed from their custody. I.H. was placed with C.H.'s mother.
On June 12, 2019, a petition was filed on behalf of I.H. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling). At the detention hearing, the following day, I.H. was formally detained from parental custody and maintained with C.H.'s mother. Mother and C.H. were ordered to complete the paternity inquiry, as well as, information relating to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
As to ICWA, C.H. reported that he was a registered member of the Cherokee tribe. C.H.'s mother also stated that she was a registered member of the Cherokee tribe. In addition, since C.H. was a registered member of the Cherokee tribe, both Mother and C.H. were receiving services from the Cherokee tribe. On July 8, 2019, counsel for CFS informed the juvenile court that the Cherokee Nation intended to intervene in this case.
On July 23, 2019, Mother and C.H. waived their constitutional rights and submitted the petition on the basis of the social worker's reports. The juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true and continued the matter for a contested dispositional hearing.
Regarding paternity, C.H. stated that he was present during the time of the pregnancy and was present at birth. C.H. also asserted that he was named on I.H.'s birth certificate. At that time, the social worker recommended making C.H. the presumed father of I.H. However, on August 14, 2019, C.H. and his mother met with the social worker, and informed the worker that C.H. did not believe he was the father of I.H. C.H. explained that he had had a vasectomy a few years ago and that he was incarcerated during the time Mother had conceived the child. C.H. also stated that Mother had informed him I.H. was "their miracle baby" and that he did not want to disclose this information to Mother "in fear of a backlash" from Mother. C.H. also noted that his relationship with Mother was "'toxic.'" He further asserted that even though he believed he was not the biological father of I.H., he still desired custody of the child, loved the child, and wanted what was best for the child. Based on the information disclosed, CFS requested an order for a paternity test and a continuance for CFS to receive the paternity test results and notice the possible fathers and the Cherokee Nation.
At a hearing held August 15, 2019, Mother advised the juvenile court that there were two other men who could possibly be I.H.'s biological father. Reluctantly, Mother named L.H. and M.M. as possible fathers of I.H. The court ordered C.H. to paternity test and set a further hearing for September 19, 2019.
On September 10, 2019, C.H.'s mother took I.H. to be paternity tested. C.H., however, had not tested. On September 17, 2019, the social worker attempted to contact C.H. but was unable to reach him. The social worker thereafter contacted C.H.'s mother, who stated that she was aware she was most likely not I.H.'s biological grandmother but still wanted to adopt the child. The social worker recommended C.H. be considered an alleged father and not entitled to services. The social worker also recommended that no services be offered to Mother.
The further contested dispositional hearing was held on September 19, 2019. CFS's counsel advised the juvenile court that C.H. had failed to submit to the paternity test and that he could not possibly be the biological father, in which case the Cherokee Nation would not be participating in the case. The tribal representative agreed that if C.H. was not the biological father, the tribe would not be participating in the matter. C.H.'s attorney informed the court that even if C.H. was not the biological father, C.H. was still requesting to be found the presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). In response to the court's query of whether C.H. agreed he was not the biological father, C.H.'s counsel stated, "he's in question as to whether or not he's the biological father." The court replied that C.H. therefore needs to testify because there was an indication he could not possibly be the biological father.
Thereafter, C.H. testified that he was possibly not C.H.'s biological father, that he had a vasectomy in 2013, and that he had not taken the paternity test. C.H. also noted that Mother had cheated on him and that he did not take the paternity test because he was "working" and because he was "scared to find out the truth". C.H. explained, "I was just afraid to find out that—I was afraid to accept what she told me was true, that she did have—she had cheated on me. That's what it was." In response to minor's counsel's question whether he was afraid to learn the possibility I.H. was not his child, C.H. stated, "No, that she actually cheated on me. I didn't want to accept it. I—obviously, yeah, if [I.H.] wasn't mine, yeah. It would be hard to accept that she wasn't mine. But it's more of everything." C.H. also acknowledged that it would be "hard to accept" I.H. was not his biological child because "We had this relationship for a long time."
During cross-examination by his counsel posing leading questions, C.H. responded in the affirmative that: (1) when he signed the birth certificate he was unaware of the possibility he might not be I.H.'s father; (2) he lived with Mother prior to I.H.'s birth; (3) he went to prenatal appointments with Mother; (4) he bought I.H. clothes, a bed, blankets, and diapers; (5) he was present at the time of I.H.'s birth; (6) he named I.H. after his grandmother; (7) he took I.H. home from the hospital; (8) he intended to take care of I.H. until age 18 if he was found to be the presumed father; and (9) he held I.H. out to be his daughter. In response to C.H.'s counsel's leading questions as to whether he fed I.H., changed her diapers, rocked her to sleep, and soothed her when she was upset, C.H. stated "Every day."
CFS's counsel argued that from his testimony and his statements to the social worker, C.H. wants to be the father "when it's convenient." Counsel explained: "First he says he holds himself out as the father, but when he talked to the social worker he says he doesn't believe he's the biological father. He believes that he had a vasectomy and he was in custody. So at that point he didn't want to be the father. He's not holding himself out as a father. He holds himself out as a father when it's convenient for him. [¶] He had the opportunity to test for paternity and he didn't make the time to do that because he was scared; he's equivocating again with regard to the paternity test, as to whether he wants to be the father. He's not holding himself out. He hasn't established biology. And at most, he should be an alleged father. And I would argue to the Court that he probably should be a non-party. He doesn't have really any connection to the child. He has a connection to the mother." I.H.'s counsel joined in the statements made by CFS's counsel and added C.H. did not want to find out the truth about whether Mother had cheated on him. C.H. had mentioned if he learned I.H. was not his child it would be very difficult for him to accept.
C.H.'s counsel argued that C.H. had established presumed father status based on him accepting the child as his own, being committed to the child, attending prenatal appointments, being at the child's birth, signing the child's birth certificate, and feeding the child at visits. C.H.'s counsel also asserted that C.H. should not be penalized for struggling with the realization he may not be the child's biological father.
The tribal representative stated that it was "vitally important that we clear up the issue of paternity" because there were possibly two other men that could be the father and for ICWA purposes. The tribal representative therefore requested the court to order C.H. to undergo a paternity test and sought a one-week continuance. The representative noted that if C.H. was not the biological father, the Cherokee Nation would be withdrawing intervention. The juvenile court agreed, ordered C.H. to paternity test within the next three court days, and continued the matter to October 23, 2019.
On October 2, 2019, the social worker received C.H.'s paternity test results indicating C.H. was not the biological father of I.H. On October 22, 2019, C.H.'s mother informed the social worker that she and her husband were still interested in adopting I.H.
At the continued October 23, 2019 hearing, the juvenile court noted that C.H. was not the biological father of I.H. The Cherokee Nation withdrew their request to intervene and the court found that ICWA did not apply. After hearing arguments, the court found that C.H. was not a presumed father. The court explained: "Okay. Yes, at most we're talking about a six-week period that the child was in his care. And, I mean, frankly, it's because the Department didn't know about the birth of the child; based on the mother's CFS history and the extent to which that involved Mr. H[.], I have no doubt that the Department would have removed the child at birth. [¶] But we do have the other issues, particularly the 6.7 of August 15th, which undermines the credibility of some of the testimony of Mr. H[.] on the stand. [¶] All of this record combined does not meet the burden under [Family Law Code section] 7611(d) that he unequivocally holds this child out to be his child. [¶] And I'm going to find him to be a non-party and relieve Counsel."
After excusing C.H. from the proceedings, the court denied Mother reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 21, 2020. The court placed I.H. with C.H.'s mother as a non-related extended family member.
On October 28, 2019, C.H. filed a notice of intent to file writ petition.
III
DISCUSSION
C.H. argues the juvenile court erred in finding he was not I.H.'s presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), and making him a nonparty to the dependency matter because he received I.H. into his home and held I.H. out as his own. He also contends the court erred in holding his statements to the social worker that he was not I.H.'s biological father against him. We disagree.
A. Overview of Governing Law
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.) provides the statutory framework for judicial determinations of parentage. (Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 116.) The UPA distinguishes among three categories of father: an alleged father, a biological father, and a presumed father. (In re D.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 811, 824.) A person who may be the biological father of a child but has not established paternity, or achieved presumed father status, is an alleged father. (In re H.R. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1283; In re D.P. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 689, 695.) An alleged father has limited rights in dependency proceedings, generally consisting of notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to appear to challenge his parentage status. (In re D.P., at p. 695.) An alleged father is not entitled to appointed counsel or reunification services. (Ibid.) A biological father is a father who has established paternity, but has not achieved presumed father status. (In re H.R., at p. 1283; In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.) A biological father may be offered reunification services only if the juvenile court determines that such services will benefit the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); In re Kobe A., at p. 1120.) A presumed father enjoys a full panoply of rights, including entitlement to appointed counsel, reunification services, and custody absent a finding of detriment. (In re H.R., at p. 1283; In re D.P., at p. 695.) Presumed father status is based on the familial relationship between the parent and child, rather than any biological connection. (In re J.L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1018, , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 486.)
The UPA sets forth several rebuttable presumptions under which a person may qualify as a presumed parent. (Fam. Code, § 7611.) As pertinent here, Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), provides that a person is presumed to be the natural parent of a child if: "The presumed parent receives the child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child." The presumption afforded by Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), is an evidentiary one affecting the burden of proof. (In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139, 147-148.) The burden is on the person seeking presumed parent status to demonstrate the foundational facts—the parent held out the child as his or her natural child and received the child into his or her home—giving rise to the presumption. (R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 773; S.Y. v. S.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031.) The person must have an existing "parental relationship that warrants protection, not the mere desire to parent a child." (In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553.) Once that burden is satisfied, the presumption of natural parenthood arises, and the burden shifts to the party opposing the presumption to rebut it by clear and convincing evidence. (Fam. Code, § 7612, subd. (a) [the "presumption under [s]ection 7611 is a rebuttable presumption . . . and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence"].)
Where, as here, the juvenile court finds that the person seeking presumed parent status has failed to meet his burden of proof, the question on appeal, as in all failure of proof cases, is "'whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant[ ] as a matter of law.'" (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1163; accord, In re I.W. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527-1528.) "Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' and (2) 'of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.' [Citation.]" (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)
We review a juvenile court's determination of presumed father status for substantial evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.) If there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. (In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534.) "We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. [Citation] The appellant has the burden of showing the finding or order is not supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]" (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.
B. Analysis
C.H. contends that he qualified as a presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), because he openly received I.H. into his home and held I.H. out as his own. In support of these claims, C.H. points to his testimony that he attended prenatal appointments, purchased various baby items for I.H., was present at I.H.'s birth, and named I.H. after his grandmother. He also notes that he testified he cared for I.H. every day by feeding her, changing her diapers, soothing her when she was upset, rocking her to sleep, and that he intended to care for I.H. until she was 18 years of age. C.H. argues that this evidence was sufficient to meet his burden of establishing the presumption of natural parenthood. However, the juvenile court was not required to accept C.H.'s leading testimony, and in fact, questioned C.H.'s credibility. We conclude that C.H. has failed to show that he was entitled to presumed father status as a matter of law.
Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), "requires the person seeking presumed parent status to demonstrate an established parental relationship with the minor and commitment to the minor's well-being." (In re Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 493.) "When determining whether the person has met the statutory requirements of receiving the child into his or her home and openly holding the child out as his or her own, the court may consider a wide variety of factors, including the person's provision of physical and/or financial support for the child, efforts to place the person's name on the birth certificate, efforts to seek legal custody, and the breadth and unequivocal nature of the person's acknowledgement of the child as his or her own. [Citation.]" (R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774, italics added.) Other factors include whether the person "actively helped the mother in prenatal care," "whether and how long [the person] cared for the child," "the number of people to whom [the person] had acknowledged the child," and "whether [the person] provided for the child after [the child] no longer resided" with the person. (In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1211.) "No single factor is determinative; rather, the court may consider all the circumstances when deciding whether the person demonstrated a parental relationship by holding out the child as his or her own and assuming responsibility for the child by receiving the child into his or her home. [Citations.]" (R.M. v. T.A., supra, at p. 774.) "Presumed parent status is afforded only to a person with a fully developed parental relationship with the child . . . ." (Id. at p. 776, italics omitted.)
In this case, as the juvenile court explained, the record establishes that C.H. lived with I.H. for a mere six weeks and did not unequivocally hold I.H. out to be his child. Although C.H. was unable to control the amount of time I.H. spent in his care, "[a] child's physical presence within the alleged father's home is, by itself, insufficient under [Family Law Code] section 7611, subdivision (d)" to constitute "receipt of the child into [the man's] home" (W.S. v. S.T. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132, 145) and even "a caretaking role and/or romantic involvement with a child's parent" is insufficient to establish presumed fatherhood. (R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 776-777.) Instead, the record must reflect substantial evidence of an "established" and "fully developed parental relationship." (Id. at pp. 780-781.) Here, it does not.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether C.H. received I.H. into his home. The record shows that C.H. was in jail from January 3, 2019 to March 12, 2019, and had a history of moving into Mother's home when he was released from jail. Mother reported that C.H.'s mother "helped her out with getting the place here in Barstow" and that after they were both released from jail, they began living together in a trailer. It can reasonably be inferred that C.H. moved into Mother's home following his release from jail.
Nor does the record contain substantial evidence reflecting a "commitment to [I.H.]" of the type presumed father status seeks to protect. (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 898.) Although C.H. implied that he had attended all the prenatal appointments when he stated that he "went to everything" in response to his attorney's questions, it can reasonably be inferred that C.H. had not as he was incarcerated between January 3, 2019 to March 12, 2019. In addition, C.H. did not appear to be unequivocal in holding out I.H. as his child. He questioned whether he was I.H.'s biological father and reported that information to his mother and the social worker. He also did not take the paternity test, partly, because he was afraid to learn Mother had cheated on him and stated if he learned I.H. was not his child it would be very difficult for him to accept.
Presumed father status "requires something more than a man's being the mother's casual friend or long-term boyfriend; he must be 'someone who has entered into a familial relationship with the child: someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child's well-being' regardless of his relationship with the mother." (In re D.M., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 553.) In In re D.M., the mother's boyfriend, who was not the biological father, moved in with her three months before the minor was born. (Id. at p. 545.) The boyfriend helped the mother prepare the home for an infant, bought baby supplies, and visited the minor in the hospital. (Id. at pp. 546-547.) The infant, however, was taken into protective custody directly from the hospital based on the mother's lack of bonding, termination of parental rights to a sibling, and an ongoing dependency proceeding regarding another sibling. (Id. at p. 545.) The juvenile court found the boyfriend to be the presumed father, observing he had "'received the child into his home as far as he could under the circumstances of this particular case.'" (Id. at p. 548.) The Court of Appeal reversed, stating "the juvenile court's observation that [the boyfriend] had done what he could to 'develop' a bond . . . suggest[s] that the court considered only the possibility that [the boyfriend] would develop a parental relationship with the child, not that the relationship already existed." (Id. at p. 555.)
Similarly, C.H.'s desire to develop a parental relationship—and we do not question the sincerity of that desire—is insufficient to support presumed father status. Presumed father status is accorded to a man with an existing "parental relationship that warrants protection, not the mere desire to parent a child." (In re D.M., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 553.)
We acknowledge that I.H.'s age and her detention from C.H. may have limited his ability to establish a parental relationship with her. But presumed father status is not based on the good intentions or desires of the would-be parent; it is based on a parental connection that it would be detrimental to the child to disrupt. (See In re D.M., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 554.) Thus, even if C.H. "'ha[d] done all of the things that a biological father under the circumstances might do to develop a bond in a relationship with this child'"—a conclusion which the record before us does not support—this still would not be sufficient to establish presumed father status, absent "an existing familial relationship with the child." (Id. at pp. 548, 554.) Even "[a] biological father is not entitled to [presumed father status] merely because he wants to establish a personal relationship with his child," and "an unmarried man who is not biologically related to the child is not entitled to custody or to reunification services merely because he wants to be the parent." (Id. at p. 554.) Therefore, although it may be laudable that C.H. made some effort to be a parent to I.H., this is only relevant to the extent it created a parental bond with I.H.
While C.H. testified that he had received I.H. into his home and held out her as his own, the juvenile court questioned C.H.'s credibility in ruling on C.H.'s request for presumed father status. It was the exclusive province of the juvenile court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. (See In re L.L. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1310 [in reviewing a juvenile court's finding as to whether a person is a presumed parent, we "do not reweigh the evidence or credibility of witnesses"]; T.W. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 30, 47 [the appellate court must "defer to the juvenile court's findings of fact and assessment of the credibility of witnesses"].)
In sum, the purpose of presumed father status as a basis for granting a man additional rights in dependency proceedings is to protect a parental relationship from which the child has previously benefitted. On this record, C.H. simply cannot establish that the evidence he offered to support his claim for presumed father status compelled a finding in his favor as a matter of law.
IV
DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied. The request for a stay of the 366.26 hearing is also denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. RAPHAEL
J.