Opinion
A152232
01-24-2018
C.G., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, Respondent. SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Mateo County Super. Ct. Nos. 16JD0171-16JD0173)
Petitioner is the Father of three children, a girl born in January 2011, a boy born in November 2011, and girl born in December, 2012. He challenges the juvenile court's order setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 by arguing that (1) he was not provided reasonable reunification services and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a new appointed counsel. For the reasons given below, we deny the petition.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The San Francisco Family Court issued a restraining order in a previous dependency prohibiting Father's contact with the children. Father was denied reunification services in that case. The children were living with their mother, and she was aware of her obligation to follow the order. Yet, both parents disregarded it. They had electronic and personal contact with each other, and Father was in the mother's home while the children were present. They actively hid their contact from the authorities. (San Mateo County. Human Services. Agency v. Carl G. (2017) 2017 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 6352, *1-11.)
Father's request that we take judicial notice of the June 3, 2015 restraining order is granted. (Evid. Code §§ 459, subd. (a)(2) and 452, subd. (d)(1).)
Father had two other children from a previous relationship, but his parental rights to those children were terminated due to his violent behavior and those children were no longer in contact with him. Services were denied due to this prior termination of Father's parental rights. (Section 361.5, subds. (b)(10) & (b)(11).)
The earlier dependency petition was dismissed, and this case was filed soon after. The San Francisco Juvenile Court ordered that the children be placed out of the home, ordered reunification services for Father, and transferred the matter to San Mateo County for disposition. In San Mateo County Human Services Agency v. Carl G. (2017) 2017 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 6352, A150037, we affirmed the superior court's assertion of jurisdiction and disposition orders. To avoid needless duplication, we will not discuss the factual basis for this dependency in detail. Briefly stated, the court detained the children because of serious neglect due to domestic violence between their parents. In our earlier opinion, the record "provided a compelling basis for the court's finding of an ongoing pattern of domestic violence that placed the children at risk of substantial harm." (Id. at *17.)
Because only Father filed a petition in this court, we focus on facts concerning him.
Following the transfer of this case to San Mateo, the San Mateo County Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a disposition report on November 16, 2016. All three children were being cared for by their godparents in a confidential location. Father was convinced that mother was having an affair. He was unable to hold a job because of his suspicions, and the family had a "history of homelessness." Father told the oldest daughter details of what he believed to be her mother's sexual conduct. Once, when the family had moved into a San Francisco homeless shelter, Father threatened to kill a male staff member he suspected of having an affair with the mother. While he was in San Francisco County jail, Father underwent a mental health assessment, which determined he had mental health issues and was obsessed with the mother's whereabouts. He was referred to the Non Violence Alliance Program.
The children's godfather reported that Father would monitor the mother's conversations via cellphone and get distracted from his work as a driver, causing him to lose jobs.
Father spoke of the mother and their children in "glowing terms." He considered them his family, and described their family dinners as a " 'beautiful thing.' " He dismissed the allegations of domestic violence as "completely made up." He said he had video evidence of his interactions with the children to support his claim, despite the fact that he also said he was not present in the home.
Father likely realized he was not to be in the home and made the statement to show he complied with the stay away directive in the restraining order.
According to Father, the children's godmother made up the allegations against him so she could continue to receive money for caring for the children. He considered the San Francisco court to be "corrupt" and he and the mother brought a civil suit against San Francisco Child Welfare Services.
But Father has a history of threatening the assigned social workers in his dependency cases. Both in the case involving his other children, and in this case when it was pending in San Francisco, Father threatened the assigned social workers and they had to be reassigned. A. Reunification Services and Permanent Planning
Even though, in July 2016, the court ordered that Father be provided therapeutic visits with the children as determined by the social worker, he had no contact with them as of the November 16 disposition report. Visiting never began because the children were afraid of meeting with him, and it was postponed indefinitely after one of the children made sexual abuse allegations.
The older daughter reported that Father was "bad to her mother," slapped her, threw her to the ground, and yelled at her. He would also spank the children's privates (front and back), and instructed his oldest daughter to lick her siblings' legs and faces "like a dog" because she was doing "bad stuff." Furthermore, one time Father touched the older daughter's genital area and it hurt her. During a therapy session her therapist told the older daughter that she might see Father again. She ran away and hid in a tunnel in a nearby park and had to be coaxed out. It was the son's belief that he was at the Keller Center because "our dad hit us." He confirmed that his older sister licked him and also said that Father once hit him on the leg with a belt.
The Keller Center for Family Violence Intervention, provides comprehensive medical and social services for victims of family violence.
The godparents reported that the older daughter touches others inappropriately. The godfather described her as a "woman in a girl's body." The godfather also expressed concern regarding the son's angry and harsh reactions towards his sister.
The major concern involved her touching her brother. The report was unclear, however, whether she would also attempt to touch other people, such as her godfather, inappropriately.
Father's former step-daughter was also interviewed at Keller Center and reported that when she was 13 and 14 years old Father engaged in various inappropriate behavior with her. He would hover around her when she undressed, inappropriately look at her, forcibly kissed her, and grazed her breasts when he sparred with her while practicing martial arts. She also said he beat her mother, choked her, and cut her throat. He would threaten to kill the family and lock the younger children in the closet. She considered him an "abusive perv," and attributes various adversities in her life to Father that include missing eighth grade for a year and becoming an abusive person herself.
The Agency updated the case plan in advance of the disposition hearing. Father was to attend a 52-week batterer intervention program, refrain from physical, verbal and emotional fights in front of the children, attend an anger management class, not engage in sexual abuse, and abide by court orders. Visitation with Father was not to occur due to the children's fear of him and the sexual abuse allegations. The social worker was to meet with each child and each parent at least once a month. The juvenile court prohibited in-person, telephone, and written contact between the children and Father. An interim review hearing was scheduled for February 28, 2017.
The report for the interim review hearing described the two older children's antipathy toward or desire not to see Father. The youngest simply nodded and responded "yes," when her brother said Father was bad. There is a description of a December 16, 2016 telephone call between Father and the social worker. Father wanted to meet with the caseworker to explain how the findings in his earlier case were false. He said he took legal action against police departments and the San Francisco Child Protective Services Agency for investigating him. The social worker scheduled a meeting with Father for December 22, but reminded him that her role was to discuss the services mandated by his case plan. She also emphasized that Father should discuss the limitations of the restraining order with his attorney, and Father refused to do so because he believed the restraining order was not valid.
The December 22 meeting did not take place because Father was 40 minutes late. He was given a phone number to call to re-schedule the appointment. On January 6, 2017, he left a voicemail for the social worker accusing the Agency and the police of being against him. He insisted that all the allegations against him were false and threatened legal action against the social worker and the Agency. He also complained that he had not been given a chance to talk about inter-agency corruption. The social worker returned Father's call on January 10. However, they were unable to discuss the elements of Father's case plan. Rather, Father again denied the allegations against him. The social worker emphasized to Father that past allegations were not part of his current case. When the social worker told Father that he needed to address the restraining order with his attorney, Father again became upset and threatened to take legal action.
The Interim Review Report stated that it was difficult to engage Father in services. He was unable to discuss his case plan, and was fixated instead on his claims of Agency wrongdoing and the restraining order that kept him from his children. The children did not want any contact with him. The juvenile court admitted the Agency's interim report, confirmed its prior orders, and confirmed a six-month status review for May 9, 2017.
After the interim hearing, Father filed a declaration stating his innocence. He denied the allegations of sexual abuse concerning his daughter and step-daughter, asserted that his children did not fear him but loved him, and he denied ever striking or pushing the children's mother. He reiterated his claim that the godparents wanted to adopt his children for monetary gain and claimed, generally, that the Agency's report was filled with "false fabricated statements and allegations."
Pending the six-month review, the children remained with their godparents. The oldest child had been involuntarily hospitalized for six days after reporting that she was hearing voices directing her to kill children in her class and to hurt herself. She was prescribed anti-psychotic medication, and referred to a psychiatrist.
Between the interim and six-month reviews, the social worker sent a letter to the two addresses provided by Father advising him what he needed to do to receive services. One of them was returned, marked "refused." Father, however, left the social worker a voicemail on April 3, 2017, stating that he would contact her supervisor regarding his eldest daughter's hospitalization and with any other questions he had. But he did not contact the supervisor.
A week later Father called the social worker and, for the first time, requested services. Father said he did not receive her letter, so the social worker sent him an e-mail containing the information. Father repeated his claim that the allegations against him were false and that any investigation of him should be closed because it was baseless. Two days later, Father called the social worker again demanding visits with the children. He asserted that he did not need to complete services to get visitation and claimed there was no restraining order. He also said he would request new counsel. The social worker twice contacted Father's attorney to update her regarding the status of possible visitation.
Father was assessed for possible therapeutic visits, but they did not occur due to the sexual abuse allegations. The children consistently said they did not want to visit with Father, because he was "bad" or "mean." The restraining order was set to expire on May 29, 2017, and the Agency intended to renew it.
The scope of the restraining order is addressed in the Discussion section of this opinion.
Father had not engaged in services. The Agency opposed visitation and returning the children to him. His unwillingness to discuss his case plan and his obsession with alleged Agency wrongdoing made it difficult to engage him in reunification services. The Agency continued to recommend the same case plan elements for Father. He was to refrain from physical, verbal or emotional fights in front of the children, attend an anger management class, refrain from any sexual abuse, abide by court orders, and attend a batterer intervention program.
On April 25, 2017, Father filed a section 388 petition, primarily based on alleged statements the older daughter made during her hospitalization that he never abused her, and he requested a trial in order to refute the sexual abuse allegations and related issues. The juvenile court summarily denied the petition because it presented no new evidence and did not promote the children's best interests. Father and mother, however, then filed a successive pair of 388 petitions, seeking to contest the sexual abuse allegations and return the children to Mother. The court set them for a hearing on June 19, 2017.
Because the section 388 petitions were identical, the social worker had concerns that the parents continued to be in contact with one another. The mother speculated that perhaps Father obtained hers and copied it before it was filed with the court.
The contested six-month and 12-month reviews and the section 388 hearings were continued to August 22, 2017. The Agency's status review report filed on June 9 observed that the children continued to resist meeting with Father. The report noted an Alternative Family Services letter regarding the negative effects visitation with Father would have on the children, the Agency's intention to seek a new restraining order, and Father's repeated protestations of innocence and demand that the case be terminated. The report also referred to a May 22 call from Father to the social worker when he warned her to "watch out" because he was about to institute his lawsuit against her.
On August 17, 2017, the Agency filed a combined response to the parents' 388 petitions, a third addendum to the six-month review, and an addendum to the 12-month review. The response said Father contacted the social worker's supervisor regarding his belief that his case would be closed in accord with a notice the parents had received via email. When the supervisor indicated any such documentation was erroneous and would be corrected, Father abruptly hung up. The Agency's response also showed that the social worker sent Father a certified June 22 letter regarding the necessary steps for him to start and complete his case plan. When the certified letter was returned as undeliverable, the social worker sent Father an uncertified letter discussing the case plan. The Agency's assessment of Father was similar to earlier ones. He remained obsessed with his allegations of Agency wrongdoing. So, the social worker was unable to discuss his case plan. Nevertheless, she provided Father "the proper referral information through various mediums[,] but he has failed to engage in any services." The Agency recommended that Father's reunification services be terminated and the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing.
The social worker testified at the August 22 hearing. When she was explaining how the mother's psychologist was working with the mother primarily on issues arising from domestic violence, the following exchange occurred between Father and the court:
THE COURT: Hang on. [¶] Sir, if I catch you one more time glaring at the mother in a menacing way—
THE FATHER: You know what—(hits both fists on the table)—I haven't glared at no one. I'm out of here. You have a problem. [¶] We came here together. Okay. [¶] It's going to go up on appeal. This is all a farce. I haven't looked at her one time. We came here together in her car. Okay. [¶] We still—we still have sex. We sleep with each other. This is all a farce. Okay. And I'm out of here. [¶] . . . [¶] (The father exists the courtroom.)The court granted Father's counsel a brief recess to allow him to convince Father to return. The attorney's efforts were unsuccessful, and the hearing resumed without Father.
THE COURT: The record should reflect the following words in the father's diatribe were shouted in a very loud and threatening fashion and directed toward the Court and toward the mother.
The social worker testified that she was assigned the case on December 1, 2016. She had not met with Father in person. She had spoken to him twice by phone—on December 16, 2016, and January 10, 2017. On January 10, she e-mailed Father referrals for domestic violence, batterer's intervention, and anger management programs. She also sent him certified and non-certified letters on March 22 and 27, April 12, June 22, and July 31, 2017. She sent Father's counsel a letter on May 18, 2017. She was not aware that Father ever participated in any mandated services, either from the time she was assigned to the case or when the case was open in San Francisco.
She was also unable to reach Father by phone on December 1, 2016.
She stopped calling Father because he was threatening whenever they spoke over the phone. She was never able to have a genuine conversation with him about the services that were being offered. Father did telephone her supervisor to threaten and complain, but did not ask about obtaining services. She last heard from him on April 3, 2017, when he left a voicemail message warning her that he planned to sue her.
No other witnesses testified at the hearing. Father's counsel argued that reasonable services were not provided based on the limited record of phone and written contacts enumerated by the social worker. The juvenile court emphatically rejected that argument, stating that "reasonable efforts have been made in abundance in two batches. . . ." The court found that Father "has shown himself to be a person who can barely control his behavior in a courtroom where there are armed bailiffs, let alone in a home with vulnerable people." Finding it was an intolerably toxic situation for the children, the court stated it would follow the Agency's recommendation and set the matter for a termination of parental rights.
Presumably, the juvenile court was referring to services offered in San Francisco from January 28, 2015, through April 15, 2016, and then in San Mateo from November 21, 2016, through August 22, 2017.
B. Father's Request For New Counsel.
At the hearing on August 22, Father informed the court that he was dissatisfied with his appointed attorney and wanted a Marsden hearing. The court conducted a confidential hearing to consider Father's request.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 allows a criminal defendant to move to substitute court-appointed counsel for ineffective assistance. Recognizing that this is a dependency not a criminal case, the juvenile court characterized what petitioner was seeking as "something akin to a Marsden motion."
His first complaint was that counsel refused to challenge the court's intended disposition. Father's attorney responded that jurisdiction was decided before the case was transferred to San Mateo and she thought it unwise to challenge disposition because Father was offered reunification services despite the fact that his parental rights were terminated in a proceeding involving his two older children. Thus, counsel believed it was in Father's best interest to submit on disposition.
Father also believed his attorney should have challenged the disposition report, particularly the sexual abuse allegations. In response, counsel pointed out a declaration filed March 1, 2017, explaining in great detail Father's objections to the report. Father also complained that the attorney did not subpoena his children, the children's godmother and the social worker so they could be questioned about whether the sexual abuse allegations were true. Counsel responded that she made a strategic decision that these witnesses would not help Father because the children are very fearful of him, and the godmother believed the children should be removed from Father's custody. Finally, the attorney did not consider the issues Father wanted to raise through these witnesses relevant to possible disposition.
The juvenile court denied Father's motion. The court observed that the issues before the court were purely dispositional, there was no irretrievable breakdown of communication between client and counsel, and Father's counsel, who was a certified specialist in dependency, had done everything for Father that she would have done for any other client.
Father filed his Notices of Intent to File Writ Petition regarding all three children on August 25, 2017. After a request to augment the record, his petition was filed on October 12, 2017, and the Agency's opposition was filed on November 3, 2017. On October 23, 2017, we temporarily stayed the section 366.26 hearing.
Mother also submitted a Notice of Intent, which was stamped received, rather than filed, on September 27, 2017. Regardless, she never submitted any petition to this court.
DISCUSSION
Father makes two arguments challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. First, he contends the court erred when it found that reasonable reunification services had been provided him. Second, he contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for new counsel. We disagree. I. FATHER RECEIVED REASONABLE REUNIFICATION SERVICES.
Father's claim that he did not receive reasonable reunification services is based on three specific allegations: (1) there is a dearth of evidence regarding the precise referrals made by the Agency; (2) the Agency failed to meet its obligation to maintain monthly personal contact with Father; and (3) the Agency failed to arrange for the required visitation.
We review the juvenile court's finding that Father was provided reasonable services pursuant to the substantial evidence standard. (In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.) All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the respondent and we draw all reasonable inferences necessary to uphold the juvenile court's order. (Ibid.) The evidence must be reasonable, credible, and solid. (In re Lynna B. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 682, 695.) Where multiple inferences can be drawn from the facts, we may not substitute our deduction for the juvenile court's. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
An agency is required to make a good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan. (In re John B. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 268, 275.) Here there is sufficient evidence to conclude the Agency did precisely that. Father's plan contained elements designed to address domestic violence, battering, and anger management. He does not claim that the plan's design was infirm or that it should have addressed additional issues. Rather, Father is making an evidentiary argument that he was not provided reasonable services because the record does not contain the specific classes or programs he was referred to. However, nothing in the record before the juvenile court suggests that Father ever claimed he was not provided specific, appropriate referrals. Because there was never a suggestion to the juvenile court that the Agency did not make appropriate referrals, we will not entertain this claim now on appeal. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406.)
To support his argument, Father cites In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1452 which held that the services provided were unreasonable in part because the parents were provided an inadequate list of counseling agencies. But there the record reflected the precise deficiency in the referral—it failed to identify what the parents needed to do to comply with the plan. No agencies were identified, nor were the parents told to arrange individual counseling. No analogous evidence exists in the record in this case.
The greater potential concern arises from the requirements in both the case plan and internal Agency regulations that the social worker have a minimum of monthly personal contact with Father. Here, the social worker who was assigned to the matter on December 1, 2016, testified in August 2017 that she never met with Father in-person.
Father relies on Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996 (Mark N.) to argue that the reasonable services finding should be reversed because the Agency failed in its duty to maintain monthly contact with Father. Although a key consideration in determining that reasonable services had not been offered in Mark N. was the department's failure to maintain monthly personal contact (id. at 1012) with the parent, the situation was vastly different from this case. In Mark N. the incarcerated father wrote at least four letters to the agency seeking direction on his reunification plan, and three of them were unanswered. (Ibid.) During 13 months of the 17-month reunification period, the department did not contact the father at all. (Ibid.)
This case is starkly different than Mark N. Here, the Agency made repeated efforts by telephone, letter and email to discuss Father's case plan with him and provide the necessary referrals. One meeting was thwarted by Father's tardiness, and at every step, the Agency's efforts were met with Father's complete denial of the facts that required the referrals. It was reasonable for the social worker to understand Father's repeated claims of innocence as a repudiation of his case plan, which was predicated on the very behavior Father denied. In addition, he was threatening and denied the legitimacy of the restraining order.
It is frequently stated that reasonable services are tailored to a family's unique needs. (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010.) The adequacy of the plan is to be judged according to the particular circumstances of the case. (Id. at 1011.) Here, the Agency's repeated efforts to implement the plan were consistently met with Father's negative, evasive, and threatening responses. Father denied the underlying problems that led to this dependency and he attacked the legitimacy of the restraining order. On this record, the evidence supports a conclusion that the Agency made a good faith effort to offer Father reasonable services.
Father also claims the services he received were unreasonable because, although visitation assessment was ordered, none actually took place. Rather, the Agency "indefinitely tabled" the idea of visitation. Father contends that the Agency disingenuously relied on an ambiguous restraining order that was never presented to the juvenile court to justify the denial of visitation.
Our review of the June 3, 2015 restraining order indicates that its scope is unclear. It appears to restrain Father from having direct or indirect contact with his three children who are the subjects of this dependency. However, item 5(c), which is checked, appears to allow Father the right to visit the children. But item 5(c) has two sub-categories—neither one of which is checked. The first is "None." Had it been checked, it would clearly have prohibited any visitation with the children. The second sub-category is "Visitation according to the Attached Schedule (Form JV-205 must be attached if any visitation is ordered)." Had it been checked, and the appropriate form attached to the restraining order, Father would have been allowed visitation according to a set schedule. Without further clarification there is no way to know what restrictions, if any, the order was intended to place on Father's possible visitation.
Nonetheless, we see no reason to find that the Agency's reunification services were inadequate. First, the restraining order was at most an alternative reason the Agency could have denied Father visitation. But the record shows the Agency did not intend to rely on the order to deny visits. It was only after sexual abuse allegations were made against Father that the Agency indefinitely tabled the idea of visitation. The Agency also weighed the children's fear of Father in deciding against visits. Thus, even without the restraining order, the Agency had a reasonable basis to deny visitation.
Moreover, although there was some ambiguity in the order, the fact that a schedule for visiting (Form JV-205) was not attached to the restraining order is consistent with the Agency's view that the restraining order did not allow for visitation. Finally, the Agency specifically advised Father to consult with his attorney about the restraining order. Father refused, and insisted that the restraining order was illegitimate and illegal. Thus, Father rejected the opportunity to explore the possible effect of the restraining order and clear up any ambiguity that could have contributed to his denial of visitation.
There is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided. II. THE DENIAL OF FATHER'S MOTION FOR NEW COUNSEL WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
To prevail on a motion for new appointed counsel in a dependency case, a parent must show either that counsel was not providing effective representation or that the parent and counsel "have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result." (In re Z.N. (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282, 293-294.) We review a juvenile court decision to decline to appoint new counsel for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 295.)
In order to show that counsel was ineffective, a parent must show that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1711.) Here, there is no probability that the proceeding would have turned out more favorably for Father with different counsel. Father exhibited nothing but contempt for the juvenile court, the proceedings, and the Agency. He openly boasted that he disregarded the most fundamental order in this case, that he avoid contact with the children's mother. That order was issued to ensure the children's safety and provide an opportunity for the parents to heal their domestic violence. He did nothing to implement his case plan. He was threatening, both in and out of court. In light of Father's attitude and statements displayed before the court, there is no basis to conclude he would have obtained a more favorable judgment with different counsel. Because he suffered no conceivable prejudice, Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of this conclusion, we need not address whether Father received deficient representation.
Similarly, there was no evidence of an irreconcilable conflict between Father and his counsel resulting in ineffective representation. (In re Z.N., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 293-294.) The content of the discussions between counsel and Father relayed to the juvenile court by both of them shows various tactical disagreements. But it also shows they communicated with each other effectively. Each was able to explain his or her perspective to the other. There is no indication that counsel's emotions colored her judgment or caused her to make unsupported strategic decisions. A client's claims of a lack of trust, an inability to get along with a lawyer, or tactical disagreements are insufficient to prevail on a motion to discharge appointed counsel. (In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 441, 458.) In his petition, Father simply asserts that "it seems obvious that there had been a breakdown in communication" between him and his attorney. Father focuses on his attorney's refusal to explore his denial of the sex abuse allegations and the allegation that his children were afraid of him and did not want to see him. But he presents no credible evidence to support his claims that these allegations were false. Without such evidence, Father's claim reflects nothing more than a tactical disagreement with counsel.
Moreover, counsel presented the substance of Father's denial of sex abuse before the juvenile court in Father's declaration, and her position that the remainder of Father's claims were irrelevant to disposition is not unreasonable.
When we review a juvenile court's decision not to substitute counsel, we are to consider (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the parent's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict was so substantial that a total lack of communication between parent and counsel prevented an adequate defense. (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 606-607 [finding these factors, used by the Ninth Circuit in reviewing a trial court's refusal to substitute counsel, to be consistent with California law under Marsden].) Here, Father's motion was untimely. Father told the social worker on April 12, 2017, that he would request new counsel. Nonetheless, he did not inform the juvenile court of his decision until August, 22, 2017, the day of the hearing on the section 388 petitions and the combined 6- and 12-month reviews. Father provides no explanation for this approximately four-month delay, which would have required a continuance. When a motion to substitute counsel would require a continuance, it is well within a trial court's discretion to deny the motion. (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 607.) Furthermore, the court made a full inquiry into Father's complaints about his counsel. The court had Father enumerate his complaints and listened to counsel's explanation for her actions. The simple fact that the juvenile court found Father's complaints to be meritless does not mean that its inquiry was inadequate. Finally, there is no evidence that the disagreements between counsel and Father caused a total lack of communication between them, depriving Father of adequate representation. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motion for new appointed counsel.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons given above, the petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. The temporary stay issued by this court on October 23, 2017, is dissolved. Our decision is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
Siggins, J. We concur: /s/_________
McGuiness, Acting P.J. /s/_________
Jenkins, J.
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.