Ms. Bowling alleges that the implied “abruptness” of her departure made her appear “reckless and untrustworthy, ” [#11 at ¶ 41], because as the individual in “total control over operations and technology, ” [id. at ¶ 34], the IMLCC would face “serious hardships” in her absence [id. at 24]. Thus, construing the Counterclaim in a light most favorable to Ms. Bowling, I cannot conclude that Mr. Smith's statements were incapable of a defamatory meaning or effect as a matter of law. See C.G. v. City of Fort Lupton, No. 13-CV-01053-REB-CBS, 2014 WL 2597165, at *14-15 (D. Colo. June 10, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss Colorado defamation claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)).
2001) Specifically, a motion to dismiss can be granted on the basis that the challenged publication was substantially true. Fry , 2013 COA, ¶ 24, ––– P.3d –––– ; see also Barnett, 36 P.3d at 147 (affirming trial court's dismissal of a defamation claim where challenged statement's substantial truth was clear from plaintiff's complaint); C.G. v. City of Fort Lupton , No. 13–CV–01053–REB–CBS, 2014 WL 2597165, at *14–15 (D.Colo. June 10, 2014) (dismissing defamation claim on a 12(b)(6) motion where substantial truth was clear from the face of the complaint). B. APPLICATION