Opinion
July 23, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting therefrom the provision denying the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment, and substituting therefor a provision granting the defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the defendant is awarded one bill of costs.
In 1984 the defendant sold to the plaintiffs two lots contained within a larger parcel she owned. At that time the parties also executed an agreement which gave the plaintiffs the right of first refusal with respect to a third, adjoining lot. A few years thereafter the defendant put the adjoining lot (hereinafter Lot 9) on the market as part of a larger parcel. The defendant received several offers to purchase the entire parcel, one of which she accepted. However, that deal was never consummated. A second offer was thereafter received for the same amount as the offer that the defendant had previously accepted. Although the defendant did not inform the plaintiffs of her dealings with respect to Lot 9, the plaintiffs became aware thereof and advised the defendant of their intention to enforce their right of first refusal. As a result, the defendant declined to enter into a contract with the potential purchaser. After the defendant received and rejected a higher offer from a third purchaser, who intended, in turn, to sell Lot 9 to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs commenced this action, seeking, inter alia, to enforce their right of first refusal and to compel the defendant to sell Lot 9 to them. After proceeding with discovery the plaintiffs moved, and the defendant cross-moved, for summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that there existed issues of fact warranting a trial and, accordingly, denied both the motion and the cross motion. We modify and grant summary judgment dismissing the complaint to the defendant.
"The effect of a right of first refusal, also called a preemptive right, is to bind the party who desires to sell not to sell without first giving the other party the opportunity to purchase the property at the price specified" (LIN Broadcasting Corp. v Metromedia, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 54, 60 [emphasis in original]). However, such a right does not compel an owner to sell her property (see, LIN Broadcasting Corp. v. Metromedia, Inc., supra; see also, K.S. S. Rest. Corp. v. Yarbrough, 104 A.D.2d 486; CB Wholesale Stationery v. De Bella Dresses, 43 A.D.2d 579; Costello v. Hoffman, 30 A.D.2d 530). It appears that the defendant has chosen not to sell the lot in question at this time, and thus, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Kooper and O'Brien, JJ., concur.