No. 01-7612 DOERR v. PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE CO., ante, p. 935; No. 01-7707 ZHARN v. UNITED STATES, 534 U.S. 1166; No. 01-7712 CLARK v. O'DEA, WARDEN, ante, p. 938;
Moreover, we have consistently upheld the validity of this statute. See e.g., United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002); United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2001). We will not and moreover cannot upset our prior precedent.
See United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Neither Morrison nor Jones modifies our decision in McAllister, upholding the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), under Congress' Commerce Clause power." (citing United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996))) (other citations omitted), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002). This conclusion is consistent with those reached by other circuits.
See United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[A]s long as the weapon in question has a 'minimal nexus' to interstate commerce, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.") (affirming United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182 (2002); United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding the de minimus standard as it applies to robberies prosecuted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). We similarly reject this argument.
Apprendi is not implicated, however, where judges find facts increasing the mandatory minimum sentence below the maximum sentence for the crime committed. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 565, 569-70, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002). "[F]acts guiding judicial discretion below the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
This court reviews the constitutionality of statutes de novo. United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11th Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002). III.
See United States v. Bailey, 286 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). Fredette concedes that we have held, in United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002), that Apprendi does not apply to sentencing factors that increase a defendant's guideline range but do not increase the statutory maximum. Fredette's sentence in this case does not exceed the total statutory maximum.
We review the District Court's denial of Gorman's motion to suppress evidence de novo; the District Court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Summers, 268 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002). The District Court's denial of Gorman's motion to dismiss for noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act is reviewed de novo.
We review the district court's denial of a motion to suppress de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Summers, 268 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002). Bates' contention that he was stopped when the officer partially blocked the sidewalk with his car and asked Bates questions is unpersuasive.
We now join every circuit addressing the issue in concluding that they do not.See United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154-57 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219-220 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Skidmore, 254 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Abernathy, 277 F.3d 1048, 1049-1050 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Summers, 268 F.3d 683, 688-89 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S.Ct. 1182, 152 L.Ed.2d 124 (2002); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586-88 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 986, 121 S.Ct. 1635, 149 L.Ed.2d 495 (2001); United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1028, 1035 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 960, 121 S.Ct. 2616, 150 L.Ed.2d 770 (2001). In United States v. Affleck, 861 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1988), we held that "because [Section] 924(e)(1) does not create a separate offense but is merely a sentence enhancement provision," neither the statute nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement.