Opinion
No. 1-906 / 01-0285.
Filed January 9, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, MICHAEL S. WALSH, Judge.
Carlos David Ceron appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for the State on his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Patrick T. Parry of Forker and Parry, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Mark A. Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
Carlos David Ceron appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for the State on his application for postconviction relief. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. In November 1996 a jury convicted Ceron of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and failure to affix a drug stamp. Our supreme court affirmed his conviction, rejecting his claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. State v. Ceron, 573 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1997). In 1999 Ceron sought federal habeaus corpus relief claiming the same grounds alleged in his direct appeal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied his request in September 1999. On September 28, 2000, Ceron filed a pro se application for postconviction relief and supporting memorandum claiming he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel in several respects. On October 13, 2000, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, which Ceron resisted. The district court granted the State's motion. Ceron appeals.
Standard of Review. We ordinarily review postconviction relief proceedings for errors of law. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). However, when the applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo. Id. When summary judgment is granted in a postconviction relief action, we examine the record to determine if a genuine issue of fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bugley v. State, 596 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Iowa 1999).
Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The district court may grant summary judgment in a postconviction relief proceeding "when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Iowa Code § 822.6 (1999). Disposition under section 822.6 is analogous to the summary judgment procedure in Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 237 through 240. Summage v. State, 579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998). To avoid summary judgment an applicant for postconviction relief must set forth facts showing there is a material issue for trial. Id. at 822-23. "A fact issue is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issues should be resolved, but if the conflict in the record consists only of the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts, entry of summary judgment is proper." Id. at 822.
The State correctly notes Ceron did not raise any of the claims asserted in his application for postconviction relief on direct appeal. "Generally, a claim not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a postconviction relief proceeding unless the applicant can demonstrate a sufficient cause or reason for not properly raising the issue previously." Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 141. We acknowledge that ordinarily the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may constitute sufficient reason for failing to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. Id. However, before we can excuse Ceron's failure to file these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, we must first find that an issue of material fact remains on each of his claims precluding summary disposition. Earnest v. State, 508 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1993).
The claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised in the instant appeal are different than raised in Ceron's direct appeal of his criminal conviction.
After our de novo review of the record, we find Ceron has failed to carry his burden of showing that a material issue of fact exists with regard to any of his claims. The only conflict in the record is the legal consequences flowing from the undisputed facts. The undisputed facts fail to demonstrate any act or omission by trial counsel that amounts to performance below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ceron has also failed to illustrate there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. He is unable to so because the record is clear that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. We agree with the district court's conclusion that none of Ceron's arguments have merit. The district court properly granted the State's motion for summary relief.
AFFIRMED.