Opinion
21-35736
10-13-2022
NICOLE M. CEREGHINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted October 7, 2022 Seattle, Washington
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05885-MLP
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and W. FLETCHER and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Claimant Nicole M. Cereghino appeals from the district court's ruling affirming the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's denial of her claim for disability benefits. Cereghino contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly discounted (1) her subjective symptom testimony; (2) the lay evidence; and (3) the opinion of her treating psychologist.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "We review de novo a district court's decision to affirm, reverse[,] or modify a determination of the Social Security Administration []." Moore v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000)). We "will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence." Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). We affirm.
Cereghino suffers from psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis, dermatitis, hidradenitis suppurativa, fibromyalgia, irritable bowl syndrome (IBS), major depressive disorder, and anxiety. She testified that these impairments caused sharp joint pain, skin lesions, concentration issues, and unpredictable bowel movements. Cereghino testified that these conditions would prevent her from doing even a sedentary job. Cereghino's friends and family provided lay evidence to the same effect.
The ALJ may reject claimant's testimony "only by offering specific, clear[,] and convincing reasons." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). To discredit lay evidence, the ALJ must provide "reasons that are germane to each witness." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993)), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). For claims filed before March 27, 2017, such as Cereghino's, a treating doctor's contradicted opinion may be rejected "by providing specific and legitimate reasons." Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)). Substantial evidence must support these reasons. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Morgan v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)).
The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting Cereghino's testimony. The ALJ concluded that her testimony was not consistent with the medical evidence in the record showing that treatment ameliorated Cereghino's symptoms. Substantial evidence supports this conclusion. The record reflects that Humira controlled both her joint pain and skin afflictions. Treatment also helped manage her IBS. Lastly, Cereghino often presented normal during physical examination. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in discrediting her testimony. For these same reasons, the ALJ did not err in discrediting the lay testimony.
To support her claim of disability, Cereghino relied on an opinion from an examining psychologist. The psychologist opined that Cereghino had grossly intact memory functioning with deficits to immediate recall, had limitations to concentration, and had an adaptation level of "guarded-to-moderate." The ALJ gave only some weight to this opinion. The ALJ did not actually discredit the psychologist's opinions. Despite the ALJ stating that he was discrediting the psychologist's opinion to the extent it contradicted the work limitations found by the ALJ, the psychologist did not in fact opine on any work limitations. The ALJ specifically credited and accounted for the recall and adaptation deficits described by the psychologist. Therefore, the ALJ did not err with respect to the opinion of the psychologist. See Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the ALJ did not need to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a doctor's report because the ALJ did not reject the doctor's conclusion and incorporated the doctor's observations into the residual functional capacity).
All of Cereghino's remaining contentions ask us to reweigh the medical evidence in order to reach a different result from that reached by the ALJ. Our role is not to "reweigh the evidence [and] substitute [our] own judgment" for the ALJ's judgment. See Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).
AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).