"We review a trial court's dismissal of a case upon special exceptions for failure to state a cause of action as an issue of law, using a de novo standard of review." Neff v. Brady, 527 S.W.3d 511, 528 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (quoting Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)); see Chambers, 465 S.W.3d at 397; Cerda v. RJL Ent., Inc., 443 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2013, pet. denied); Martin, 343 S.W.3d at 891; Pack v. Crossroads, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 492, 507 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied). In our review, we take the "allegations, facts, and interferences in the pleadings as true and view them in a light most favorable to the pleader."
Although special exceptions are generally used to force the clarification of vague pleadings, they may also be used to determine whether a cause of action has been pleaded. Cerda v. RJL Ent., Inc., 443 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi- Edinburg 2013, pet. denied). Generally, when the trial court sustains special exceptions, it must provide the pleader with an opportunity to amend his pleadings.
A trial court does not err in granting summary judgment on a claim or defense that is not recognized under Texas law. See Methodist Hosp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 329 S.W.3d 510, 526 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Cerda v. RJL Entm't, Inc., 443 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on appellants' affirmative defense of justification.
Additionally, under the terms of the Noncompete as drafted, for two years after Nguyen left ABLe, he was prohibited from "induc[ing] or attempt[ing] to induce" ABLe employees to leave their employment. See Inducement, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "inducement" as "[t]he act or process of enticing or persuading another person to take a certain course of action); cf. Cerda v. RJL Entm't, Inc., 443 S.W.3d 221, 230 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2013, pet. denied) (stating that the meaning of the word "induce" in common usage is to "move by persuasion or influence" or "to bring about by influence") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmts. h & k (1979) (discussing inducement in the context of tortious interference with contract). The claim against Nguyen for breach of the Noncompete is not before us, and we have held that E2 and Southwest are entitled to dismissal of the tortious interference claims against them that are based on Nguyen's alleged breach of that agreement.