Cerajewski v. McVey

13 Citing cases

  1. Lurie v. City of Indianapolis

    245 Ind. 457 (Ind. 1964)   Cited 4 times

    Supplemental footnote to majority opinion. A dissenting opinion by Achor, C.J., on July 1, 1964, has been filed in this case placing reliance on the cases of Cerajewski v. McVey (1947), 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650, 171 A.L.R. 723; and Rappaport v. Dept. of Public Health (1949), 227 Ind. 508, 87 N.E.2d 77, 88 N.E.2d 150, which held the additional taxing and hospital districts there created to be unconstitutional. The dissent further states such decisions ". . . are landmark cases which have been cited and relied upon in nearly every case wherein the constitutionality of a newly created taxing and bonding authority has been established . . .", specifically referring to: Datisman, etc. v. Gary Public Library (1960), 241 Ind. 83, 170 N.E.2d 55; Book v. Board of Flood Control Comrs. etc. et al. (1959), 239 Ind. 160, 156 N.E.2d 87; Martin v. Ben Davis Conservancy Dist. (1958), 238 Ind. 502, 153 N.E.2d 125; Protsman v. Jefferson-Craig Consol. School Corp. (1953), 231 Ind. 527, 109 N.E.2d 889; Dept. of Pub. Sanitation v. Solan (1951), 229 Ind. 228, 97 N.E.2d 495.

  2. Protsman v. Jefferson-Craig Consol. School Corp.

    231 Ind. 527 (Ind. 1953)   Cited 20 times
    In Protsman v. Jefferson-Craig Consol. School Corp., etc., 231 Ind. 527, 109 N.E.2d 889, 890 (Sup. Ct. 1953), cited by plaintiff, the agreement provided an option to purchase on any rental date. It further provided: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to provide the Lessee shall be under any obligation to purchase demised premises."

    We may add that, in our opinion, the limitation of the activities in which the parties may be required or permitted to engage during the life of the lease are equally impotent to effect such a change. Cerajewski v. McVey (1947), 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650, 171 A.L.R. 723; Rappaport v. Dept. of Public Health (1949), 227 Ind. 508, 87 N.E.2d 77, 88 N.E.2d 150; and see interesting discussion in 25 Ind. Law Journal, p. 325. If the school corporation is unable to build a school house it must lease one. If, as it appears here without contradiction, the school corporation can lease a new building at a fair and reasonable rental, this court would not be unwarranted in striking the arrangement down merely because the school corporation can, at its option, but without compulsion so to do, acquire ownership of the property on favorable terms.

  3. Rappaport v. Dept. of Public Health

    227 Ind. 508 (Ind. 1949)   Cited 16 times

    If actual control of the new mechanics for exercising the old functions remains in the city, that is a proper matter to consider in determining the question of evasion. In Cerajewski v. McVey (1947), 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650, we recently considered the primary question presented by the case before us. It is not necessary, therefore, that we discuss 1. here in detail the applicable law.

  4. Lawson v. Pub. Trans. Corp.

    256 Ind. 552 (Ind. 1971)   Cited 1 times

    This court has had several opportunities to interpret the above quoted provisions and several maxims have evolved in respect to the debts of municipal corporations. See Datisman v. Gary Public Library (1960), 241 Ind. 83, 170 N.E.2d 55; Bailey v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District (1960), 240 Ind. 401, 166 N.E.2d 520; City of Indianapolis v. Buckner (1954), 233 Ind. 32, 116 N.E.2d 507; Cerajewski v. McVey (1947), 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650; Campbell v. City of Indianapolis (1900), 155 Ind. 186, 57 N.E. 920. The principles stated in these cases are well settled and we need not enter into a lengthy discourse concerning them.

  5. Hawkins v. City of Greenfield

    248 Ind. 593 (Ind. 1967)   Cited 9 times

    Other authorities of similar import are readily available, but in the interest of brevity we quote from a Supplemental Footnote to the majority opinion found in 198 N.E.2d 755 in the case of Lurie v. City of Indianapolis (1964) 245 Ind. 457 199 N.E.2d 699, which in our minds presents the modern approach to the solution to the questions posed in this appeal and to which we adhere: "A dissenting opinion by Achor, C.J., on July 1, 1964, has been filed in this case placing reliance on the cases of Cerajewski v. McVey (1947) 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650, 171 A.L.R. 723; and Rappaport v. Dept. of Public Health (1949), 227 Ind. 508, 87 N.E.2d 77, 88 N.E.2d 150, which held the additional taxing and hospital districts there created to be unconstitutional. The dissent further states such decisions `. . . are landmark cases which have been cited and relied upon in nearly every case wherein the constitutionality of a newly created taxing and bonding authority has been established . . .', specifically referring to: Datisman, etc. v. Gary Public Library (1960), 241 Ind. 83, 170 N.E.2d 55; Book v. Board of Flood Control Comrs., etc., et al. (1959), 239 Ind. 160, 156 N.E.2d 87; Martin v. Ben Davis Conservancy Dist. (1958), 238 Ind. 502, 153 N.E.2d 125; Protsman v. Jefferson-Craig Consol. School Corp. (1953), 231 Ind. 527, 109 N.E.2d 889; Dept. of Pub. Sanitation, etc. v. Solan (1951), 229 Ind. 228, 97 N.E.2d 495. (See note 5 of dissent.)

  6. City of Phoenix v. Phoenix Civic Aud. Con. Cent

    99 Ariz. 270 (Ariz. 1965)   Cited 33 times
    In City of Phoenix v. Phoenix Civic Auditorium Convention Ctr. Ass'n., Inc., 99 Ariz. 270, 408 P.2d 818 (1965) ("Civic Center I"), the court was asked to declare the constitutionality of the City's proposed agreement with a nonprofit entity to construct a civic center and lease it to the City on a long-term basis in return for monthly rental payments.

    The best reasoned opinions under facts similar to the instant case hold that they are in effect purchase agreements. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Ala. 91, 36 So.2d 475; Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183, 79 A.2d 753; State ex rel. Public Institutional Bldg. Authority v. Neffner, 137 Ohio St. 390, 30 N.E.2d 705; State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E.2d 200; Austin v. Healy, 376 Ill. 633, 35 N.E.2d 78; Cerajewski v. McVey, 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650, 171 A.L.R. 723. The dissenting opinion clearly shows why the majority opinion in the Dean case was based on a strained construction of the facts.

  7. Datisman, Etc. v. Gary Public Library

    170 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. 1960)   Cited 3 times

    See: Miller v. Akron Public Library (Ohio Com. Pleas 1951), 96 N.E.2d 795, 798; and Lambert v. Board of Trustees of Public Library (1913), 151 Ky. 725, 152 S.W. 802, 807, where the establishment of separate library districts have been upheld. In Cerajewski v. McVey (1947), 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650, 171 A.L.R. 723, upon which appellant relies, the statute which was declared invalid authorized the creation of a separate unit in the City of Hammond for the building of technical-vocational high schools. The boundaries of such unit were identical with the School City and the unit was administered by and under the control of the Board of School Trustees of the School City of Hammond.

  8. Book v. Board of Flood Control Commissioners

    239 Ind. 160 (Ind. 1959)   Cited 14 times

    The rationale of the above cases is that improvements of a local rather than a political or governmental character may be financed and the costs thereof paid by a special tax or assessment limited to the area benefited. The cases of Rappaport v. Dept. of Public Health (1949), 227 Ind. 508, 87 N.E.2d 77 and Cerajewski v. McVey (1947), 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650 are constantly urged upon us on questions of this sort as supporting the contrary view. Suffice it to say here they dealt with the governmental functions of maintaining hospitals and schools and could hardly be considered within the category commonly referred to as local improvements.

  9. Martin v. Ben Davis Conservancy Dist

    238 Ind. 502 (Ind. 1958)   Cited 46 times
    Applying the concept of color of law or apparent authority of law to statutes later found to be unconstitutional

    The opinion further says that local public improvement districts with authority to create indebtedness and pay for same with revenue levied on the special benefits are not 17. violative of the constitutional provision in question. Board of Com'rs, etc. v. Harrell et al. (1897), 147 Ind. 500, 46 N.E. 124; Cerajewski v. McVey et al. (1947), 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650. Here we have a district created for local public improvement, particularly benefiting the land within the district.

  10. Re West Highway Sanitary Dist

    77 Wyo. 384 (Wyo. 1957)   Cited 10 times

    This, then, would present an anomalous, if not absurd situation. See Cerajewski v. McVey, 225 Ind. 67, 72 N.E.2d 650. So if say nine-tenths or any other proportion of a city or town were organized as a sewer district along with some area outside, then, upon the theory of counsel for the district, no constitutional limitation of indebtedness would exist, whereas under the constitution, the area in the city or town could not be burdened by an indebtedness of 2% of the taxable value of the property, plus 4% thereof for sewer purposes. So if a village were incorporated as a town, the limit of indebtedness could not exceed 2% of the taxable value of the property, plus 4% additional for sewers. If on the other hand, the village were organized as a sanitary or sewer district, there would not, according to the theory of counsel, be any constitutional limit at all.