Central Republic Trust Co. v. Petersen Furniture

5 Citing cases

  1. Kelley/Lehr & Associates, Inc. v. O'Brien

    194 Ill. App. 3d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 13 times
    Finding that a mortgage does not allow a mortgagee to collect rents because it does not give it possession, rather a passive assignment of rents becomes activated when the mortgagee does take possession

    Silverstein v. Schak (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 641, 645-46. However, where the mortgagor was rightfully in possession at the time of the execution of the lease, a tenant had priority over a subsequent mortgage ( Central Republic Trust Co. v. Petersen Furniture Co. (1935), 279 Ill. App. 492, 504), so long as the lease had not been assigned to the mortgagee as additional security ( Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. W.T. Grant Co. (1944), 321 Ill. App. 487, 501). Where a lessor obtains title under an instrument granting it full possession, and later assigns its rights back to the grantor upon a default in a contract, the grantor takes the property back subject to valid leases executed by the lessor, and tenants who paid rent in advance do not pay twice. ( Meyer v. Sachsel (1908), 143 Ill. App. 563, 566.)

  2. Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Assn

    11 Ill. App. 3d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)   Cited 7 times

    At the time of closing, when the insurance commission is earned, Illinois law of mortgages gives the mortgagee only a lien on the land to secure payment of the debt. ( Central Republic Trust Co. v. Peterson Furniture Co., 279 Ill. App. 492, I.L.P. Mortgages, sec. 112.) Therefore, all the insurance which a savings association like Unity sells either through a subsidiary or service corporation would be with "others" as that concept is used in the Illinois Insurance Code.

  3. Merrick v. Daehler

    282 N.E.2d 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)   Cited 2 times

    Plaintiffs have argued that the repeal of Sec. 13 in the Conveyancing Act and the inclusion of the definition in Sec. 23.1 of the Illinois Mortgage and Foreclosure Act was an attempt to bring the wording in agreement with the decisions and to restrict the term mortgage to the purposes of the Mortgage and Foreclosure Act. Florence Daehler argues that the statute cannot be restricted by making a distinction between common law mortgages and equitable mortgages. ( DeVoigne v. Chicago Title Tr. Co. (1922), 304 Ill. 177, 182, 183; Osborne on Mortgages, Sec. 77, page 87.) Based upon this conclusion, she further cites cases holding that a conveyance by a mortgagee cannot effect the previous status of title ( Willhite v. Berry (1908), 232 Ill. 331, 334; Lightcap v. Bradley (1900), 186 Ill. 510, 522-523; and cases which stand for the proposition that a mortgagee has only a lien ( e.g., Kling v. Ghilarducci (1954), 3 Ill.2d 454, 460; Central Republic Trust Co. v. Petersen Furniture Co., (1935), 279 Ill. App. 492, 495.) The counter-defendants rely principally upon Williams v. Williams (1915), 270 Ill. 552, and Gannon v. Moles (1904), 209 Ill. 180, as illustrating that a deed given as security has been distinguished from an ordinary mortgage so as to permit reconveyance as directed by the parties.

  4. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. W. T. Grant Co.

    53 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944)   Cited 9 times

    nstitute an assignment of a lease then in existence; that as to merger, when the lessee purchased the fee for a valuable consideration and it was recited in the conveyance that it was the intention thereby to merge the leasehold estate into the fee, a complete merger was thereby effected, and all obligation to pay rent under the lease was at an end; that while the existence of an outstanding lien upon the lesser estate will usually prevent a merger, an outstanding lien by way of judgment, mortgage or otherwise upon the greater estate, is no obstacle to a merger; and that if the mortgagee was not satisfied to rely upon the value of the land and building as security for its mortgage, then a very simple and obvious method existed by which the lessor's interest in the lease could have been obtained as additional security, namely, an assignment of the lessor's interest in the lease as collateral, with notice thereof, either constructive or actual, to the lessee. The Grant Company submits Central Republic Trust Co. v. Petersen Furniture Co., 279 Ill. App. 492, and the numerous cases cited and discussed therein, as decisive authority for the right of a landlord and a tenant to cancel a lease, despite the existence of a mortgage lien upon the premises prior to default under the mortgage. In that case, decided by the first division of the Appellate Court in this district, the owner trustees on March 10, 1926 leased the premises to defendant for a period of 15 years at a stipulated rental of $172,200, payable in graduated monthly instalments.

  5. Chicago Title Trust Company v. Kesner

    16 N.E.2d 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938)   Cited 4 times
    In Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Kesner, 296 Ill. App. 187, the intervening estate consisted of a mortgage of $400,000 upon the leasehold, the lesser estate, preventing its merger into the fee.

    When on August 6, 1932, these mortgages were in default and bills to foreclose were filed, the trustee became to all intents and purposes the owner of the fees. Central Republic Trust Co. v. Petersen Furniture Co., 279 Ill. App. 492, 504. No subsequent acts of the parties could change its right to have the terms of the mortgages observed and there could be no extinguishment of the leases by the acts of the Lehmanns. Thomas v. Home Mut. Bldg. Loan Ass'n, 243 Ill. 550, 559.