Cent. Crosstown R.R. Co. v. Met. St. R. Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Bartlesville Elec. L. v. Bartlesville Interurban

    26 Okla. 453 (Okla. 1910)   Cited 20 times
    In Bartlesville Electric Light and Power Company v. Bartlesville Interurban Ry. Co., 26 Okla. 453, 109 P. 228 (1910), plaintiff [holder of a franchise] brought an action to enjoin defendant [who did not have a franchise] from using public streets for transmission of electricity.

    " Other cases in point are Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N.J. Eq. 242; Central Ry. Co. of New Jersey v. Penn. Ry. Co., 31 N.J. Eq. 475; Central C. Ry. Co. v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 16 App. Div. 229, 44 N.Y. Supp. 752; Twin Village Water Co. v. Damariscotta Gaslight Co., 98 Me. 325, 56 A. 1112; Patterson v. Wollmann, 5 N.D. 608, 67 N.W. 1040, 33 L. R. A. 536; McInnis v. Pace et al., 78 Miss. 550, 29 So. 835; Tugwell Madison v. Eagle Pass Ferry Co., 74 Tex. 480, 9 S.W. 120, 13 S.W. 654. When plaintiff accepted its franchise, it did so subject to the power of the municipality to grant to other persons or corporations similar franchises, and with the knowledge that it might be compelled to exercise its rights under its franchise with others exercising similar rights. If, by the competition of rival companies to whom the use of the streets and public grounds has been granted by the municipality, plaintiff is rendered unable to discharge the obligations of its contract to furnish the city and its inhabitants with light and power at stipulated prices, except at a financial loss to it, plaintiff cannot complain, for it must be held to have contemplated such condition might arise and to

  2. Baltimore Steam Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.

    123 Md. App. 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)   Cited 9 times

    eveals almost universal agreement with the Kelly proposition that a holder of a nonexclusive franchise has standing to enjoin competition by one lacking any franchise. E.g., Kinder v. Looney, 171 Ark. 16, 18-19, 283 S.W. 9, 10 (1926); City of Groton v. Yankee Gas Services Co., 224 Conn. 675, 685-86, 620 A.2d 771, 776 (1993); Central States Electric Co. v. Incorporated Town of Randall, 230 Iowa 376, 386, 297 N.W. 804, 809 (1941); Reo Bus Lines Co. v. Southern Bus Line Co., 209 Ky. 40, 43-44, 272 S.W. 18, 19 (1925); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 185 So.2d 313, 315 (La.Ct.App. 1966); Deister, supra; Village of Blaine v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 12, 265 Minn. 9, 22, 121 N.W.2d 183, 193 (1963); Payne v. Jackson City Lines, 220 Miss. 180, 191, 70 So.2d 520, 523 (1954); Lincoln Traction Co. v. Omaha, L. B. Ry. Co., 108 Neb. 154, 159-60, 187 N.W. 790, 793 (1922); Millville Gas Light Co. v. Vineland Light Power Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 305, 307-08, 65 A. 504, 505 (1906); Central Crosstown R.R. Co. v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 16 A.D. 229, 234-35, 44 N.Y.S. 752, 756-57 (N.Y.App. Div. 1897); City Coach Co. v. Gastonia Transit Co., 227 N.C. 391, 395, 42 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1947); Bartlesville Elec. Light Power Co. v. Bartlesville Interurban Ry. Co., 26 Okla. 453, 458, 109 P. 228, 229 (1910); Citizen's Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Lackawanna Wyo. Valley Power Co., 255 Pa. 145, 155, 99 A. 462, 465 (1916); Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 133 Tenn. 99, 109, 179 S.W. 635, 638 (1915) ( Memphis St. Ry. Co. I); Lindsley v. Dallas Consol. St. Ry. Co., 200 S.W. 207, 210 (Tex.Civ.App. 1917); Turner v. Hicks, 164 Va. 612, 617, 180 S.E. 543, 545 (1935); Puget Sound Traction, Light Power Co. v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wn. 482, 490, 173 P. 504, 507 (1918); Carson v. Woodram, 95 W. Va. 197, 202, 120 S.E. 512 (1923). See also Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 521, 49 S.Ct. 235, 237, 73 L.Ed. 483 (1929).

  3. Manhattan B. Three-Cent Line v. Third Ave. R. Co.

    154 App. Div. 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913)   Cited 1 times

    It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the defendant railroad companies are operating a street surface railroad over a highway, within the boundaries of the city of New York, which is neither named nor described in the original certificate of incorporation of either of said companies, nor in any certificate of extension thereof, and that neither of said companies has obtained any franchise therefor in the manner prescribed by law. If such is the case, the so-called license or consent of the defendant, the commissioner of bridges, is of no avail ( Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 152 N.Y. 244; Delaware, L. W.R.R. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 158 id. 266, 478; Hatfield v. Straus, 189 id. 208; Richards v. Citizens' Water Supply Co., 140 App. Div. 206), and their acts constitute a public nuisance. ( Fanning v. Osborne, 102 N.Y. 441; Central Crosstown R.R. Co. v. Met. St. R. Co., 16 App. Div. 229. ) But a nuisance which is common or public in its nature cannot be lawfully abated at a suit in equity of a private individual or corporation, unless such person is a party specially aggrieved; that is, one who has suffered greater injury by reason of defendant's unlawful acts than the public generally (2 Wood Nuis. [3d ed.] § 839; Central Crosstown R.R. Co. v. Met. St. R. Co., supra; City of Yonkers v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 136 App. Div. 701, 707), and this must be both alleged and proved. (Wood Nuis., supra.)

  4. El. City R. Co. v. City of Niagara Falls

    48 Misc. 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905)

    That a street surface railroad already constructed has the right to maintain an action against another company to restrain it from constructing its road along the former's route, without its consent, is sustained by these authorities, but they afford no support for the restraint of municipal action. Forty-second St. R.R. Co. v. Thirty-fourth St. R.R. Co., 52 N.Y. Super. Ct. 252; New York Cable Co. v. Chambers St. R.R. Co., 40 Hun, 29; Indianapolis Cable St. R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R.R. Co., 8 L.R.A. 539; Central Crosstown R.R. Co. v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 16 A.D. 229; Booth Street Railways, § 122. Whether the municipal authorities of the city of Niagara Falls should make the proposed grant to the International Railway Company, in view of the grant heretofore made to the plaintiff, is a matter resting in their sound discretion, and the court possesses no power to interfere with such discretion under the facts presented in this case.