Both this court and the Court of International Trade have distinguished cases where Customs violated an agency-ordered suspen-sion of liquidation from cases involving violation of a court-ordered injunction preventing liquidation. See Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1324 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (distinguishing LG Electronics on grounds that it involved "liquidations in violation of an injunctive order"); Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167-69 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) ("Put simply, a court-ordered suspension of liquidations creates a whole different ball game apart from the standard protest and judicial review framework provided by Congress. Liquidations in violation of a valid court order have no legal effect, and it is futile to place a legal nullity within Congress' statutory scheme.") (internal citations and quotations omitted). Where, as here, liquidation occurred during an agency-ordered suspension of liquidation, the liquidation must be protested under § 1514.

The concept of notice has been further refined to require that the notice be unambiguous and public.See Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed Cir. 2004) (citing Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1275-76) ("Our case law further requires that, in addition to being unambiguous, the notice to Customs be public"). Assuming arguendo that the Federal Circuit had not made the public nature of the notice a requirement, the court would do so here. The sound policy advanced by the appellate court is to have a clean starting point for the six-month period.

Moreover, unlike importers who have the potential to protest an erroneously liquidated entry subject to an antidumping duty order, see 19 U.S.C. § 1514; Shinyei Corp. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining various remedies available to importers), Plaintiffs, as domestic interested parties, do not have a comparable express statutory means of remedying Customs' premature liquidation of entries covered by the statutory suspension of liquidation. See Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that domestic interested parties to antidumping proceeding have no available remedy to rectify an erroneous Customs' liquidation of entries subject to an antidumping duty order). Plaintiffs therefore do not have an available, adequate remedy at law.

A deemed liquidation is a protestable event that falls squarely within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). See Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States , 283 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (An importer challenging liquidation can “invoke[ ] the jurisdiction of the [CIT] under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) if, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5),” which cross-references the deemed liquidation provision of 19 U.S.C. § 1504, the importer “timely protest[s] the liquidations.”); see also Cemex, S.A. v. United States , 384 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“While we agree that Customs'[s] role in making antidumping decisions, i.e. , in calculating antidumping duties, is generally ministerial, Customs here made a decision regarding liquidation ,” which may be protested under § 1514(a). (footnote omitted)).

Deemed liquidation was intended to aid importers by giving them "finality as to their duty obligations by providing for deemed liquidation at the rate claimed by the importers [i.e. the cash deposit rate] unless actual liquidation occurred within specified time limits." Cemex v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). As this case illustrates, however, trading accuracy for finality may be sweet in one case and bitter in another.

The Federal Circuit first recognized that deemed liquidation may be challenged only by importers through filing a protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004). "By contrast, domestic parties have no specific avenue of relief for improper liquidation.

Thus, a "deemed liquidation" under section 1504 has the same effect as the expiration of the time for reliquidation in [United States v. Sherman Sons Co., 237 U.S. 146 (1915)]: it subjects any further collection efforts by the government in connection with the same entry to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The same principle was recited in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (CIT 2003), aff'd, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding domestic parties have no right to challenge a deemed liquidation by administrative protest). The purpose of [ 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d)] was to give importers finality as to their duty obligations by providing for deemed liquidation at the rate claimed by the importers, unless actual liquidation occurred within specified time limits.

While this court has recognized a limited range of circumstances in which Customs' underlying liquidation pursuant to AD or CVD orders may be subject to protest, we find no such circumstance here. See, e.g., Koyo Corp. of U.S.A. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that deemed liquidation under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) is subject to protest when Customs fails to execute liquidation instructions); Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding that Customs made a particular "decision" when it erroneously recognized a deemed liquidation at an "as entered" rate instead of applying the final rate). Rimco has not alleged that Customs made any substantive determinations or undertook any discretionary actions that would constitute § 1514(a) decisions.

See Hutchison , 827 F.3d at 1362 ("Indeed, when Customs makes a decision to liquidate, that decision is ‘[m]ore than passive or ministerial’ and ‘constitute[s] a "decision" within the context of § 1514(a).’ " (alterations in original) (quoting Cemex, S.A. v. United States , 384 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) )). Accordingly, this case "presents exactly the scenario in which § 1514's protest provisions can be invoked because Customs engaged in some sort of decision-making process."

In order for an entry to be deemed liquidated, the suspension of liquidation must have been removed; Customs must have received notice of the removal of the suspension; and Customs must not have liquidated the entry at issue within six months of receiving notice of the suspension removal. Cemex, S.A. v. United States , 384 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States , 283 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ). "Liquidation" is defined as "the final computation or ascertainment of duties on entries for consumption or drawback entries." 19 C.F.R. § 159.1.