In reaching this conclusion, the Court articulated principles of uniformity relevant to wrongful death actions, and more generally, to maritime tort law, which have moved subsequent courts to limit recovery in other similar contexts. See e.g., CEH, Inc. v. FV Seafarer, 148 F.R.D. 469, 472 (D.R.I. 1993) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court's decision in Miles, however, does not enunciate an absolute bar to recovery of punitive damages in all general maritime cases.

In light of the fact that attorney's fees may be considered a form of punitive damages, the Court clarifies that the award of attorney's fees may be recovered in maintenance and cure cases. See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1513; C.E.H. Inc. v. F/V "Seafarer", 148 F.R.D. 469, 472 (D.R.I. 1993), aff'd, 153 F.R.D. 491 (D.R.I. 1994). The Supreme Court has sanctioned the recovery of attorney's fees under general maritime law in actions brought by seamen who are forced to hire attorneys to obtain maintenance and cure due to the callous attitude of the employer.

A few Federal cases have discussed Miles and held that punitive damages are available other than under the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act. (CEH, Inc. v FV "Seafarer", 148 FRD 469, 471-473 [D RI 1993], affd 153 FRD 491 [D RI 1994]; Duplantis v Texaco, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 787, 788 [ED La 1991].) Most cases have applied Miles to bar punitive damages under the Jones Act.

In addition, a number of district courts have invoked the Supreme Court's ruling in Miles as a basis to disallow punitive damages for claims under the general maritime law in order to further uniformity between that law and the analogous federal statutes, DOHSA and the Jones Act. See, e.g., CEH, Inc. v. FV "Seafarer", 148 F.R.D. 469, 472 (D.R.I. 1993) (collecting cases); Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y.A/S, 822 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va. 1993) (federal decisions are "increasingly less receptive to recovery of punitive damages in a general maritime law survival action"); Ortega v. Oceantrawl, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 621, 623 (D. Alaska 1992); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 679, 680-82 (E.D.Mich. 1992). Most of these cases involved claims by seamen, and there are a few district court rulings to the contrary.

With that being said, "when courts have ordered that individual defendants disclose their financial information, they have sometimes limited production to a statement of the defendant's net worth." Id. (citing CEH, Inc. v. FV Seafarer, 148 F.R.D. 469, 473 (D.R.I. 1993)). Here, Plaintiffs' request that PLS produce "all documentation regarding the net worth of PLS Financial Services, Inc. [and PLS Loan Store of Texas, Inc.] for the past five years, including tax returns, income statements, SEC filings, audits, and financial statements" (Dkt. #143, Exhibit A). Plaintiffs, however, have not demonstrated that PLS Financial Services and PLS Lone Store of Texas' net worth cannot be discovered through some less intrusive manner.

However, when courts have ordered that individual defendants disclose their financial information, they have sometimes limited production to a statement of the defendant's net worth. See, e.g., CEH, Inc. V. FV Seafarer, 148 F.R.D. 469, 473 (D.R.I. 1993). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Amin-Akbari's motion as to Bozelli's testimony.

Wauchop v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 539, 550 (N.D.Ind.1991); CEH, Inc. v. FV Seafarer, 148 F.R.D. 469, 471, aff'd, 153 F.R.D. 491 (D.R.I.1994).           But where, in advance of expert discovery, a plaintiff seeks to inquire about a damage theory that may never come into being, and that is to be used essentially for rebuttal, different questions are presented.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court articulated principles of uniformity relevant to wrongful death actions, and more generally, to maritime tort law, which have moved subsequent courts to limit recovery in other similar contexts. See, e.g., CEH, Inc. v. FV Seafarer, 148 F.R.D. 469, 472 (D.R.I. 1993) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court's decision in Miles, however, does not enunciate an absolute bar to recovery of punitive damages in all general maritime cases.

In addition to the Second Circuit's belief that Miles precludes punitive damage claims in general maritime actions, the majority of District Courts which have addressed this issue are similarly of the view that the Miles decision precludes claims for punitive damages under the general maritime law in order to further uniformity between that law and the analogous federal statutes DOHSA and the Jones Act. See e.g., CEH Inc. v. FV"Seafarer", 148 F.R.D. 469, 472 (D.R.I. 1993); Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y.A/S, 822 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va. 1993); Ortega v. Oceantrawl, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 621, 623 (D.Alaska 1993); In re Cleveland Tankers Inc., 791 F. Supp. 679, 680-82 (E.D.Mich. 1992). It must also be noted, nevertheless, that some District Courts have found punitive damage awards proper despite the Supreme Court's ruling.

See, e.g., The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 546, 558-59, 4 L.Ed. 456 (1818) (piracy case, observing that punitive damages are an appropriate response to "lawless misconduct" or "gross and wanton outrage"); In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 624, 625 (5th Cir. 1981) (wrongful death action, reviewing cases and finding punitive damages available under general maritime law where there is willful and wanton misconduct);Hines v. J.A Laporte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987) (following In re Merry). See also CEH, Inc. v. F/V SEAFARER, 148 F.R.D. 469, 473 (D.R.I. 1993) (tort action, acknowledging claim for punitive damages under general maritime law "based upon allegations of willful, reckless and malicious misconduct"). Cf. B.F. McKernin, 416 F. Supp. at 1073 (finding that under New York law, negligence, even amounting to "gross disregard for plaintiff's rights," is insufficient to warrant punitive damages against sea carrier).