Defendant relies on two cases that it believes supports its broad reading of the rail carrier exemption. Those cases, Cederblade v. Parmelee Transportation Co., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948) and Williams v. Alex's Transportation, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1997), are discussed by the court below in connection with the "terminal area" exception to jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act. As will be explained, Cederblade does not support defendant's construction of the exemption and Williams is not persuasive to the court.
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2). In Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948), an independent contractor used motor vehicles to transport passengers and property between railroad depots or between railroad and boat depots in Chicago, Illinois. See Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 94 F. Supp. 965, 966 (N.D.Ill. 1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948).
Id. at 834. See also Cedarblade v. Parmalee Transportation Co., 94 F.Supp. 965 (N.D.Ill. 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948). We therefore hold that the ICC did not run afoul of any established court precedents when it held that the service performed by ACI was in interstate commerce.
The task which confronts this court, as it so often does, is where to draw the line. Two other courts, the Fourth Circuit in Airlines Transportation, Inc., v. Tobin, 198 F.2d 249, and a district court in Cederblade v. Parmelee Transportation Co., D.C.N.D.Ill., 94 F. Supp. 965, affirmed on other questions, 7 Cir., 166 F.2d 554, have addressed themselves to somewhat similar factual situations as that at bar and have reached contrary results. The Tobin decision held that the employees were engaged in commerce; the Cederblade opinion held they were not.
They are Tews and Scott, supra. The Tews court conducted a thorough analysis of the terminal area exemption, and, relying in part on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Corp., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948), found that the terminal area exemption applies only if the employer provides transportation services within a terminal area for a rail carrier subject to jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 13503(b). The Scott court, relying on Tews and Cederblade, came to the same conclusion. 2009 WL 3561301, at *6 ("Therefore, consistent with the Court's analysis in Tews, we find that an employer is only exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA under the terminal area exception of the [Motor Carrier Act] when providing transportation service by motor vehicle within a terminal area, and only for those employees furnishing such service, providing 49 U.S.C. § 13503(b)(1)(B) is also satisfied.").
However, material issues of fact exist as to which employees may have been engaged in providing terminal transfer services for railways and during what periods of time, preventing entry of summary judgment. See Cedarblade v. Parmalee Transp. Co., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948) (applying railway exemption to bus operators). D. Willfulness
The defendants cite several other cases in support of their motion for summary judgment. Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 94 F. Supp. 965 (N.D.Ill. 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948), Wirtz v. National Electric Co., 285 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.Okla. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Shultz v. National Electric Co., 414 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1969), and Mateo v. Auto Rental Co., 240 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1957) all dealt with the issue of defining an end to the stream of commerce.
It is to be noted that Parmelee intervened in that case and that the six railroad defendants were parties plaintiff. Even if it had not been decided by the express holdings of the cases first cited above that the railroads could properly enter into an exclusive transfer contract with a single transfer agent, this conclusion would follow from the Supreme Court's holding in the City of Chicago case that the service is authorized as a reasonable and proper interchange facility, which is in accordance with the holdings in Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 7 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 554 and Commercial Zones Terminal Areas, 48 Motor Carrier Cases 418 (1948). It is well settled that railroads have the right to combine their terminal facilities and to select a joint agent to operate such facilities.
Respondents cite other cases in which the opposite result was reached. See Mateo v. Auto Rental Co., 240 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1957); Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 94 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Ill. 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948). [6] Ultimately, "[t]he decision must rest on the particular facts of each case."