Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co.

9 Citing cases

  1. Tews v. Renzenberger, Inc.

    592 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (D. Kan. 2009)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that the mere presence of a few commercial motor vehicles in a company's fleet does not render all of its driver's exempt from overtime pay

    Defendant relies on two cases that it believes supports its broad reading of the rail carrier exemption. Those cases, Cederblade v. Parmelee Transportation Co., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948) and Williams v. Alex's Transportation, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1997), are discussed by the court below in connection with the "terminal area" exception to jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act. As will be explained, Cederblade does not support defendant's construction of the exemption and Williams is not persuasive to the court.

  2. Williams v. Alex's Transp., Inc.

    969 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1997)   Cited 5 times

    29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(2). In Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948), an independent contractor used motor vehicles to transport passengers and property between railroad depots or between railroad and boat depots in Chicago, Illinois. See Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 94 F. Supp. 965, 966 (N.D.Ill. 1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948).

  3. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com'n v. U.S.

    812 F.2d 8 (D.C. Cir. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    Finding that a motor carrier had a common arrangement with an air carrier when it "operated pursuant to an explicit contract" with the airline, and that this was sufficient for the ICC to find the motor carrier's activities to be in interstate commerce, despite the absence of a through-ticketing agreement

    Id. at 834. See also Cedarblade v. Parmalee Transportation Co., 94 F.Supp. 965 (N.D.Ill. 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948). We therefore hold that the ICC did not run afoul of any established court precedents when it held that the service performed by ACI was in interstate commerce.

  4. Mateo v. Auto Rental Company

    240 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1957)   Cited 19 times
    Finding that a shuttle service lacking any contract with an airline and which was mostly hired by interstate passengers upon arriving at the airport was not interstate commerce

    The task which confronts this court, as it so often does, is where to draw the line. Two other courts, the Fourth Circuit in Airlines Transportation, Inc., v. Tobin, 198 F.2d 249, and a district court in Cederblade v. Parmelee Transportation Co., D.C.N.D.Ill., 94 F. Supp. 965, affirmed on other questions, 7 Cir., 166 F.2d 554, have addressed themselves to somewhat similar factual situations as that at bar and have reached contrary results. The Tobin decision held that the employees were engaged in commerce; the Cederblade opinion held they were not.

  5. Miller v. Professional Transportation, Inc. (S.D.Ind. 8-25-2010)

    3:09-cv-0111-RLY-WGH (S.D. Ind. Aug. 25, 2010)   Cited 10 times

    They are Tews and Scott, supra. The Tews court conducted a thorough analysis of the terminal area exemption, and, relying in part on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Corp., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948), found that the terminal area exemption applies only if the employer provides transportation services within a terminal area for a rail carrier subject to jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 13503(b). The Scott court, relying on Tews and Cederblade, came to the same conclusion. 2009 WL 3561301, at *6 ("Therefore, consistent with the Court's analysis in Tews, we find that an employer is only exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA under the terminal area exception of the [Motor Carrier Act] when providing transportation service by motor vehicle within a terminal area, and only for those employees furnishing such service, providing 49 U.S.C. § 13503(b)(1)(B) is also satisfied.").

  6. Morrison v. Quality Transports Services, Inc.

    474 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2007)   Cited 29 times
    Finding that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation extends "`only to drivers who reasonably could be expected to make one of the carrier's interstate runs. . . .'"

    However, material issues of fact exist as to which employees may have been engaged in providing terminal transfer services for railways and during what periods of time, preventing entry of summary judgment. See Cedarblade v. Parmalee Transp. Co., 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948) (applying railway exemption to bus operators). D. Willfulness

  7. Brennan v. S M Enterprises

    362 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1973)   Cited 7 times
    In Brennan v. S M Enterprises, 362 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 164 U.S. App.D.C. 368, 505 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a Fair Labor Standards Act case, employees of Washington, D.C., parking garages were held to be covered because their work facilitated interstate travel by commuters from Virginia and Maryland and by tourists from across the country.

    The defendants cite several other cases in support of their motion for summary judgment. Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 94 F. Supp. 965 (N.D.Ill. 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948), Wirtz v. National Electric Co., 285 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.Okla. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Shultz v. National Electric Co., 414 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1969), and Mateo v. Auto Rental Co., 240 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1957) all dealt with the issue of defining an end to the stream of commerce.

  8. Parmelee Transportation Company v. Keeshin

    186 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ill. 1960)   Cited 13 times
    In Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin (N.D. Ill. 1970), 186 F. Supp. 533, an agreement between 21 railroads using passenger terminals in Chicago to contract with a single carrier to perform all independent transportation services for passengers between the various terminals at fixed rates was also held to be permissible.

    It is to be noted that Parmelee intervened in that case and that the six railroad defendants were parties plaintiff. Even if it had not been decided by the express holdings of the cases first cited above that the railroads could properly enter into an exclusive transfer contract with a single transfer agent, this conclusion would follow from the Supreme Court's holding in the City of Chicago case that the service is authorized as a reasonable and proper interchange facility, which is in accordance with the holdings in Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 7 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 554 and Commercial Zones Terminal Areas, 48 Motor Carrier Cases 418 (1948). It is well settled that railroads have the right to combine their terminal facilities and to select a joint agent to operate such facilities.

  9. Port v. Utils. Transp. Comm'n

    92 Wn. 2d 789 (Wash. 1979)   Cited 41 times

    Respondents cite other cases in which the opposite result was reached. See Mateo v. Auto Rental Co., 240 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1957); Cederblade v. Parmelee Transp. Co., 94 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Ill. 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1948). [6] Ultimately, "[t]he decision must rest on the particular facts of each case."