Opinion
No. 37016-6-II.
February 24, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 04-5-00140-1, Susan Serko, J., entered October 26, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Penoyar, A.C.J., and Hunt, J.
C.C. appeals a trial court order, arguing that it improperly modified the stipulated parenting plan presented by the parties. We affirm.
Our commissioner reviewed the matter under RAP 18.14. and referred it to a panel of judges.
FACTS
In connection with the dissolution of their marriage, C.C. and C.N. entered into an agreed parenting plan, as provided by CR 2A. On August 23, 2007, they presented the plan to the trial court. The trial court signed the document but directed the parties to provide a typed copy for entry. Appellant's Br. at 1-2. Although the trial court had specifically asked that the parties' This is a matter involving a minor child, and the file has been sealed. It is appropriate to provide confidentiality in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that initials will be used in the case caption and in the body of the opinion to identify the parties.
The appellant has not provided the transcript from this hearing.
submit a typed parenting plan, the handwritten document was stamped as filed in open court on August 23.
On October 26, C.C. and C.N. appeared before the court to "enter all final pleadings" and presented the typed version of the plan. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 3. When the trial court examined that document, noting that it had overlooked the language previously, it questioned the provision that the guardian ad litem Rae Lea Newman "shall not ever be involved in this case in the future and shall not be called as a witness in the future by either side" and told the parties that it would strike that language. Clerk's Papers at 9.
Counsel for the father objected, arguing that the parties had negotiated the provision when they entered their CR 2A stipulation. The trial court responded:
I certainly should have read that a little bit more closely. . . . I think this language is inappropriate in a Court's final order. It is suggesting that Judge Stainer [sic], two years from now, can't enlist or ask if one of the parties want [sic] Ms. Newman to be there. I don't think she should be, quite frankly, but if somebody subpoenas her records or her to be in court, what you're suggesting is that I've said she cannot appear. I don't think that's appropriate and I should have been careful in my reading of the 2A agreement.
RP at 8.
Despite the father's objection, the trial court struck the language, noting that it went beyond its capacity to predict what would happen in the future. RP at 8-9. C.C. appeals.
ANALYSIS
C.C. contends that no CR 60 provision permitted the trial court's action. He argues that having signed the agreed plan, the court could not change it. We disagree.
The trial court properly modified the agreed plan under CR 60(a). That rule provides that "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative." CR 60(a). Here, the trial court explained that it had overlooked the language at issue when it signed the first version of the agreement. As it never intended to prohibit the consideration of any evidence in future proceedings, it properly corrected its mistake under CR 60(a).
The trial court correctly determined that it should not make evidentiary decisions for another court. A court acts only in matters pending before it. It cannot control proceedings in another court. Am. Mobile Homes of Wash., Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 115 Wn.2d 307, 313, 796 P.2d 1276 (1990). Such action would also have been contrary to the intent of RCW 26.09.182, which requires a court considering a permanent parenting plan to "determine the existence of any information and proceedings relevant to the placement of the child that are available in the judicial information system and databases." The language at issue would have been unenforceable.
Affirmed.
A majorityofthe panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Hunt, J. and Penoyar, A.C.J., concur.