Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted Without Oral Argument: February 22, 2007
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. Bk. No. LA 05-43980-AA, Adv. No. LA 06-01305-AA. Honorable Alan M. Ahart, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding.
Before: KLEIN, MONTALI, and DUNN, Bankruptcy Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Appellant/debtor, Shanel Stasz, challenges the bankruptcy court's decision to give preclusive effect to a confirmed final arbitration award and grant summary judgment in favor of appellee, Hugo Quackenbush, on his complaint for nondischargeability of debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). We AFFIRM.
FACTS
Appellee, a wealthy businessman and longtime employee of a prominent securities firm, and appellant were involved in a romantic relationship from 1997-2000. In 2000 their relationship soured and came to a bitter end.
Appellee filed an action in state court against appellant and obtained a temporary restraining order against her ( Quackenbush v. Stasz, S.Ct. San Francisco County, 2000, No. FL 036974). Appellant threatened to file a countersuit against appellee to publicly embarrass him by making public statements concerning him, his employer, his friends, and his colleagues based on information she gained during their relationship and from information she found while going through his personal papers and effects.
Appellant further threatened to contact the District Attorney's Office to have appellee investigated and criminally prosecuted.
In an effort to avoid such public humiliation and further distress, and to bring their acrimonious relationship to an end, appellee entered into a detailed written Confidential Settlement Agreement and General Release (" Agreement") with appellant on May 1, 2000. The Agreement was intensively negotiated in April 2000 with several drafts being exchanged between the parties. Appellee was represented by counsel, and appellant, who herself holds a law degree, was also represented by counsel of her choosing.
Pursuant to the Agreement, both appellant and appellee were to keep confidential the existence and terms of the Agreement and the nature of their disputes. Neither party was to contact or directly communicate with each other in any way, other than through counsel.
Pursuant to the Agreement, appellee was to pay appellant a total of $3,175,000, secured by a deed of trust (" DOT") on an apartment building owned by appellee. Appellee made an initial payment of $2.5 million, and additional payments of $225,000 were to be made on the first, second, and third anniversaries of the Agreement's effective date, provided appellant complied with all the provisions of the Agreement.
The Agreement also contained an arbitration provision. Id. That provision states:
12. Dispute Resolution. Any and all disputes of any kind between the parties, including but not limited to ones arising out of or related to interpretation or enforcement of any provision of this Agreement, shall be resolved by confidential binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association Large, Complex Commercial Dispute Panel in San Francisco, California before a single neutral arbitrator under the AAA Large, Complex Commercial Dispute Rules and Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection and California law. All aspects of the arbitration (including but not limited to pre-hearing, discovery (if any) and hearing procedures) shall be kept strictly confidential and sealed. The arbitrator shall have the power to award provisional, ancillary, temporary, preliminary and permanent equitable remedies, including but not limited to injunctive relief, but either party may at its option without waiving its right to arbitration hereunder seek injunctive relief from a court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. The arbitrator's award or awards shall be final and binding, and judgment on any award may be entered by any court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Without waiving or limiting the generality of the foregoing agreement to arbitrate disputes, the parties agree that any court proceedings between them shall be brought and conducted in the Superior Court in and for the City and County of San Francisco, and each party agrees to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of that court and that it is and will be a proper venue. All pleadings and other documents in any court proceedings between the parties shall be filed to the extent legally permitted under seal.
A little more than one month after the parties voluntarily and knowingly entered into the Agreement, appellant personally and directly contacted appellee by telephone on several occasions. During some of those calls, appellant told appellee that she would make embarrassing statements to third parties about him, his colleagues, and his employer unless he gave her more money. Appellant also sent letters to appellee's place of employment that discussed appellee and their confidential Agreement.
In July 2000, appellee initiated arbitration proceedings against appellant by filing a claim with the American Arbitration Association (" AAA") alleging violations of the no-contact and confidentiality provisions of their Agreement. Appellant refused to pay her share of the AAA filing fee. Due to appellant's refusal to pay, appellee paid the entire filing fee. Appellant filed a counterclaim seeking specific performance of their Agreement.
After appellant's harassing phone calls continued, appellee initiated proceedings with the AAA for an interim restraining order against appellant to stop her from continuing to violate their Agreement. The AAA appointed a retired California superior court judge to serve as arbitrator and hear the restraining order request. Appellant filed two written oppositions to appellee's request for a restraining order.
While appellee's restraining order request was pending, appellant sent appellee's counsel a letter in which she threatened to file a lawsuit in the Los Angeles Superior Court unless she was paid $50 million. A copy of the draft complaint was attached to the letter. Appellant also telephoned appellee and threatened him directly.
On November 30, 2000, appellant stipulated to the entry of an interim restraining order. Over appellant's objection, the arbitrator made findings that the claims asserted in appellant's draft complaint must be resolved through arbitration, not in state court, and some of the allegations, if made public, would violate the terms of the confidentiality provisions of the Agreement.
After appellant stipulated to entry of a restraining order, and after the arbitrator announced at a hearing on the restraining order request that he intended to enter detailed findings over appellant's objection, appellant filed an action in Los Angeles Superior Court ( Stasz v. Quackenbush, (Super. Ct. L.A. County 2000, No. BS066549) (" Stasz I"). Appellant challenged the arbitration provision in the Agreement as " unconscionable", and brought a motion to have the arbitration provision excised.
On January 17, 2001, the Superior Court in Stasz I denied appellant's motion to " excise" and found the arbitration provision to be fully enforceable and not unconscionable. Appellant appealed, and the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed the Order in an unpublished decision ( Stasz v. Quackenbush (Nov. 19, 2002, B147388)).
On June 25, 2001, appellant filed a second suit against appellee in state court alleging invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and deceit. ( Stasz v. Quackenbush, (Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 2001, No. BC252954) (" Stasz II"). Appellant also sought injunctive relief. The complaint filed in Stasz II was based on the same claims and allegations contained in the draft complaint appellant had threatened to file against appellee. Pursuant to the arbitrator's interim restraining order, those claims were to be pursued in arbitration, not in state court.
Appellant also had the Stasz II complaint delivered to appellee's place of employment in a concentrated effort to embarrass and humiliate appellee.
Appellant had the complaint delivered to the guard station at appellee's office. The guard on duty delivered the complaint to the legal department. Appellee's friends and colleagues in management were notified of the complaint and the matters contained therein.
In August 2001, appellee filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration in Stasz II. Appellant opposed the motion.
Appellant's opposition repeated several of the factual allegations contained in her state court complaint. She also attached, as a matter of public record, a document that contained approximately 200 pages of exhibits that had been kept confidential in the arbitration or under seal in Stasz I.
In September and October 2001, appellee filed and served an Application and Supplemental Application for Remedies with the arbitrator, for appellant's repeated violations of the restraining order.
On October 12, 2001, the Superior Court granted appellee's Motion to Compel Arbitration in Stasz II and stayed Stasz II pending the outcome of the arbitration.
A few days before the arbitration hearing on appellant's Application for Remedies, appellant informed the AAA and the arbitrator by faxed letter that she would not participate in the hearing.
Appellant requested that a letter and 50 pages of " exhibits" included with that letter be considered as her opposition to appellee's Application for Remedies. This " letter" was a personal letter sent to appellee's counsel stating why her conduct was justified.
The arbitrator proceeded with the duly noticed hearing without the appellant.
In late 2001, the arbitrator issued an interim award of damages in favor of appellee based on appellant's violations of the Agreement and restraining order. The arbitrator found the appellant's violations to be " willful" and had caused appellee " real and significant injuries and damages." Appellee was awarded $369,553.40 in compensatory damages, and $28,000 in arbitration costs, for a total interim award of $397,553.40.
The arbitrator denied appellee's request for punitive damages " without prejudice to proof of continued violations should they actually occur."
The same day that the arbitrator issued his first interim award order, appellant faxed a letter to upper management and general counsel at appellee's place of employment that contained statements about appellee, their disputes and the pending arbitration.
In January 2002, appellee sought further remedies for appellant's further violations of their Agreement. The following week, appellant filed a third lawsuit in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging causes of action against appellee's attorneys, his employer, and the AAA (Stasz v. [appellee's firm] (Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 2002, No. BC266691)) (" Stasz III").
With respect to appellee's second request for remedies, notice was duly served on all parties, and the arbitrator held two telephonic hearings in February and March 2002. Appellant again informed the AAA and the arbitrator by faxed letter that she would not participate in either hearing. Appellant did not appear for the February hearing. However, at the March hearing, appellant initially appeared via telephone, but when she was informed that any participation on her part would be " on the record", appellant hung up the phone and did not participate further.
The arbitrator later issued his second interim remedies award order in which he awarded appellee an additional $150,000 in compensatory damages, and $250,000 " in recognition of the willful and repetitive nature of [appellant's] violations, and to deter her from any further violations." The arbitrator found that appellant violated the Agreement and restraining order " willfully and with the intent to injure" appellee.
Despite the increased damage award against her, appellant continued to violate the Agreement and restraining order.
Because of appellant's continued violations, appellee filed a Motion for Judgment on All Claims and Counterclaims in the arbitration (" Motion for Judgment"). The Motion for Judgment was heard on June 4, 2002, at the AAA offices in Los Angeles. Both parties were duly notified of the hearing, date, time, and location. Appellee attended through his counsel. Appellant, however, notified the arbitrator through written letter that she elected not to attend the hearing " on advice of counsel." Appellant did not submit any evidence in opposition to appellee's motion, other than a letter stating her position that the arbitration was automatically stayed pending her appeal of Stasz I.
In appellant's voluntary absence, the arbitrator requested appellee to present evidence in support of his claim.
On July 31, 2002, the arbitrator issued a Final Award in appellee's favor on all claims. The arbitrator also reaffirmed and incorporated the factual findings, legal conclusions, and remedies of the interim awards into the Final Award.
The arbitrator found that appellant breached the Agreement by:
(1) directly contacting [appellee] and threatening to make embarrassing statements about him to third parties; (2) filing suit against [appellee] (Stasz II) instead of pursuing her claims through arbitration; (3) making allegations in the Stasz II complaint that violated the confidentiality provisions of the agreement and that were unnecessary to plead her causes of action; (4) sending a letter to the [appellee's] firm on December 21, 2001, that contained inaccurate and disparaging assertions about [appellee]; and (5) filing another suit related to the agreement (Stasz III) in which she made unnecessary, disparaging remarks about [appellee], the [appellee's] firm, and some of the firm's officers.
The Arbitrator finds that [appellant] knew clearly from the Arbitrator's prior interim awards that the various statements in the complaint and opposition . . . were unnecessary, improper, violative of the parties' Agreement and the Arbitrator's orders, and were undertaken with specific intent to injure [appellee] emotionally, embarrass him at his place of work, and undermine the value to [appellee] of the Agreement into which she had entered. . . .
41. [Appellee] has been embarrassed before his colleagues at work, one of whom is a lifelong personal friend. He provided evidence that he has suffered personal humiliation, emotional anguish and anxiety in his personal and professional life, with accompanying sleeplessness and occasional bouts of nausea. . . .
43. The Arbitrator's First Interim Remedies Award denied damages for willfulness and deterrence without prejudice to proof of further violations. The Arbitrator found the willful violations shown in [appellee's] second application to support $250,000 in recognition of the willful and repetitive nature of [appellant's] intentional and tortious acts, and to deter her from any further violations. The deterrent effect of this award apparently was not sufficient. [Appellant] has continued - in fact, has escalated - conduct that since the entry of the Interim Restraining Order can only be considered intentionally tortious, and malicious and oppressive within the meaning [of] California Civil Code Section 3294(c). Upon [appellee's] motion, the Arbitrator awards an additional $350,000 for the most recent violations in recognition of the recalcitrantly malicious, oppressive, willful and repetitive nature of [appellant's] violations, and to deter her more forcefully from any further violations.
The Final Award also excused appellee from making any further payments to appellant under the Agreement and imposed an injunction enforcing the Agreement's noncontact and confidentiality provisions against appellant.
The damages awarded to appellee totaled approximately $1.5 million.
After the Final Award was issued, appellant and appellee returned to state court in Stasz II, which had been stayed pending the arbitration of appellant's claims. Appellee moved to confirm the Final Award, and appellant moved to vacate the Final Award.
On September 30, 2002, the state court confirmed the Final Award in its entirety and entered judgment against appellant. Appellant appealed.
Appellant appealed portions of Stasz III and Stasz II. The Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal consolidated the three appeals.
On August 5, 2004, the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the state court that confirmed the Final Award. The California Supreme Court denied review on November 17, 2004.
Appellant filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy case on October 13, 2005.
On February 3, 2006, appellee filed an adversary proceeding against appellant to except the confirmed Final Award from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
Appellee made, and the bankruptcy court granted, a Motion for Summary Judgment (" MSJ") in the adversary proceeding based upon the confirmed Final Award. The bankruptcy court concluded that the issues litigated before the arbitrator and the state court were done so in an adjudicatory manner, and that the " detailed findings of the judicially confirmed Arbitration Award conclusively and preclusively establish that the monetary relief awarded in favor of [appellee] . . . is based on [appellant's] willful and malicious injury to [appellee] within the meaning" of § 523(a)(6).
The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of appellee excepting from discharge $1,984,778.18 in damages (plus judgment interest) established in the judicially confirmed Final Award.
The court also concluded that the non-monetary obligations under the Agreement and the permanent injunction issued by the Superior Court did not give rise to a " claim" by appellant within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 105(5), and thus the enforceability of those obligations were not affected by any discharge appellant may have received.
This timely appeal ensued.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1334. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
ISSUE
Whether the judicially confirmed arbitration award was eligible for issue preclusive effect under California law so as to be applied in a bankruptcy nondischargeability action to establish willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review summary judgment de novo to assess whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Khaligh v. Hadaegh (In re Khaligh), 338 B.R. 817, 823 (9th Cir. BAP 2006).
We review rulings regarding rules of res judicata, including issue and claim preclusion, de novo as mixed questions of law and fact in which legal questions predominate. Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1988); Alary Corp. v. Sims (In re Assoc. Vintage Group, Inc.), 283 B.R. 549, 554 (9th Cir. BAP 2002); Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 823. Once it is determined that preclusion doctrines are available to be applied, the actual decision to apply them is left to the trial court's discretion. Robi, 838 F.2d at 321; George v. City of Morro Bay (In re George), 318 B.R. 729, 733 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff'd, 144 Fed.Appx. 636 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1094, 126 S.Ct. 1068, 163 L.Ed.2d 861 (2006); Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 823. When state preclusion law controls, such discretion is exercised in accordance with state law. Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
The question is whether, as a matter of California law, a California court would be permitted to give issue preclusive effect to the confirmed arbitration award that was entered as between the parties. If so, then the bankruptcy court was also entitled to give issue preclusive effect. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 287, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984); Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001); Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 824.
California law prescribes that a confirmed arbitration award has the status of a judgment in a civil action. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1287.4; Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 826.
Under California preclusion law, there are six elements that must be satisfied before issue preclusion will be applied in the context of mutuality. Lucido v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225-27 (Cal. 1990); Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 825. The first five " threshold" elements are: (1) identical issue; (2) actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3) necessarily decided in the former proceeding; (4) former decision final and on the merits; and (5) party against whom preclusion sought either the same, or in privity with, party in former proceeding. Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 824. The sixth element is an additional inquiry into whether it would be fair and consistent with sound public policy to impose issue preclusion in the particular setting. Id. at 824-25.
Under the sixth element, when applying issue preclusion based on a confirmed arbitration award, the court must examine " whether the underlying arbitration followed basic elements of adjudicatory procedure and was, thus, 'adjudicatory in nature.'" Id. at 828 quoting Kelly v. Vons Cos., 67 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1336, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 763 (1998).
Whether an underlying arbitration is " adjudicatory in nature" and thus eligible for preclusion depends, in California courts, on whether the proceeding entailed the " essential elements of adjudication" as outlined by Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83. Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 828-30. Those essential elements include:
(a) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the adjudication, as stated in § 2;
(b) The right on behalf of a party to present evidence and legal argument in support of the party's contentions and fair opportunity to rebut evidence and argument by opposing parties;
(c) A formulation of issues of law and fact in terms of the application of rules with respect to specified parties concerning a specific transaction, situation, or status, or a specific series thereof;
(d) A rule of finality, specifying a point in the proceeding when presentations are terminated and a final decision is rendered; and
(e) Such other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in question, having regard for the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, the urgency with which the matter must be resolved, and the opportunity of the parties to obtain evidence and formulate legal contentions.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(2); Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 830.
Appellant's opening brief sets forth several arguments why the underlying arbitration was not adjudicatory in nature. She first argues that the arbitrator, who was a seasoned California Superior Court judge, was chosen by the AAA on an emergency basis and not by the parties as required by their Agreement.
Our review of the arbitration provision in the Agreement does not reveal a requirement that the parties agree to a mutually acceptable arbitrator. The arbitrator was designated pursuant to AAA rules. Furthermore, had the chosen arbitrator exceeded his authority when he presided over the Motion for Judgment and thereafter entered his Final Award, the state court was authorized to vacate the Final Award. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a)(4); Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 826.
The state court order confirming the Final Award in its entirety was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. It follows that the validity of the arbitration, including the status of the arbitrator, was necessarily approved and does not affect the adjudicatory nature of the arbitration.
Appellant also argues that she did not participate in the final arbitration hearing because of her contention that the arbitration was stayed pending resolution of Stasz I (whether the arbitrator provision was unconscionable and should be removed from their Agreement). When appellant voluntarily chose not to participate in arbitration, and she refused to pay her share of the arbitration fee, appellee paid the arbitration fee in total and proceeded without her.
Appellant does not dispute that she had adequate notice of all the arbitration hearings and she admits that she voluntarily chose not to participate or to submit evidence on her behalf. Further, the arbitrator expressly found that appellant had actively participated at various stages of the arbitration and subsequent judicial proceedings.
In the Final Award, the arbitrator expressly noted that despite being duly notified of the hearing, the appellant voluntarily chose not to appear and not to submit evidence or argument on her behalf. Faced with appellant's deliberate absence, the arbitrator invoked AAA Rule R-31, which provides:
Arbitration in the Absence of a Party or Representative. Unless the law provides to the contrary, the arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party or representative who, after due notice, fails to be present or fails to obtain a postponement. An award shall not be made solely on the default of a party. The arbitrator shall require the party who is present to submit such evidence as the arbitrator may require for the making of an award.
In its Final Award, the arbitrator expressly found that " no aspect of this Final Award has been entered solely on the basis of [appellant's] failure to appear or submit evidence." Id.
Because the appellant was adequately notified, her voluntary absence does not dictate a finding that the arbitration was not " adjudicatory in nature." See Papadakis v. Zelis (In re Zelis), 66 F.3d 205, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1995) (debtor's voluntary decision not to appear at various hearings or file any opposition does not preclude a finding that an issue was litigated.)
Further, appellant's contention that the arbitration proceeding was stayed pending her appeal of Stasz I was rejected by the arbitrator and by the Los Angeles Superior Court three times.
The arbitration was not stayed pending the appeal and appellant's voluntary choice not to appear does not vitiate the adjudicatory nature of the arbitration.
As noted, the record reveals that the arbitrator was a retired California Superior Court judge who, by definition, had extensive knowledge and dealings with the adjudicatory process. All parties were adequately notified of all hearings, including the final hearing. Appellee appeared through his counsel, and appellant voluntarily chose not to appear or to present evidence in opposition. The Final Award is a twenty-six page reasoned decision that reaffirms and incorporates the factual findings, legal conclusions, and remedies from the three interim awards.
The Final Award reflects that the arbitrator reviewed the entire record of all proceedings before him, which included evidence and written statements from appellant during the two-year course of the proceedings. The arbitrator explained, in detail, the facts and evidence before him and concluded that the appellant engaged in conduct that was " intentionally tortious, and malicious and oppressive[.]"
Therefore, the arbitration process satisfies the essential elements of adjudication and was conducted in an inherently adjudicatory fashion. See Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 830.
Having concluded that the sixth element regarding adjudicatory process was satisfied, we turn to whether the five " threshold" requirements of issue preclusion were satisfied. Because appellee brought a nondischargeability action under § 523(a)(6) in the bankruptcy court, the issues litigated in the arbitration would need to equate with " willful and malicious" injury. Id. at 831.
The § 523(a)(6) inquiry involves a two-step analysis. The first step is whether there was a " willful injury." Id. " Willful" injury entails a " deliberate or intentional" injury. Id. Intent is either the " subjective intent of the actor to cause harm or the subjective knowledge of the actor that harm is substantially certain to occur." Id.
The second step is whether the subject conduct was " malicious." Id. To constitute malicious conduct, there must be a (1) wrongful act; (2) done intentionally; (3) which necessarily causes injury; and (4) without just cause and excuse. Id.
In all three interim awards and in the Final Award (which incorporated the interim awards), the arbitrator specifically found the appellant's conduct to be intentionally tortious and malicious. The arbitrator also found that appellant's conduct was deliberate and " undertaken with specific intent to injure [appellee] emotionally, embarrass him at his place of work, and undermine the value to [appellee] of the Agreement into which she had entered."
The arbitrator also awarded a total of $600,000 in punitive damages to appellee " in recognition of the recalcitrantly malicious, oppressive, willful and repetitive nature of [appellant's] violations" and to deter her from further violations.
Thus, the issue of whether appellant's conduct was willful and malicious was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the arbitration. The Final Award was made on the merits of the case and was not based on appellant's default. The Final Award was confirmed over appellant's objection by the Superior Court, and affirmed on appeal by the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. And finally, both proceedings (the arbitration and the adversary proceeding) involve the same parties. Thus, all five " threshold" elements are satisfied.
The bankruptcy court did not err when it concluded issue preclusion was available to establish willful and malicious injury for purposes of § 523(a)(6). Further, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it chose to impose issue preclusion as a basis for summary judgment without relitigating the issue of willful and malicious injury. See Khaligh, 338 B.R. at 832.
CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy court did not err when it entered summary judgment in favor of appellee without relitigating the issue of willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). AFFIRMED.
First Interim Award:
$369,553.40
Second Interim Award:
$400,000
Additional damages:
$700,000
Total damages:
$1,469,553.40