Acknowledging that a document cannot be made part of a personnel file simply by placing it in there, the court stated that, because the evaluations and letter were precisely what one would expect to find in a personnel file, they were per se exempt from disclosure. Copley, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 325, citing CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942 (1990). Here, the trial court determined that Copley was binding on it and thus determined that Catalani's employment contract was exempt from disclosure.
In his attempt to extrapolate that principle to his own case, Longmire points to the holdings of Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000), Doe v. Town of Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Mass. 1993), and CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 556 N.E.2d 648 (Ill.App.Ct. 1990). Not only are all three of those decisions from beyond this Circuit, but those actions each arose either in response to conduct by government officials or to statutes or regulations requiring the disclosure of information.
See Braun v. City of Taft, 154 Cal.App.3d 332, 341-43, 201 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658-59 (Ct. App. 1984) (statute does not create all or nothing policy for records in personnel files); Denver Publishing Co. v. University of Colorado, 812 P.2d 682, 684-85 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (records in personnel files which did not implicate a privacy right or which contained information routinely disclosed to others not covered by exemption); CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 556 N.E.2d 648, 651 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (to allow information to be exempt from disclosure "simply because it is in a personnel file would permit a subversion of the broad purposes of the Act"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Board, 446 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 (Mass. 1983) (only personal information found in personnel files covered by the exemption); The Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d 1144, 1147 (R.I. 1982) (nonconfidential information is not exempt from disclosure simply because it is stored in personnel files).
This court has held that public employees have a reasonable expectation that their racial identification will remain private. CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill.App.3d 936, 945 (1990). Elmore offers no contrary argument that is supported by case law.
In another case considering whether personnel files automatically provided an asylum for public records, we quoted from a decision by the First District: "`To hold that all information contained in a personnel file is exempt from public disclosure simply because it is in a personnel file would permit a subversion of the broad purposes of the [Act].'" Reppert, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 507, 874 N.E.2d at 909, quoting CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942, 556 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1990). In Reppert, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 503, 874 N.E.2d at 906, the plaintiff's sued Southern Illinois University and its chancellor to compel them to comply with the plaintiffs' request for copies of employment contracts of several university employees.
Contrary to defendants' suggestion, the mere fact that personnel files are per se exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b)(ii) does not mean that the individual contracts are also per se exempt simply because they are kept in those files. See CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942, 556 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1990) ("To hold that all information contained in a personnel file is exempt from public disclosure simply because it is in a personnel file would permit a subversion of the broad purposes of the [FOIA]"). In that regard, we note that section 8 of the FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/8 (West 2004)) explicitly permits the disclosure of nonexempt documents (such as the employment contracts here) that are contained within exempt public records (such as personnel files).
The documents listed in section 10 are still properly part of a personnel file and thus are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. A document cannot be made part of a personnel file simply by placing it there. CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942 (1990). In this case, however, the requested documents are precisely what one would expect to find in a personnel file and are thus per se exempt from disclosure.
Moreover, monitoring a government body's actions without evidence of any wrongdoing by it serves little public interest as government bodies are presumed to act lawfully. See CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 948 (1990). Public interest based upon a requester's allegation of improper conduct is "insubstantial" unless there is at least some evidentiary support that the public body has acted improperly.
The county points out that plaintiffs offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that the county used the money for anything other than its constitutionally mandated purposes. See CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App.3d 936, 948, 556 N.E.2d 648 (1990) (public officials are presumed to act in accordance with the law). So, the county argues, the county did not retain the $3 charge, but used it to partially discharge the county's funding responsibility to the circuit court.
In determining whether disclosure is required under Margolis, we apply the following four-pronged test, which balances (1) the plaintiff's interest in disclosure; (2) the public interest in disclosure; (3) the degree of invasion of personal privacy; and (4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested information. Margolis, 180 Ill. App.3d at 1089-90, citing Minnis v. United States Department of Agriculture, 737 F.2d 784, 786 (1984) (applying federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. ยง 552 (1988 Supp. V 1993)); see also CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App.3d 936, 947, 556 N.E.2d 648 (1990). As stated above, the plaintiff desires the information to enable it, through surveys and other home mailings, to involve parents of District students in the collective bargaining process and to inform them in the eventuality of labor strikes.