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finding "substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner's finding that the events . . . should not be characterized as 'sudden'" where the claimaint developed a renewed fear of heights after moving from a first-floor office to a fifth-floor office
Summary of this case from Dubinovic v. Des Moines Pub. Sch.Opinion
No. 2-788 / 01-0594
Filed October 30, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
Julie Cavanaugh appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision. AFFIRMED.
Julie Cavanaugh, West Des Moines, for appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Charles Lavorato, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Julie Cavanaugh appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision. Cavanaugh contends (1) the Dunlavey legal causation standard is inapplicable to the facts of this case, and (2) that the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding she was exposed to extraordinary stressors in the workplace. We affirm.
Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire Cas. Co, 526 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1995).
Background Facts and Proceedings. Julie Cavanaugh was employed by the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) as a child support recovery worker from 1976 to 1981. In 1981 Cavanaugh was promoted to regional supervisor for the central region of the Child Support Recovery Unit, and she remained in that position until July 1994, when she was demoted to a nonsupervisory position. In January 1994, prior to her demotion, Cavanaugh sustained a nonwork-related neck injury and underwent treatment.
In 1994 the state government underwent reorganization requiring state agencies to reduce their supervisory personnel. As a result, Cavanaugh was demoted to a nonsupervisory position, and she was required to transfer the physical location of her office to the fifth floor of the Hoover State Office Building. She expressed concern to James Hennessy, her supervisor, about the location of her office, as she was afraid of heights. Further, Cavanaugh indicated to Hennessy her preference in remaining at her original workstation on the first floor. Hennessy requested that she provide a medical verification regarding her fear of heights and her need for an accommodation. Cavanaugh was unable to do so because it had been awhile since she had the problem. Shortly before July 4, 1994, Cavanaugh spoke with Hennessy about having an office away from the window. During this conversation, Cavanaugh also told Hennessy about her desire to apply for long-term disability benefits due to her back problems. They discussed the procedure for applying for long-term disability benefits.
On July 5, 1994, Cavanaugh reported to work on the fifth floor of the Hoover Building. While at work she experienced increasing fear and anxiety to the extent that she felt she had to leave work. Cavanaugh was on leave between July 1994 and May 1995. During Cavanaugh's absence, Hennessy spoke with her counselor, Dr. Judith Reinhardt, regarding whether she could return to work and perform the essential functions of her job. Dr. Reinhardt responded by providing restrictions including a transfer out of the Child Support Recovery Unit. Given those restrictions, it appeared Cavanaugh could not perform the essential functions of her job. Cavanaugh never returned to work and eventually received long-term disability benefits.
In May 1995 Cavanaugh filed a workers' compensation claim contending the mental injury she suffered on July 5, 1994, arose out of and in the course of employment. The deputy commissioner entered a decision denying benefits. She appealed. On October 27, 1999, the commissioner affirmed the arbitration decision. Cavanaugh filed a petition for judicial review challenging the commissioner's decision. On March 14, 2001, the Polk County District Court entered a ruling affirming the commissioner's decision and holding that Cavanaugh failed to prove "legal causation by showing she was subjected to work-related stressors of a greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stressors that workers employed in the same or similar jobs, experience routinely regardless of their employer". Cavanaugh appeals.
Standard of Review. Our review is governed by Iowa Code chapter 17A (1997), Iowa's Administrative Procedure Act. Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 286-87 (Iowa 2001). An appeal of a district court's ruling on judicial review of an agency decision "is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its section 17A.19(8) judicial review function." Ahrendsen ex rel. Ahrendsen v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 613 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2000). Section 17A.19 permits a reviewing court to reverse an agency decision when it is "[i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions," or when it is "unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 17A.19(8) (1997).
Our review is for correction of errors of law, not de novo. Gilbert v. USF Holland, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2001). We broadly and liberally construe the commissioner's findings to uphold, rather than defeat the commissioner's decision. Second Injury Fund v. Hodgins, 461 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Iowa 1990). "We must examine whether the commissioner's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when the record is viewed as a whole." Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994). The commissioner's factual findings are binding on us if they are supported by substantial evidence. See IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). "Thus, we `are not free to interfere with [an] agency finding where there is a conflict in the evidence or when reasonable minds might disagree about the inference to be drawn from the evidence, whether disputed or not.'" Gilbert, 637 N.W.2d at 198(quoting Stephenson v. Furnas Elec. Co., 522 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1994)). On the other hand, we are not bound by findings that lack substantial evidence. Id. Legal Causation. Cavanaugh contends the Dunlavey legal causation standard for unusual workplace stress is inapplicable to this case since the stimulus that caused Cavanaugh's mental injury was the result of a "sudden" or "traumatic" event. In February 2002 the Iowa Supreme Court decided this issue in Brown v. Quick Trip Corp., 641 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa 2002), holding "when a claim is based on a manifest happening of a sudden traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain, the legal-causation test is met irrespective of the absence of similar stress on other employees." Brown, 641 N.W.2d at 729; Tocco v. City of Great Falls, 714 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Mont. 1986). We find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner's finding that the events of July 5, 1994 should not be characterized as "sudden" given the fact Cavanaugh knew about her transfer well before July 5, 1994. Consequently, the Brown standard is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Thus, the appropriate test under the circumstances of this case is whether the stress is greater than that of other workers employed in the same or similar situation. See Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 1995). It is clear to this court that Cavanaugh did not suffer from stress greater than that of other workers employed in the same or similar job. In fact, she failed to present any evidence that she was subjected to extraordinary stressors. The commissioner correctly pointed out:
Most certainly, all employees in today's workplace face the problems which arise from downsizing initiatives in both the public and private sector. Also, most certainly, all employees face the prospect of being assigned to different work locations and to multilevel work facilities above ground level. Cavanaugh's problems on July 5, 1994, arose solely from her preexisting mental frailty and mental problems.
Accordingly, we find substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole, to support the commissioner's conclusions.