Cauthen v. State

8 Citing cases

  1. Jones v. State

    403 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    Defendant argues that it was reversible error to instruct the jury on the various methods in which the offense of trafficking in cocaine could be committed without giving them remedial instructions, limiting the jury's consideration to the particular manner in which trafficking in cocaine was alleged in the indictment. See Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 567 (4) ( 340 S.E.2d 199). The State contends the defendant waived exception to the recharge by suggesting that the trial court "read the trafficking charge again." Defendant waived exception to the trial court's recharge of the pertinent provisions of OCGA § 16-13-31 (a) (1) by suggesting that the trial court "read the trafficking charge . . ."

  2. Green v. State

    260 Ga. 625 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 61 times
    In Green, we rejected the probationer's argument that the State's use of his urine sample as evidence against him had violated his Paragraph XVI right against compelled self-incrimination.

    The Court of Appeals has consistently ruled that evidence of cocaine metabolites in an individual's urine is "direct positive evidence" that the individual ingested cocaine at sometime in the immediate past before the urine sample was given, and had therefore possessed the cocaine he subsequently ingested. Sparks v. State, 195 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 394 S.E.2d 407) (1990); Buffington v. State, 190 Ga. App. 365 ( 378 S.E.2d 884) (1989); Bentley v. State, 183 Ga. App. 112 ( 358 S.E.2d 274) (1987); Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565 ( 340 S.E.2d 199) (1986); Stevens v. State, 165 Ga. App. 814 ( 302 S.E.2d 724) (1983). We perceive the nature of such evidence differently.

  3. Hunt v. State

    582 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 3 times

    As several witnesses on the scene testified that Hunt was in the driver's seat of the vehicle immediately after the accident, the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Hunt was the driver at the time of the accident. See Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 566(2) ( 340 S.E.2d 199) (1986), overruled in part on other grounds, Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625 ( 398 S.E.2d 360) (1990); see also Smith v. State, 222 Ga. App. 701, 702(1) ( 475 S.E.2d 715) (1996). Thus, the court did not err in denying Hunt's motion for directed verdict or his motion for new trial, and we affirm his convictions for vehicular homicide and DUI. See OCGA §§ 40-6-393(a) and 40-6-391(a)(5).

  4. Ancrum v. State

    399 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 16 times

    " Reversible error occurs when the court instructs that "an offense may be committed in more than one manner where only one manner is alleged in the indictment and no remedial instructions are given to limit the jury's consideration to that particular manner." Owens v. State, 173 Ga. App. 309, 312 ( 326 S.E.2d 509) (1985); Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 567 ( 340 S.E.2d 199) (1986). Reviewing the court's charge in its entirety, we find that adequate limiting instructions were given. The court read the indictment to the jury, pointing out that in Count 1 the appellants were charged with trafficking by knowing possession of the cocaine.

  5. Langham v. State

    395 S.E.2d 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 17 times

    ]" (Emphasis supplied.) Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 567 (4) ( 340 S.E.2d 199) (1986). Any error in the reference to OCGA § 16-13-31 (a) (1) in its entirety was cured when the trial court subsequently instructed the jury that it would be authorized to convict appellants only upon a finding of actual possession, sole or joint, or as a party to the crime of actual possession.

  6. Thompson v. State

    392 S.E.2d 732 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 7 times

    We need not address appellant's equal access arguments since "[t]he presence of [amphetamine] in a defendant's bodily fluids is considered to be direct positive evidence of possession of [amphetamine]. [Cit.]" Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 199) (1986). Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to authorize any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of amphetamine.

  7. Buffington v. State

    190 Ga. App. 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 8 times

    [Cit.]" Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 340 S.E.2d 199) (1986). See also Bentley v. State, 183 Ga. App. 112, 113 (3) ( 358 S.E.2d 274) (1987).

  8. Sidwell v. State

    363 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 5 times

    `However, it is reversible error to instruct the jury that an offense may be committed in more than one manner where only one manner is alleged in the indictment and no remedial instructions are given to limit the jury's consideration to that particular manner.' (Cits.)" Cauthen v. State, 177 Ga. App. 565, 567 (4) ( 340 S.E.2d 199) (1986). After instructing the jurors on the general provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), supra, the trial court specifically charged them that the only offenses of which the appellant could be found guilty were selling LSD or, as a lesser included offense, possessing LSD. By its verdict, the jury demonstrated that it had not been misled or confused by the court's prior instructions setting forth other types of conduct prohibited by the Act.