Opinion
CIVIL ACTION, No: 01-3577, SECTION: "J" (2)
December 2, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Objection to Magistrate's Order of October 24, 2002 Under Rule 72(A) and 74.1E (Rec. Doc. 30) which was set for a November 20, 2002 hearing. Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Wilkinson's denial of her request for an imposition of an "inference of fault" against Defendants under the "doctrine of spoliation." Plaintiff also objects to Magistrate-Judge Wilkinson's denial of her request for attorney's fees and expenses.
Plaintiff's motion objects to Magistrate Judge Wilkinson's October 23, 2002 minute entry (Rec. Doc. 28). In his minute entry, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production (Rec. Doc. 23).
The district court applies a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing a magistrate judge's ruling on a non-dispositive, pretrial motion, such as a discovery motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1995). The imposition of an "inference of fault" under the "doctrine of spoliation" is predicated on bad faith conduct by the defendant. Caparotta v. Entergy Corp., 168 F.3d 754, 756 (5th Cir. 1999). A defendant's mere negligence is insufficient. Vick v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975). A plaintiff must establish that the defendant intentionally destroyed the evidence sought for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of its use. Burge v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, 2000 WL 815879, at *3 (E.D. La. 2000). The destroying party must have been on notice of the evidence's relevance to potential liability, "and thus subject to a duty to preserve such evidence." Anderson v. Prod. Mgmt. Corp., 2000 WL 492095, at *4 (E.D. La. 2000).
In the instant case, Plaintiff makes no attempt to establish an intentional destruction of evidence on the part of Defendants. Plaintiff submitted no evidence of bad faith or intentional conduct by Defendants. Plaintiff attempts to rely merely on an unsupported assertion that Caprock failed to preserve evidence that it knew or should have known would be relevant to the instant litigation. A mere factual assertion is insufficient to justify the imposition of an "inference of fault." As a result, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson's denial of Plaintiff's request for such an imposition was not clearly erroneous. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Wilkinson's denial of Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees was also not clearly erroneous because he granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's motion to compel production.
Therefore;
It is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Objection to Magistrate's Order Under Rule 72(A) and 74.1E (Rec. Doc. 30) is DENIED.