The court held that venue was proper in the Western District of Missouri because violating a Western District of Missouri Court order rendered venue proper here even though the violations happened elsewhere. Id; see Catipovic v. Turley, No. C 11-3074-MWB, 2012 WL 2089552, at *15 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012) ("The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that matters of importance to the plaintiff's suit, such as conduct of the parties or a court order on which the claim is based, are a "substantial part" of the events giving rise to the plaintiff's claims.") (emphasis added); see also Advanced Logistics Consulting, Inc. v. C. Enyeart LLC, No. 09-720 (RHK/JJG), 2009 WL 1684428, at *4 (D. Minn. June 16, 2009) (citing Setco in holding that venue could be proper even though Defendant's allegedly harmful actions took place elsewhere). Here, Plaintiff cites Steen to support her argument that the Southern District of Florida is not a proper venue under § 1392(b)(2) because Defendant's allegedly harmful actions did not occur in the Southern District of Florida.
Accordingly, venue in this district is not proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; see also Setco Enters. Corp. v. Robbins, 19 F.3d 1278, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e ask whether the district the plaintiff chose had a substantial connection to the claim, whether or not other forums had greater contacts."); Catipovic v. Turley, 2012 WL 2089552, at *17-18 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (finding that to conduct the substantial contact inquiry, the court must: (1) consider the nature of plaintiffs' claims and the acts or omissions underlying those claims; and (2) determine whether substantial events or omissions material to those claims occurred in this district). The plaintiff is currently incarcerated in Minnesota.
In considering a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue, the court is permitted to consider evidence outside the pleadings. Weimer v. Gen. Motors LLC , No. 4:16-CV-02023, 2017 WL 3458370, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2017) ; Cooper v. Dep't of Army , No. 4:13CV3086, 2013 WL 6631618, at *1 n.1 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2013) ; Catipovic v. Turley , No. C 11-3074, 2012 WL 2089552, at *16 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012) (collecting cases).Plaintiff alleges she required certain health care services and treatment beginning in December 2015, and such services were provided in Lancaster and Saunders County, Nebraska. (Filing No. 11, Amended Complaint ¶ 3.)
A defendant's "mere denial" of the plaintiff's allegations has no bearing on the Court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Catipovic v. Turley, No. C 11-3074-MWB, 2012 WL 2089552, at *24 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012). In its motion, defendant largely categorizes plaintiffs' factual allegations as conclusory in nature and asserts that the homeowners insurance policy does not cover the complained-of event.
A defendant's "mere denial" of the plaintiff's allegations has no bearing on the Court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Catipovic v. Turley, 2012 WL 2089552 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012). The Court has reviewed Croker's motion to dismiss and the motion consists only of Croker's denial of plaintiff's allegations.
This is, indeed, the third time that Turley has challenged this court's personal jurisdiction over him. On June 8, 2012, I entered a Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding Defendants' Motions To Dismiss (docket no. 25), Catipovic v. Turley, 2012 WL 2089552 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012) (slip op.), in which I denied Turley's April 23, 2012, Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (docket no. 16), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that decision, I explained, inter alia, that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists, which is accomplished by pleading sufficient facts "to support a reasonable inference that the defendant[ ] can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state," K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591-92 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and that, "[w]here, as here, the district court does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and affidavits, . . . the court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of that party.
Thus, summary judgment on the issue of personal jurisdiction is not appropriate in this case. On June 8, 2012, I entered a Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding Defendants' Motions To Dismiss (docket no. 25), Catipovic v. Turley, 2012 WL 2089552 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012) (slip op.), in which I denied Turley's April 23, 2012, Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (docket no. 16), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that decision, I explained, inter alia, that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists, which is accomplished by pleading sufficient facts "to support a reasonable inference that the defendant[ ] can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state," K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 591-92 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and that, "[w]here, as here, the district court does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and affidavits, . . . the court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of that party.
" (citations omitted)). See also Murphy v. Schneider National, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 2004); Catipovic v. Turley, No. C 11-3074-MWB, 2012 WL 2089552, at *16 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012). Cooper is a civilian employee of the United States Army (the Army). (Def.'s Br., Statement of Facts ¶ 6, ECF No. 18.) The Secretary of the Army is John M. McHugh, (id. ¶ 2), and although the Army is engaged in operations worldwide, its principal place of business is located at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, (id. ¶¶ 3-4).
To conduct this inquiry, the Court must: (1) consider the nature of Plaintiffs' claims and the acts or omissions underlying those claims; and (2) determine whether substantial events or omissions material to those claims occurred in this District. Id. (citing Catipovic v. Turley, 2012 WL 2089552, at *17-18, (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2012)). Under controlling Eighth Circuit case law, in deciding whether a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a plaintiff's claims occurred in this District, the Court focuses only on the defendants' alleged wrongful activities.
To conduct this inquiry, the Court must: (1) consider the nature of Plaintiffs' claims and the acts or omissions underlying those claims; and (2) determine whether substantial events or omissions material to those claims occurred in this District. See Catipovic v. Turley, No. C 11–3074, 2012 WL 2089552, at *17–18, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79824, at *52–55 (N.D.Iowa June 8, 2012). Under controlling Eighth Circuit case law, in deciding whether a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this District, the Court must focus only on Defendants' alleged wrongful activities. See Woodke v. Dahm, 70 F.3d 983, 985–86 (8th Cir.1995); Catipovic, 2012 WL 2089552, at *17–18, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79824, at *52–53 (citing Woodke, 70 F.3d at 985).